False Designation of Origin

September 12, 2013

80/20 Sues “John Doe” for Trademark Infringement and Passing Off

Fort Wayne, Indiana — Trademark lawyers for 80/20, Inc. of Columbia City, Indiana filed a trademark infringement suit in the Northern District of Indiana alleging John Doe d/b/a TNutz of Champlain, New York infringed the trademark “80/20”, Trademark Registration No. 2,699,302, which has been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

80/20 is a manufacturer of T-slotted aluminum extrusion products and accessories. It sells to customers through a distribution network and an online “garage sale.” It asserts that it has marketed products and services under the trademark “80/20” since at least 1990. TNutz does business via its own website and an eBay store.

TNutz is accused of unfairly competing with 80/20 by, among other things, falsely representing that some of the products that it offers for sale are genuine 80/20 products when, according to 80/20, they are not. 80/20 indicates that it has no affiliation with TNutz.

The complaint also states that TNutz represents its own goods as 80/20 goods with the intention of causing confusion among, and deceiving, consumers who seek to purchase genuine 80/20 parts from or through 80/20. It also contends that TNutz has purposely hidden its true identity and physical location from consumers and competitors, asserting that the businesses listed as contacts for both TNutz’s website and its physical address are unrelated third parties.

80/20 indicates that it sent a cease-and-desist letter to TNutz on May 10, 2013 demanding that TNutz cease infringement and compensate 80/20 for the damages caused by the allegedly infringing conduct. 80/20 apparently received no response to its demands.

The complaint lists the following causes of action:

· Count I: Trademark Infringement

· Count II: Lanham Act Violation — Passing Off

Trademark lawyers for 80/20 ask the court for preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting infringement; an award of actual damages and profits by TNutz attributable to infringement of 80/20’s trademarks and/or statutory damages; an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, upon a finding that this is an exceptional case; and the destruction of all materials in TNutz’s control bearing the “80/20” mark.

Practice Tip:

If a defendant’s identity is not clear from the evidence available when a complaint is filed, a “John Doe” designation is typically used to represent that unidentified defendant. After filing such a complaint, the plaintiff may then ask the court to use its authority to subpoena various third parties, such as internet service providers, to disclose the identity of the Doe defendant(s). Here, presumably, the plaintiff will subpoena to eBay to discover the identity of “John Doe.”

Although trademark lawsuits with a “John Doe” defendant are a relative rarity, this is the second one we have blogged about this week. Sometimes, as was the case in the other recent trademark complaint with a “John Doe” defendant, revealing the identity of the unknown defendant is largely procedural. In other cases, however, Doe defendants are highly motivated to preserve their anonymity, as they do not want to be associated with the embarrassing allegations in the complaint. See, e.g., one Doe defendant’s request to quash or modify a subpoena in a copyright case which involved the alleged illegal downloading of adult content.

September 6, 2013

Texas Roadhouse Sues Multiple Restaurants Operating as “Texas Corral” or “Amarillo Roadhouse”

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Grand Rapids, Michigan — Trademark lawyers for Texas Roadhouse, Inc. and Texas Roadhouse Delaware LLC, both of Louisville, Kentucky (collectively, “Texas Roadhouse”) sued for trademark infringement in the Western District of Michigan alleging that the Defendants, including those doing business as multiple Texas Corral restaurants located in Indiana (collectively “Texas Corral”), as well as one Amarillo Roadhouse restaurant, also located in Indiana, infringed the service mark TEXAS ROADHOUSE, Trademark Registration Nos. 1,833,533; 2,231,309; and 2,250,966, which have been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Texas Roadhouse operates a Texas-themed restaurant chain. The first Texas Roadhouse restaurant opened in Clarksville, Indiana in 1993. As of March 2013, there were 397 Texas Roadhouse restaurants in 47 states and three countries.

Texas Roadhouse contends that each of the restaurants is required to comply with strict exterior and interior design requirements so that the look and feel is substantially identical across all Texas Roadhouse locations. It lists three U.S. Service Mark Registrations that include the mark “Texas Roadhouse” and asserts that each of them is incontestable. Texas Roadhouse also claims ownership of various unregistered marks that include the word “Texas” and “Roadhouse” as well as copyright protection, including a U.S. Copyright registration, of its marquee. Finally, Texas Roadhouse claims intellectual-property rights in the trade dress of its restaurants, including the look of the exterior design of the building, the interior décor, the music and the menu.

