Articles Posted in Breach of Contract

January 9, 2015

High Court Will Decide Whether to Overrule Brulotte Doctrine

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Washington, D.C. – The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case asking whether its decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), that a licensee’s obligations are absolved after the expiration of a patent, should be overruled. Kimble v. Marvel Ent. Inc., U.S., No. 13-720.

Ninth Circuit Decision

In this case, Kimble held a patent on a glove that allows its wearer to shoot pressurized foam string from the palm, mimicking a gesture of the comic-book hero “Spider-Man.” (Patent No. 5,072,856). Kimble met with Marvel’s predecessor to discuss his glove invention, which was then covered by his pending patent application. When Marvel began manufacturing a similar toy called the “Web Blaster,” Kimble sued in 1997 for patent infringement and for breach of contract based on an alleged oral agreement to compensate him for any use of his ideas.

November 26, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: Hoosier Momma Sues Founding Member Erin Edds

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Indiana trademark attorneys for Hoosier Momma, LLC (“Hoosier Momma”) of Brownsburg, Indiana sued Erin Edds (“Edds”) of Marion County, Indiana in the Southern District of Indiana. In this Indiana litigation, Hoosier Momma accuses Edds of violations of the federal Lanham Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Indiana’s Uniform Trade Secret Act, as well as computer tampering, misappropriation and attempted misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with business relationships, and conversion. Among its allegations, Hoosier Momma contends that Edds tarnished its “Hoosier Momma” trademark as well as its “Betty Design” trademark, U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 4584165 and 4584167, which have been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

In 2010, Kimberly Cranfill (“Cranfill”), Catherine Hill and Edds formed Hoosier Momma. They are the sole members of Hoosier Momma, which is in the business of developing and selling vegan, gluten-free products that are sold in more than 600 restaurants, stores and hotels in at least six states.

Hoosier Momma alleges multiple wrongs by Edds, including making damaging false statements, engaging in conduct that conduct negatively affects Hoosier Momma’s reputation and sales of its products, tarnishing its trademarks, and changing passwords to Hoosier Momma’s social media accounts without authorization, refusing to relinquish control of the accounts and continuing to post to those accounts.

Edds is also accused of accessing Cranfill’s e-mail account to obtain confidential information as well as sharing confidential information with Wilks & Wilson, a competitor of Hoosier Momma. Hoosier Momma also contends that Edds contacted Tone Products, Inc. (“Tone,”) a direct competitor of Hoosier Momma’s packer, and asked that Tone reverse engineer a Hoosier Momma product to allow Tone to determine the confidential recipe of such product, a trade secret of Hoosier Momma, and provide it to Edds for her personal use and/or a use that jeopardized the disclosure of Hoosier Momma’s trade secrets. Hoosier Momma also claims that Edds improperly contacted several of Hoosier Momma’s distributors, clients, manufacturers and other business partners.

Further, Edds allegedly attempted to sell her interest in Hoosier Momma without the consent purportedly required under the Hoosier Momma operating agreement. Finally, Hoosier Momma contends that Edds sold and traded Hoosier Momma product and improperly retained the proceeds.

In its Indiana trademark complaint, filed by trademark lawyers for Hoosier Momma, the following is claimed:

Count I: Violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq.
Count II: Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq.
Count III: Computer Tampering
Count IV: Misappropriation and Attempted Misappropriation of Trade Secrets and Violation of Indiana Uniform Trade Secret Act
Count V: Breach of Contract
Count VI: Breach of Fiduciary Duties
Count VII: Tortious Interference with Business Relationships
Count VIII: Conversion
Count XI [sic]: Unjust Enrichment

Hoosier Momma asks for injunctive relief; compensatory and exemplary damages; costs; expenses; and attorneys’ fees.

November 14, 2014

Indiana Trade Secret Law: Court Rules on Enforceability of Trade Secret Agreements

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Pennsylvania trade secret attorneys, in conjunction with Indiana co-counsel, for Distributor Service, Incorporated (“DSI”) of Pennsylvania sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Rusty J. Stevenson (“Stevenson”) of Indiana and Rugby IPD Corp. d/b/a Rugby Architectural Building Products (“Rugby”) of New Hampshire violated an agreement containing non-competition, non-solicitation, and non-disclosure provisions. In the instant order, the court ruled on motions for summary judgment filed by DSI and Stevenson.

Plaintiff DSI is a seller and distributor of wholesale specialty building products to businesses in the Middle Atlantic and Midwest regions of the country. It has eight locations in Indiana, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, and Michigan. Defendant Rugby is also in the business of selling and distributing wholesale specialty building products. It does so throughout the United States, including in Indiana, and is a direct competitor of DSI. Stevenson, formerly an employee of DSI, is currently employed by Rugby.