Texas Corral, against which Texas Roadhouse filed this complaint, also operates casual, western-themed, family restaurants. It owns and operates nine restaurant locations doing business under the name “Texas Corral.” A total of ten locations are at issue in this lawsuit. Six Indiana cities have “Texas Corral” restaurants: Highland, Merrillville, Portage, Michigan City, Martinsville and Shelbyville. Texas Corral also purportedly owns and operates a location that does business as “Amarillo Roadhouse” in Indiana, which is also at issue in this trademark-infringement lawsuit. In addition, three other Texas Corral restaurants have been listed in the complaint: two in Michigan and one in Illinois.

Also listed in the complaint are Paul Switzer, asserted to be the franchisor/licensor of Texas Corral restaurants and Victor Spina, asserted to be a franchisee/licensee. “John Doe Corp.,” a fictitious name intended to represent entities or individuals whose actual identity is not currently known to Texas Roadhouse, is also listed as a Defendant.

In the complaint, trademark attorneys for Texas Roadhouse assert that Texas Corral and Amarillo Roadhouse routinely use trade dress, trademarks, service marks, trade names, designs or logos that are confusingly similar to or copies of intellectual property owned by Texas Roadhouse. This purportedly infringing use is asserted to be visible in signage, print and electronic promotional materials, menus, décor, building design and websites.

Texas Roadhouse’s complaint against Texas Corral and Amarillo Roadhouse lists the following:

· Count I: Trade Dress Infringement

· Count II: Federal Trademark Infringement

· Count III: Trademark Infringement Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 429.42

· Count IV: Trademark Infringement Under Ind. Code § 24-2-1-13

· Count V: Trademark Infringement Under Common Law

· Count VI: Copyright Infringement Under 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

· Count VII: Unfair Competition Under Michigan and Indiana Common Law

Texas Roadhouse asks for a judgment that Texas Roadhouse owns enforceable rights in the Texas Roadhouse intellectual property and that all registrations for the Texas Roadhouse intellectual property are valid; a judgment that the Defendants have been and are directly or indirectly infringing the Texas Roadhouse intellectual property; a judgment that the Defendants have been and are engaging in unfair competition by their unauthorized use of the Texas Roadhouse intellectual property; a judgment that Defendants acted deliberately, willfully, intentionally or with malicious intent; an injunction against Defendants prohibiting infringement; damages, including treble damages; a judgment that this case is exceptional and that the Defendants be ordered to pay all of Texas Roadhouse’s attorney fees associated with this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and 17 U.S.C. § 505; and a judgment that the defendants be ordered to pay all costs and expenses incurred by Texas Roadhouse in this action.

Practice Tip:

The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the requirements for trade dress protection in a similar context. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). At issue in Two Pesos was similar restaurant décor. Taco Cabana had sued rival Two Pesos for copying the look of its restaurant, described as “a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior and exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being sealed off from the outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of the building is a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.” The lawsuit alleged that Two Pesos had imitated this scheme and had thereby infringed on Taco Cabana’s trade dress. Among the issues considered was whether trade dress which was inherently distinctive must also be shown to have secondary meaning to be granted protection under the Lanham Act. The Supreme Court held that trade dress which is inherently distinctive is protectable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act without a showing that it has acquired secondary meaning, since such trade dress itself is capable of identifying products or services as coming from a specific source.

Also at issue in this case, among other matters, will be the eligibility of the words “Texas” and “Roadhouse” for protection under federal and Indiana intellectual-property laws. Under the Lanham Act, a federal law, the holder of a mark may ask the United States Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark on the principal register. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051, et seq. Marks that are “primarily descriptive” and “primarily geographically descriptive” of the goods or services with which they are associated are not eligible for registration on the principal register unless they have “become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(e), (f). Thus, registration of a descriptive mark on the principal register requires a showing of secondary meaning.

Although the Lanham Act protects both registered and unregistered marks, registration is desirable because it constitutes prima facie evidence of the mark’s validity. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a). Thus, federal registration of a mark “‘entitles the plaintiff to a presumption that its registered trademark is not merely descriptive or generic, or, if merely descriptive, is accorded secondary meaning.'” The plaintiff bears the burden, however, of establishing that an unregistered mark is entitled to protection.