DSI hired Stevenson in October 1999 to be a salesman. When he started, Stevenson had no sales experience in the specialty-building-products industry or any related industry. DSI indicated that it had invested significant time and resources to provide specialized training to Stevenson. In April 2005, DSI promoted Stevenson to the position of sales manager. Later, as part of his employment, Stevenson signed a Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreement with DSI. This agreement contained provisions for Non-Competition/Non-Solicitation and Non-Disclosure of Confidential Information.

During his employment with DSI, Stevenson had access to information that DSI considered to be protectable as intellectual property assets. This information included all of DSI’s “Customer Lists,” “Customer Product Preferences,” “Competitive Pricing,” and “Competitive Cost Structure” for DSI’s Indianapolis branch. DSI asserted that this information was “the cornerstone of DSI’s ability to compete effectively in the specialty building products industry in Indiana,” and that the information “derives economic value from not being generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”

In August 2013, Mr. Stevenson resigned from DSI to take a position as the general manager of Rugby’s Indianapolis branch. Shortly thereafter, DSI sued Rugby and Stevenson seeking, inter alia, damages and injunctive relief. DSI asserted claims for: (1) breach of the Non-Compete Provision; (2) breach of the Non-Solicitation Provision; (3) breach of the Non-Disclosure Provision; (4) recovery of attorneys’ fees and expenses under the Agreement; (5) misappropriation of trade secrets; (6) breach of duty of loyalty, and (7) tortious interference.

In this opinion, District Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment filed by DSI and Stevenson. DSI’s motion was denied in its entirety. Stevenson’s motion for summary judgment was granted as to Count 1, breach of the Non-Compete Provision, and Count 2, breach of the Non-Solicitation Provision. Stevenson’s motion for summary judgment on Count 3, breach of the Non-Disclosure Provision, was denied.

The court began by discussing the standard for upholding the provisions at issue. It is a longstanding principle in Indiana that covenants that restrict a person’s employment opportunities are strongly disfavored as a restraint of trade. To be enforceable, such restraints, such as a noncompetition agreement, must be reasonable. The court noted that it, while in many other contexts reasonableness was a question of fact, the reasonableness of a noncompetition agreement was a question of law and, thus, was capable of evaluation in response to the parties’ motions for summary judgment.

The first hurdle for DSI was to show that the agreement protected a legitimate interest, defined as “an advantage possessed by an employer, the use of which by the employee after the end of the employment relationship would make it unfair to allow the employee to compete with the former employer.” Indiana law provides that goodwill, including “secret or confidential information such as the names and addresses of customers and the advantage acquired through representative contact,” is a legitimate protectable interest. DSI argued that it had a legitimate interest in protecting the customer relationships that Stevenson had developed during his years working for DSI as well as the information embodied in DSI’s Customer Lists, Customer Product Preferences, Competitive Pricing, and Competitive Cost Structure, to which Stevenson had been permitted access. The court agreed that this was a protectable interest.

DSI next had to establish that Non-Compete Provision of the agreement was “reasonable in scope as to the time, activity, and geographic area restricted.” DSI argued that the provision was limited merely to restricting Stevenson from engaging in competitive business activity. The court was not convinced. Instead, it noted that, as drafted, the “competitive business activity” restriction applied to the activities of Stevenson’s new employer, not to Stevenson himself. Thus, because Rugby engaged in business activities that were competitive to DSI, the agreement would de facto prohibit Stevenson from working for Rugby in any capacity, despite that no “in-any-capacity” language was explicitly applied to Stevenson in the agreement. “For example,” the court explained, “[under DSI’s agreement,] Mr. Stevenson could not serve lunch in Rugby’s cafeteria or change light bulbs in Rugby’s offices because Rugby competes with DSI.” The court concluded that, as a result, the Non-Compete Provision was overly broad and unreasonable.

Regarding this provision, DSI also contended that alleging and proving that the employee had been provided with trade secrets could render an otherwise unenforceable non-competition clause enforceable. The court rejected this argument.

The court also granted summary judgment for Stevenson on the Non-Solicitation Provision. This provision attempted to restrict Stevenson’s ability to solicit “any customer or prospective customer of [DSI] with which [Stevenson] communicated while employed by [DSI].” The court found this restriction to be vague as to “prospective customer” as well as overbroad and unreasonable in scope.

Finally, the court declined to rule on the Non-Disclosure Provision on summary judgment. It held that, to evaluate whether this provision had been violated, it would need to determine whether “customer lists” and “the identities of key personnel and the requirements of the customers of [DSI]” were confidential. As the evidence submitted regarding confidentiality was “vague, generalized, and conflicting,” the court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to the Non-Disclosure Provision and, consequently, partial summary judgment in favor of either party was inappropriate on the record before it.

Practice Tip #1: Summary judgment in federal court is guided by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for summary judgment asks the court to find that a trial on a particular issue or issues is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party is entitled to summary judgment only if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party.

Practice Tip 2: In a similar case, decided earlier this year, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the noncompetition agreement binding an ex-employee of the plaintiff was overly broad and, thus, unenforceable.