The Indiana Trademark Act is similar, and in some respects identical, to the Lanham Act. Although Indiana’s body of trademark law is relatively undeveloped, the General Assembly has specified that the Indiana Trademark Act “is intended to provide a system of state trademark registration and protection that is consistent with the federal system of trademark registration and protection under the Trademark Act of 1946.” Ind. Code Ann. § 24-2-1-0.5. Moreover, “[a] judicial or an administrative interpretation of a provision of the federal Trademark Act may be considered as persuasive authority in construing a provision of the Indiana Trademark Act.

The Indiana Trademark Act’s definitions of “trademark” and “service mark” track the Lanham Act’s definitions of those terms nearly verbatim. See I.C. § 24-2-1-2(8), (9). Like the Lanham Act, the Indiana Trademark Act does not adversely affect common-law trademark rights. See I.C. § 24-2-1-15. Registration of a trademark or service mark with the office of the Indiana Secretary of State provides a registrant with a remedy for the infringement thereof under the Indiana Trademark Act. I.C. § 24-2-1-14(a). Like the Lanham Act, the Indiana Trademark Act prohibits the registration of marks that are “primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively geographically misdescriptive of the goods or services[.]” I.C. § 24-2-1-3. This provision does not, however, prevent the registration of a mark that is used in Indiana by the applicant and has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods or services. In other words, a geographically descriptive mark may be registered under the Indiana Trademark Act if it has acquired secondary meaning.
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August 9, 2013

North American Van Lines Sues North American Master Lines for Infringement of “northAmerican” Mark

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

South Bend, Indiana — Trademark lawyers for North American Van Lines, Inc. of Ft. Wayne, Indiana sued North American Master Lines, Inc. of Hallandale, Florida alleging infringement of two trademarks for NORTHAMERICAN, Registration Nos. 0917431 and 0915264, which have been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

North American Van Lines asserts that, as early as 1946, it has used the mark “northAmerican” in conjunction with its packing and transportation services and that it has provided such services in all fifty states and the District of Colombia. It owns two registrations for the mark, both of which were issued in 1971.

North American Master Lines provides packing and transportation services across the United States. It offers local and interstate services for residential, business and military customers.

North American Van Lines claims that North American Master Lines previously did business as “1^st Choice Van Lines, Inc.” and that it changed its name to North American Master Lines in October 2012. North American Master Lines also registered and is using the “NorthAmericanMasterLines.com” domain name.

North American Van Lines has filed a lawsuit alleging trademark infringement, unfair competition and cybersquatting. It states in its complaint that North American Master Lines was aware of the “northAmerican” marks and used them to profit from the consumer goodwill related to those marks. It claims that it has received complaints from consumers who were confused regarding whether North American Master Lines was affiliated with North American Van Lines. It also asserts that it sent a cease-and-desist letter to North American Master Lines but received no response.

The complaint lists the following counts:

· Count I: Cybersquatting Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) with Respect to the NORTHAMERICAN Marks

· Count II: Trademark Infringement of the NORTHAMERICAN Marks Under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)

· Count III: Unfair Competition and False Designation of Origin of NORTHAMERICAN Marks Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

· Count VI [sic]: Unfair Competition and Trademark Infringement of the NORTHAMERICAN Marks Under Common Law

North American Van Lines asks for a judgment that North American Master Lines has infringed upon the “northAmerican” marks; the transfer of the domain name “NorthAmericanMasterLines.com”; an injunction; an order directing North American Master Lines to engage in corrective advertising; an accounting and disgorgement of profits resulting from unlawful acts; damages, including treble damages; statutory damages up to $100,000 for domain-name infringement; and attorney fees and costs.

Practice Tip: Under U.S. trademark law, geographic terms or signs cannot be registered as trademarks if they are geographically descriptive of where the goods (or services) originate. However, a geographical indication, as defined by the World Trade Organization, can also identify a particular good, not merely a geographic area. In such a case, a geographic term has been used to identify the provider of a good and, over time, consumers begin to use that geographic term not only as a descriptor of the geographic source, but also of a particular company. In such a case, the term has acquired “secondary meaning” — the capacity to identify the provider of the good — and can be protected as a trademark.

August 8, 2013

Royal Purple Sues Compressor Parts, Michael Klipstein and Southern Parts & Engineering for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana — Royal Purple, LLC of Indianapolis, Indiana has sued Compressor Parts of Holland, Ohio; Michael Klipstein (“Klipstein”) and Southern Parts & Engineering Company, LLC (“Southern Parts”) of Alpharetta, Georgia (collectively, “Defendants”) for infringement of the trademarks ROYAL PURPLE and SYNFILM, which have been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Royal Purple, which has also recently sued Liqui Moly, about which we blogged yesterday and previously, has filed an additional trademark-infringement suit in the Southern District of Indiana against Compressor Parts, Klipstein and Southern Parts.