October 31, 2014

Indiana Patent and Copyright Litigation: Lake Lite Sues Multiple Defendants for Patent and Copyright Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana – A patent and copyright attorney for Lake Lite Inc. of Laotto, Indiana filed a complaint in the Northern District of Indiana asserting, inter alia, that Universal Forest Products, Inc. of Grand Rapids, Michigan (“UFP”); Universal Consumer Products, Inc., also of Grand Rapids, Michigan (“UCP”); and Maine Ornamental, LLC of Greene, Maine infringed “Solar Dock Light” and “Low Profile Solar LED Lamp,” Patent Nos. D697,246 and 8,845,126, which have been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

Lake Lite is in the business of designing and selling dock lights and other related products and accessories in the boating/dock industry. Its product line includes solar-related dock lights.

In April 2012, Lake Lite first began to offer a “Solar Dot” line of products. Lake Lite indicates that UFP inquired about collaborating with Lake Lite to offer the Solar Dot products to UFP’s customers and that, in November 2012, a mutual non-disclosure agreement was entered so that confidential information regarding Lake Lite’s Solar Dot products could be disclosed and the potential collaboration evaluated. The disclosed information included Lake Lite’s copyright applications to now-copyrighted materials, registered as U.S. Copyright Nos. VAu001118627 and VAu001156962.

Lake Lite asserts that, during these negotiations, it made numerous modifications requested by UFP for which it was not compensated. Lake Lite and UFP failed to reach an agreement about licensing terms and discontinued negotiations. Instead, Lake Lite asserts, UFP has now wrongfully begun offering its own “Solar Deck and Dock Lights.”

In this Indiana copyright and patent litigation, Plaintiff Lake Lite’s specific complaints include that Defendants have been unjustly enriched as a result of their manufacture, importing, marketing and sale of their solar deck and dock light products. Lake Lite contends that Defendants’ acts include infringement of Lake Lite’s copyrights and patents, unauthorized use and misappropriation of Lake Lite’s confidential information and trade secrets and violation of the mutual non-disclosure agreement between Lake Lite and UCP.

The complaint, filed by a copyright and patent lawyer for Lake Lite, alleges the following:

• Count One – Copyright Infringement

• Count Two – Infringement of U.S. Patent No. D697,246

• Count Three – Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,845,126

• Count Four – Breach of Contract

• Count Five – Breach of Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

• Count Six – Violation of Indiana Uniform Trade Secret Act

• Count Seven – Unjust Enrichment

Lake Lite asks for a judgment of infringement of its copyrights-in-suit, of infringement of its patents-in-suit, that the non-disclosure agreement was violated by Defendants, that Defendants violated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in their dealings with Lake Lite regarding the Solar Dot products, that Defendants have misappropriated Lake Lite’s trade secrets and that Defendants have been unjustly enriched.

Lake Lite seeks injunctive relief; damages, including punitive damages; costs and fees, including attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip:

Indiana Code Section 24-2-3-2 defines a trade secret as:

information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:

1. derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and

2. is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

The four general characteristics of a trade secret are:

1. it is information;

2. that derives independent economic value;

3. that is not generally known, or readily ascertainable by proper means by others who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and

4. that is the subject of efforts, reasonable under the circumstances, to maintain its secrecy.

October 20, 2014

Indiana Cyberpiracy Litigation: Burns Rent-Alls Sues Aays Rent-All and Michael Sharp

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

South Bend, Indiana – An Indiana intellectual property attorney for Burns Rent-Alls, Inc. of Mishawaka, Indiana filed a cyberpiracy lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that Michael Sharpe and Aays Rent-All Co., Inc., also of Mishawaka, Indiana, had wrongfully registered and used domain names that would result in confusion with the “BURNS RENT-ALLS” common-law trademark.

Burns Rent-Alls is a fifth-generation family-owned firm that has been in business for over 100 years. It offers goods and services throughout northern Indiana and southwest Michigan under the BURNS RENT-ALLS brand including equipment rentals, convention services, event rentals, portable toilet rentals, costume rentals, and tent and canopy rentals.

Aays Rent-All is, according to Plaintiff, in a similar business and provides rentals throughout northern Indiana and southwest Michigan, including equipment rentals, convention services, event rentals, and tent and canopy rentals.

Burns Rent-Alls claims that, by virtue of its “longstanding and continuous use” of the BURNS RENT-ALLS mark, it owns common law trademark rights to that mark for use in connection with Burns Rent-Alls’ goods and services.

Aays Rent-All and Sharpe are accused of registering and using domain names that are confusingly similar to Burns Rent-Alls’ Mark, with a bad-faith intent to profit from their use and registration of those domain names. At issue are: (i) burnspartyrentall.com; (ii) burnspartyrental.com; and (iii) burnsrentall.com. Plaintiff contends that Defendants are using these names to redirect Internet traffic intended for the Burns Rent-Alls’ website to Aays Rent-All’s website. This use, Plaintiff asserts, is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive consumers into believing that there is an association between Aays Rent-All and Burns Rent-Alls.

Plaintiff also states that it agreed to pay, and did pay, $100 to purchase the burnsrentall.com domain name but that Defendants did not transfer the domain name as allegedly agreed.

In its complaint, Indiana intellectual property counsel for Burns Rent-Alls alleges the following:

Count I: Unfair Competition
Count II: Cyberpiracy
Count III: Breach of Contract

Burns Rent-Alls requests injunctive relief, including the transfer of the domain names at issue; damages, including treble damages; and costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip:

Plaintiff indicates that it attempted to obtain an agreement from Defendants regarding at least one of the domain names at issue prior to filing this lawsuit. Plaintiff contends that, despite this effort, Defendants continued to use the allegedly infringing website names. This lawsuit for unfair competition, cyberpiracy and breach of contract followed.

Another approach available to a plaintiff in such a situation is to seek a transfer of the domain names under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (“UDRP”). This policy was established to resolve “The Trademark Dilemma” inherent in the largely unpoliced sales of domain names — the registration of a trademark without the consent of the trademark owner.

As part of the process of registering a domain name, registrants must, among other things, 1) “represent and warrant” that registering the name “will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party” and 2) agree to have the matter heard as an UDRP proceeding if any third party asserts that the domain name violates its trademark rights.

The UDRP is an administrative procedure. A UDRP limits itself to matters concerning abusive registrations and will not intervene in genuine disputes over trademark rights. To prevail in a UDRP proceeding, for each domain name, the complainant must establish three elements:

The domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights;
The registrant does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the domain name; and
The registrant registered the domain name and is using it in “bad faith.”

August 4, 2014

Indiana Patent Litigation: Tippmann Family Dispute Regarding Patent Ownership and Validity Escalates to Litigation

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana – Indiana patent attorneys for Vincent P. Tippmann, Sr. Family, LLC and Tippmann Refrigeration, Inc., both of Fort Wayne, Indiana, filed an intellectual property lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana against Gerald Tippmann of Fort Wayne, Indiana to correct ownership of Patent No. 8,220,287, “Apparatus and Method for Blast Freezing or Thawing A Product,” which was issued by the U.S. Patent Office. In addition to listing requests regarding inventorship, this Indiana patent lawsuit asks the court to, in the alternative, grant a judgment under Indiana State law of negligent misrepresentation and constructive fraud on the part of Defendant, Gerald Tippmann, and for associated relief and damages.

Vincent P. Tippmann Sr. Family, LLC (“Tippmann Family, LLC”) claims ownership of the patent-in-suit, a technology that facilitates rapid and efficient freezing and thawing of food products. It also indicates that it is the inventing and owning company of various patents and patent applications related to apparatuses and methods for blast freezing and/or thawing of products.

Rapid freezing was historically done in blast freezers, which are expensive and result in irregular freezing rates across arranged product stacks. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Gerald Tippmann and Vincent P. Tippmann Jr. (presumably an employee of Tippmann Family, LLC) were the first to recognize, and jointly design, test and reduce to practice a new method and system for freezing and thawing boxes or pallets of a commodity more efficiently and rapidly through the strategic arrangement of product boxes and pallets to create a directional airflow.

This Indiana patent litigation concerns that invention, U.S. Patent No. 8,220,287 (the “‘287 Patent”), for which Tippmann Family, LLC is the assignee. According to Plaintiffs, the inventor declaration for the patent-in-suit that was signed by Gerald Tippmann averred that he and Vincent P. Tippmann Jr. were co-inventors and that the invention “was not in public use or on sale in the United States of America more than one year prior to filing this application.”

In May 2012, Gerald Tippmann left the employ of Tippmann Refrigeration, and became associated with Tippmann Construction, LLC (“Tippmann Construction”), a competitor of Tippmann Family, LLC. The owners of the Tippmann Family, LLC and the competing Tippmann Construction are relatives.

In June 2013, Gerald Tippmann and the Indiana patent lawyer for Tippmann Construction prepared a supplemental inventor declaration and disclosure statement to “clarify” statements Gerald Tippmann had made in his previous disclosures in the Tippmann Family, LLC applications. According to Plaintiffs, this supplemental declaration directly contradicts all previous declarations made by Gerald Tippmann with regard to his joint inventorship with Vincent P. Tippmann Jr., especially including its assertions that Gerald Tippmann was the sole inventor of the patent-in-suit.

In this supplemental declaration, Gerald Tippmann also indicates that he had been “mistaken” regarding the initial public display of the invention. Specifically, he claims that he had commercialized and publically used the underlying invention while in the employ of an unrelated Florida company called Citrus World on or about 1996-97.