Royal Purple claims it has sold lubricants for more than 20 years and has trademarked the color purple, at least in conjunction with various lubricating oils. It owns several federal trademark registrations for the color purple as applied to lubricating oils for automotive, industrial and household uses. It also owns multiple trademarks incorporating the word “purple” as applied to various goods. It also owns a trademark for the term “Synfilm,” for synthetic, para-synthetic and hydrocarbon lubricants for industrial uses. These trademarks are registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

Purple was chosen for its association with royalty. (Historically, purple dye was so expensive to produce that it was used only by royalty.) Royal Purple’s purple-identified lubricant products are sold in over 20,000 retailers in the United States and Royal Purple claims a strong secondary meaning and substantial goodwill in its trademark as a result of this use.

In this complaint, trademark lawyers for Royal Purple assert that Defendants offer goods on the compressorparts.com website using Royal Purple marks in a manner that is likely to cause a substantial number of ordinary consumers to be mistaken, confused or deceived into thinking that Defendants’ goods are offered by or affiliated with Royal Purple. The complaint includes the following:

· Count I: Federal Trademark Infringement

· Count II: False Designation of Origin/False Advertising

· Count III: Unfair Competition Under Indiana Common Law

· Count IV: Common Law Trademark Infringement

Royal Purple seeks a permanent injunction; an accounting; damages, including punitive damages; interest; costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip: As part of the claim, Royal Purple’s lawyers included a count of trademark dilution. This cause of action is distinct from trademark infringement and applies to trademarks that are deemed to be famous. An action for dilution can assert either, or both, of two principal harms: blurring and tarnishment. Dilution by blurring, codified in 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(2)(B), arises when association with another similar mark causes the distinctiveness of the famous mark to be compromised. In contrast, dilution by tarnishment under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) happens when the reputation of the famous mark is damaged by association with a similar mark.

August 7, 2013

Royal Purple Sues Liqui Moly GmbH and Liqui Moly USA for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana — Royal Purple, LLC (“Royal Purple”) of Indianapolis, Indiana sued Liqui Moly GmbH of Ulm, Germany and Liqui Moly USA, Inc. of Hauppauge, New York (collectively, “Liqui Moly”) alleging infringement of two marks, Registration Nos. 2,691,774 and 2,953,996, which have been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

Royal Purple is again suing over the use of the color purple. We have blogged previously about the company here. Royal Purple claims it has sold lubricants for more than 20 years and has trademarked the color purple, at least in conjunction with various lubricating oils. It owns several federal trademark registrations for the color purple as applied to lubricating oils for automotive, industrial and household uses. It also owns multiple trademarks incorporating the word “purple” as applied to various goods. These trademarks are registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

Purple was chosen for its association with royalty. (Historically, purple dye was so expensive to produce that it was used only by royalty.) Royal Purple’s purple-identified lubricant products are sold in over 20,000 retailers in the United States and Royal Purple claims a strong secondary meaning and substantial goodwill in its trademark as a result of this use.

Liqui Moly is accused of distributing, offering to sell and selling products that infringe upon Royal Purple’s trademarks and engaging in acts that constitute unfair competition and dilution. Royal Purple also alleges that Liqui Moly’s use is a purposeful attempt to trade upon Royal Purple’s trademarks. It asserts that Liqui Moly’s infringing use of Royal Purple’s intellectual property is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception in customers or potential customers who encounter the Liqui Moly products. It also claims that Liqui Moly’s use will dilute the “distinctive quality” Royal Purple’s trademarks. Finally, it alleges that Liqui Moly’s use removes from Royal Purple its ability to control the quality of products and services provided under Royal Purple’s trademark, by placing them partially under the control of Liqui Moly, USA and Liqui Moly GmbH, two third parties unrelated to Royal Purple.