The complaint, filed by Indiana intellectual property counsel, lists the following causes of action:

• Declaratory Judgment of Joint Inventorship, Correction of Inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256
• Negligent Misrepresentation under Indiana State Law
• Constructive Fraud under Indiana State Law

Plaintiffs ask that the court:

(a) Find that Gerald Tippmann and Vincent P. Tippmann Jr. are the true inventors of the ‘287 Patent;
(b) Find that Gerald Tippmann’s actions at Citrus World were an experimental use, not a public use or a commercialization, and that the invention was not ready for patenting at that time;
(c) Estop Gerald Tippmann from declaring the assertions set forth in his Declaration in the related continuation and divisional applications associated with the ‘287 Patent and any future related patents that he has assigned to the Tippmann Family, LLC;
(d) Award to Tippmann Family, LLC all costs and attorney’s fees;
(e) Alternatively to (a)-(d), find that Gerald Tippmann has committed negligent misrepresentation with respect to the actions described above, and that the Tippmann Family, LLC be awarded costs, attorney’s fees, and damages; and
(f) Alternatively to (a)-(d), find that Gerald Tippmann has committed constructive fraud with respect to the actions described above, and that the Tippmann Family, LLC be awarded costs, attorney’s fees, and damages.

Practice Tip: Public disclosure – as Gerald Tippmann has apparently claimed – is often, but not always, a bar to patentability. Indiana inventors are advised to consult with an Indiana patent lawyer to determine whether their invention(s) can be protected under U.S. patent law.

May 1, 2014

Insurance Coverage for Advertising Injury: Allstate Held to Have No Duty to Defend or Indemnify Against Allegations of False Advertising

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – An insurance attorney for Allstate Insurance Company of Northbrook, Illinois (“Allstate”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the Southern District of Indiana. Allstate asked the court to declare that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the defendants in a putative class action lawsuit proceeding against the defendants in the Middle District of Georgia. The Indiana court ruled against Defendants Preferred Financial Solutions, Inc. (“PFS”) of Indianapolis, Indiana; Credit Card Relief, Inc. (“CCR”) of Indianapolis, Indiana; Jeffery Brooks, President of PFS and CCR of Zionsville, Indiana and Thomas P. Dakich, d/b/a Dakich & Associates, of Indianapolis, Indiana.

This lawsuit concerns Allstate’s obligations to the defendants with respect to a class action lawsuit filed in Georgia against the defendants and others (the “underlying litigation”). The complaint in the underlying litigation, filed by the underlying plaintiffs, alleges that the defendants are interrelated entities that collectively comprise a debt-adjustment-services operation that targets financially troubled customers and extracts fees for worthless services.

In this litigation, which the underlying plaintiffs are attempting to classify as a class action, it is alleged that the defendants promote themselves in print, on the internet, and in broadcast media as a provider of debt-settlement services, debt-elimination services and debt-reduction services. The underlying plaintiffs contend that the defendants never made any attempts to pay or settle the debts of at least some members of the putative class.

The defendants tendered the complaint to Allstate for defense, asserting that the claims in the underlying litigation triggered potential coverage as a covered peril – an “advertising injury” – under the provisions of their insurance contracts with Allstate.

This issue – whether Allstate’s contract for insurance coverage for an “advertising injury” required them to defend and indemnify the defendants – was submitted to the Indiana District Court. Allstate moved for judgment as a matter of law, asserting that the conduct at issue did not qualify as an advertising injury. It contended that it thus had no duty to provide a defense in the underlying litigation.

Under the terms of the insurance agreement, an “advertising injury” was defined in the insurance contract as an “injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses:

1. Oral or written publication of advertising material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services;
2. Oral or written publication of advertising material that violates a person’s right to privacy;
3. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of business; [and/or]
4. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan as a result of your advertising.”

Excluded from coverage was “[a]ny advertising injury arising out of…[i]ncorrect description of or mistake in advertised price of goods, products or services sold, offered for sale or advertised.”

The Indiana court, in an opinion written by Magistrate Judge Debra McVicker Lynch, noted that there had been no allegation of defamation, violation of privacy, misappropriation of advertising ideas or infringement of intellectual property in defendants’ advertising. As a result, the court concluded that no “advertising injury,” as it was defined in the insurance contract, had occurred. As that holding was dispositive, the court did not reach the issue of whether the exclusion to coverage for “incorrect description” would have applied. As no coverage was found to exist, Allstate was determined to have neither the duty to defend nor to indemnify the defendants.

Practice Tip:

Exclusions to coverage in insurance policies are narrowly construed. However, it seems likely that, had the court not disposed of this matter as not fitting within the definition of “advertising injury,” it would have instead concluded that there was no coverage upon construing the exclusion for “incorrect description” of goods or services offered.

In contrast, businesses sued for defamation, invasion of privacy, misappropriation of advertising ideas and/or infringement of intellectual property, would be wise to consult their commercial general liability insurance policies to evaluate whether such an advertising injury is considered a covered peril.

April 3, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: Noble Roman’s Sues for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – An Indiana trademark attorney for Noble Roman’s, Inc. of Indianapolis, Indiana filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Sahara Sam’s Indoor Water Park, LLC of Pennsauken, New Jersey (“Sahara”) infringed its trademarks. These trademarks are: Noble Roman’s®, Trademark Registration No. 987,069; THE BETTER PIZZA PEOPLE, Trademark Registration No. 1,920,428; and a design mark, Trademark Registration No. 1,682,308. Noble Roman’s also states that it has registered the Tuscano’s® mark. In addition to trademark infringement, Noble Roman’s asserts that Sahara engaged in false designation of origin and unlawful competition. Noble Roman’s has registered its marks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

Noble Roman’s is in the business of franchising the operation of Noble Roman’s pizza franchises that feature pizza, breadsticks, and other related food items to various franchisees throughout the world. Noble Roman’s has used its trademarks, among them “Noble Roman’s” and “The Better Pizza People,” registered in 1974 and 1995, respectively, in commerce in connection with marketing, identifying, and promoting its pizza franchises.

On or about June 27, 2005, Noble Roman’s and entered into two franchise agreements. Under the terms of the agreements, Sahara became a franchisee of Noble Roman’s, licensed and authorized to sell “Noble Roman’s” and “Tuscano’s” branded food products using Noble Roman’s intellectual property assets. Noble Roman’s asserts that these agreements included terms relating to the accurate reporting of sales and timely payment of franchise fees and other fees.

Sahara is accused of failing to pay royalties as required under the agreement and of misreporting sales, among other things. Noble Roman’s contends that Sahara purposely, intentionally and knowingly misreported its sales to Noble Roman’s for the purpose of avoiding payment of franchise fees and/or royalties which were due.

Noble Roman’s also contends that, after electing not to renew the franchise agreements, Sahara violated certain post-termination provisions of the Agreements, including those which require Sahara to: (1) cease to use any Noble Roman’s proprietary products; and (2) remove from public view and display any signage or other articles containing or depicting the trademarks.

Sahara is further accused of having violated the non-competition covenants by selling, after termination of the franchise agreements, various food items “which can be utilized without knowledge gained from Noble Roman’s.”

Noble Roman’s states that Sahara’s actions were without the authorization or consent of Noble Roman’s and that they constitute trademark infringement, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), as well as false designation of origin in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125.

The complaint, filed by an Indiana trademark lawyer, lists the following:

• Count One (Trademark Infringement)
• Count One [sic] (Breach of Contract)
• Count Two (Fraud)
• Count Three (Injunctive Relief)

Noble Roman’s asks for injunctive relief, as well as judgment in its favor in amount to be proven at trial, together with interest, punitive damages, costs of collection and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Practice Tip: Noble Roman’s has been particularly aggressive in enforcing franchise agreements. Since 2007, it has also filed the following suits in the Southern District of Indiana:

February 12, 2014 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. B & MP and LESLIE PERDRIAU

September 5, 2012 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. VILLAGE PANTRY

March 17, 2011 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. FINDLAY TIFFIN OIL, LLC and AYMAN MAGDADDI

January 27, 2011 – NOBLE ROMAN’S INC. et al. v. BRABHAM OIL COMPANY and BRABHAM OIL COMPANY

October 9, 2009 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. CITY CENTER FOOD CORP., INC.

August 31, 2009 – NOBLE ROMAN’S INC. v. W.J. INTERNATIONAL GROUP, LLC

July 17, 2009 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. MARDAN, INC.

July 8, 2009 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. RENTON WILLIAMS

April 21, 2009 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. RICHARD A. GOMES and RRCM FOODS, INC.

April 2, 2009 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. KANDAKAR ALAM

February 17, 2009 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. EXPRESS LANE, INC.

February 10, 2009 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. JJP&L, LLC

November 6, 2008 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. PARDIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.

October 24, 2008 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v DELTA PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC, ZACK BROTHERS TRUCK STOP, LLC and STANDARD PETROLEUM CORP.

October 6, 2008 – NOBLE ROMAN’S INC. v. JAY’S GAS LLC

April 9, 2008 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. SHAHRAM RAHIMIAN

March 17, 2008 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. MEDALLION CONVENIENCE STORES, INC.

December 20, 2007 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. MICHAEL J. BRUNSWICK, LAURIE BRUNSWICK, and M&L RESTAURANTS, LLC

September 17, 2007 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. THE FRENCH BAGUETTE, LLC et al.

July 26, 2007 – NOBLE ROMAN’S, INC. v. MR. RON’S, L.C.

July 19, 2007 – NOBLE ROMAN’S INC. v. BAUER BUILT, INC. et al.

March 26, 2014

Daughter’s Facebook Comments Establish Breach of Confidentiality, Cost Her Father $80,000

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Miami, Florida – The Third District Court of Appeal for the State of Florida heard the appeal of Gulliver Schools, Inc. (“Gulliver”) and School Management Systems, Inc. in the age-discrimination and retaliation lawsuit of Patrick Snay. Appellants prevailed on their claim that Mr. Snay had breached the confidentiality clause of the settlement agreement, thus gulliver Stamp picture.jpg eliminating Gulliver’s obligation to pay portions of the settlement amount.

Patrick Snay, formerly the headmaster of Gulliver, sued for age discrimination and retaliation when Gulliver did not renew his contract for the 2010-2011 school term. The dispute was settled and the parties executed a release for the full and final settlement of Snay’s claims. Under the settlement, the school would pay $10,000 in back pay and $80,000 to Snay to settle the matter, as well as $60,000 for Snay’s legal fees.

As part of the settlement, Snay agreed to a detailed confidentiality clause, which provided that the existence and terms of the agreement between Snay and the school were to be kept strictly confidential and that, should Snay or his wife breach the confidentiality provision, a portion of the settlement proceeds (the $80,000) would be disgorged by Snay to Gulliver. This provision read, in pertinent part: “[T]he plaintiff shall not either directly or indirectly, disclose, discuss or communicate to any entity or person, except his attorneys or other professional advisors or spouse any information whatsoever regarding the existence or terms of this Agreement . . . A breach . . . will result in disgorgement of the Plaintiffs [sic] portion of the settlement Payments.”

Shortly after the agreement was signed, Snay informed his daughter that his lawsuit against Gulliver had been settled and that he was happy with the result. Snay’s daughter posted news of the agreement on Facebook, “Mama and Papa Snay won the case against Gulliver. Gulliver is now officially paying for my vacation to Europe this summer.” This Facebook post was available for viewing by approximately 1,200 of Snay’s daughter’s Facebook friends, many of whom were either current or past Gulliver students.

Gulliver learned of the Facebook post. Four days after the agreement was signed, Gulliver notified Snay that it considered the Facebook post to be a material breach of the agreement. Gulliver stated that, while it would pay the amount of the settlement which constituted attorneys’ fees, it would not pay any of Snay’s portion as a result of the breach of the confidentiality clause.

Snay moved to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that his statement to his daughter and her comment on Facebook did not constitute a breach. The trial court agreed, finding that neither Snay’s comments to his daughter nor his daughter’s Facebook comments constituted a breach of the confidentiality agreement.

Gulliver appealed. The appellate court held that the plain language of the contract prohibited the disclosure that Snay had made, stating “before the ink was dry on the agreement, and notwithstanding the clear language . . . mandating confidentiality, Snay violated the agreement by doing exactly what he had promised not to do.” Moreover, the court noted that the significance of confidentiality to Gulliver was evinced by the fact that the majority of the proceeds of the settlement agreement expressly hinged on compliance with the confidentiality provision.

Based on the clear and unambiguous language of the parties’ agreement and Snay’s subsequent testimony that he had, in fact, breached the confidentiality provision, the appellate court found for Gulliver and reversed the trial court’s order granting the Snays’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement.

Practice Tip:

It’s not hard to see how this happened. As parents, the Snays recognized that it was important to inform their daughter of the resolution of this matter. Not only was this settlement significant to Mr. Snay, but the news that a satisfactory resolution had been reached also was presumably intended to assist his daughter in dealing with the difficulties she had apparently encountered as a result of the dispute with Gulliver. According to Mr. Snay, these difficulties had left his daughter with “quite a few psychological scars which forced [him] to put her into therapy.” It is also not difficult to imagine that, feeling vindicated, the Snays’ college-aged daughter would do what many people that age do with big news: she posted it on Facebook.

In situations such as these, contract attorneys must take special care to provide whole-picture legal counseling to their clients, both during settlement negotiations and after. It was not unforeseeable that Mr. or Ms. Snay would inform their daughter of the settlement. Nor was it unforeseeable that she would, in turn, want to share the news with her friends. Presumably, the Snays’ daughter had not realized the importance of confidentiality.

Here, this problem might have been avoided. First, in drafting the confidentiality clause, release of the information to the daughter could have been included. Thus, Mr. Snay would not have signed an agreement that he presumably knew – as he was signing it – that he would soon violate. Second, an explicit and dire warning by the settlement attorney representing Mr. Snay should have been given to anyone privy to the settlement to lessen the chance of an inadvertent breach of the contract, for example: “You, your wife and your daughter absolutely must adhere to the provisions of the confidentiality clause or you could lose some or all of the benefits of this settlement agreement.”

March 13, 2014

Indiana Court of Appeals Finds Noncompetition Agreement Overly Broad and Unenforceable

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – The Court of Appeals of Indiana has affirmed the decision of the Marion Superior Court to deny injunctive relief to Clark’s Sales & Service, Inc. (“Clark’s”) of Indianapolis, Indiana in its suit against John D. Smith (“Smith”) of Indiana and Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. (“Ferguson”) of Newport News, Virginia.

In 1998, Smith began working for Clark’s, a company that sells and services appliances in the builder-distributor market in Indiana. In 2004, after one of Clark’s high-level managers left for a competitive position at another company, Clark’s had Smith and various other employees sign a written employment agreement containing both a confidentiality clause and a noncompetition agreement.

Smith resigned his position at Clark’s on April 13, 2012 but, before doing so, he took copies of Clark’s sales records from 2010 and 2011, including customer and builder contact information, the price of materials sold and the costs and profit margins of Clark’s. On April 18, 2012, he accepted an offer of employment with Ferguson, a nearby competitor. In his new position, he solicited business from various customers of Clark’s.

Indiana attorneys for Clark’s sued to enforce the confidentiality and noncompetition provisions of the agreement entered into with Smith. The trial court concluded that the restrictive covenant that Clark’s drafted was overly broad and unreasonable, and denied Clark’s motion for a preliminary injunction. From that order, this interlocutory appeal was brought.

On appeal, Clark’s challenged the trial court’s ruling, calling it clearly erroneous. It claimed that the noncompetition agreement was not unreasonable and unenforceable. Clark’s also argued that, even if the noncompetition agreement were unreasonable and unenforceable as written, the court should apply the “blue-pencil doctrine” to make whatever modifications were necessary to render the covenant reasonable and enforceable.

The Indiana appellate court first discussed whether Clark’s had a legitimate and protectable interest, defined as “some reason why it would be unfair to allow the employee to compete with the former employer.” Indiana courts have held that “the advantageous familiarity and personal contact which employees derive from dealing with an employer’s customers are elements of an employer’s ‘good will’ and are a protectible interest which may justify a restraint.” The appellate court held that, while the trial court had not explicitly stated that it had found such a protectable interest, such a finding was implicit in its ruling. The appellate court ruled that the trial court had not erred by determining that Clark’s had established this element.

The Indiana appellate court then evaluated the reasonableness of the restrictions. Both parties agreed that the two-year limit was reasonable and valid. They disagreed, however, regarding the reasonableness of the noncompetition agreement as to the scope of activities and geographic area restricted.

The appellate court held that the one type of activities prohibited – Clark’s restrictions against contact with any of its past or prospective customers – was vague and too broad. The agreement also prohibited not merely those activities which Smith had engaged in during his tenure at Clark’s, but also prohibited him from providing any services competitive to “those offered by” Clark’s. That provision was held to be “overly broad, onerous, and an undue restriction on Smith’s economic freedom” and, thus, unenforceable.

The restrictions placed on the geographic area in which Smith could work were also evaluated. Those restrictions included working “in any state in which Gregg [Smith’s previous employer] does business, as well as working for any other entity providing services competitive to Clark’s in Marion County, any county contiguous to Marion County, any county in Indiana in which Clark’s has at least one customer, the State of Indiana, or within a fifty-mile radius of Smith’s principal office with Clark’s, which was in Castleton.” The appellate court held that it was “unquestionable that the expansive geographic scope . . . is unreasonable as written.”

Finally, the court addressed the “blue-pencil doctrine.” This doctrine allows a court to strike unreasonable restrictions in a covenant not to compete, provided that they are divisible. However, this doctrine does not extend to allow a court to create a reasonable restriction, as this would subject the parties to an agreement that they have not made.

The court held that blue pencil doctrine was inapplicable, as the terms that Clark’s proposed be stricken had been written as merely a small part of an indiscrete whole. Moreover, it held that, even if it were to strike the text that Clark’s had proposed be stricken, the restrictions would still be overly broad and in excess of what would be required to protect Clark’s legitimate business interest.

The Indiana appellate court affirmed the trial court, holding that its judgment was not clearly erroneous.

Practice Tip #1: To demonstrate the reasonableness of a noncompetition agreement, the employer must first show that it has a legitimate interest to be protected by the agreement. The employer also bears the burden of showing that the agreement is reasonable in terms of the time, activities, and geographic area restricted.

Practice Tip #2: Covenants not to compete are in restraint of trade and are not favored by the law. If a court applying Indiana law finds that portions of a noncompetition agreement are unreasonable, it may not modify the restrictions to make them reasonable. Doing so would subject the parties to an agreement they had not made. The court may, however, employ the “blue pencil” rule to “cross out” portions deemed unreasonable while leaving any separable and reasonable portions intact.

Practice Tip #3: This is at least the second time that the Indiana Court of Appeals has heard an interlocutory appeal on this non-compete litigation. In a prior appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, which had improperly concluded that the noncompetition agreement failed for lack of consideration. We blogged about that appeal here.

Practice Tip #4: While Appellant-Plaintiff here argued that broad drafting was permissible and simply a “good faith effort to provide itself the greatest level of protection allowed by law,” the Indiana appellate court did not agree. Instead, it called the practice “unsavory” and reminded Clark’s that “Indiana law strongly discourages employers’ attempts to draft unreasonably broad and oppressive covenants.”