Trademark attorneys for Royal Purple filed suit alleging:

· Count One: Trademark Infringement Under Federal Law – 15 U.S.C. § 1114

· Count Two: Unfair Competition; False Designation of Origin Under Federal Law – 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

· Count Three: Dilution Under Federal Law 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)

· Count Four: Dilution in Violation of Indiana Code § 24-2-1-13.5

· Count Five: Common Law Trademark Infringement

· Count Six: Unfair Competition Under Indiana Common Law

· Count Seven: Unjust Enrichment

Royal Purple seeks preliminary and permanent injunctions, the destruction of all allegedly infringing inventory, treble damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip #1: Color can serve as a useful identifier of the source of goods to consumers. The courts, however, have had to draw some narrow lines to balance the various interests. On the one hand, companies often invest significant amounts of money in promoting their brands and color is frequently a component of that promotion. On the other hand, there are a limited number of colors — and an even more limited number of colors that are pleasing and appropriate for any given type of product — and courts are wary of providing a monopoly on any given color to any one company. After all, if such a monopoly is first provided to one company, all too soon the entire spectrum may be spoken for.

Practice Tip #2: This complaint, which is very similar to an earlier action filed by Royal Purple, has added Liqui Moly USA, Inc. as a defendant and largely omitted the earlier-filed claims relating to a third trademark, registered under the U.S. Registration No. 3,819,988.

July 18, 2013

Master Cutlery Sues Pacific Solution Marketing for Infringement of Three-Dimensional Artwork Applied to Knives

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana — Intellectual property lawyers for Master Cutlery, Inc. of Secaucus, New Jersey sued Pacific Solution Marketing, Inc. (“Pacific”) of Ontario, California alleging copyright and trademark infringement of three-dimensional artwork applied to knives. Master Cutlery seeks an injunction, damages, treble damages, statutory damages, profits, attorney’s fees and costs.

Founded 30 years ago, Master Cutlery has become the largest importer of knives in the United States. It asserts ownership of federal trademark, patent and copyright registrations for its knives, as well as common law trade dress rights (collectively, “Master Cutlery IP”). Among the rights that Master Cutlery claims are trademarks for the word marks “Sheriff” and “EMT” registered in Class 8 with the U.S. Trademark Office for knives.

Master Cutlery asserts that, after its use and registration of its various items of intellectual property, Pacific also began using the Master Cutlery intellectual property. It contends that Pacific has manufactured, produced, advertised and/or sold knives that infringe upon the Master Cutlery IP. It also asserts that Pacific has distributed advertisements and packaging bearing reproductions of Master Cutlery’s trademarks, trade dress and copyrights.

Master Cutlery sued alleging copyright infringement under the Copyright Act; federal trademark infringement, federal trademark dilution, false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act; common law trademark and copyright infringement; unfair competition; and theft and counterfeiting under Indiana state law. It further contends that this infringement was willful, intentional and done with the intent to confuse consumers. The complaint, originally filed in Indiana state court, was removed by a trademark attorney for Pacific on both the grounds of federal question and diversity of citizenship.

For its claims, Master Cutlery lists the following:

· Count I: Copyright Infringement Under 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

· Count II: Federal Trademark Infringement Under U.S.C. § 1114

· Count III: Trademark Dilution Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)

· Count IV: False Designation of Origin or Sponsorship, False Advertising and Trade Dress Infringement Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

· Count V: Common Law Trademark and Copyright Infringement

· Count VI: Unfair Competition

· Count VII: Theft Under Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)

Master Cutlery asks for a permanent injunction enjoining infringement; that Pacific be required to deliver to Master Cutlery both unsold goods and goods already distributed or sold so that they can be destroyed; for compensatory damages; for treble damages or, alternatively, Pacific’s profits trebled; for statutory damages; and for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Practice Tip: Master Cutlery has included a count of felony theft under Indiana Code § 35-43-4-2(a) in its complaint. The extent to which intellectual property is “property” in the usual sense has been litigated several times recently in the Indiana appellate court, which has made it clear that criminal statutes often apply differently to an unlawful taking of intellectual property. For a discussion of two recent cases, see here and here.

July 17, 2013

Coach Sues Again in Indiana Court Alleging Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

South Bend, Indiana — Trademark lawyers for Coach, Inc. of New York, New York and Coach Services, Inc. of Jacksonville, Florida (collectively, “Coach“) have sued Maxx Tan; Maxx Tan Logan, LLC — both of Logansport, Indiana — and James Robert McCarthy (“McCarthy”) of Marion, Indiana, individually and d/b/a Maxx Tan, for infringement of the COACH trademark which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Coach was founded more than 70 years ago as a family-run workshop in Manhattan. Since then, the company has been engaged in the manufacture, marketing and sale of fine leather and mixed-material products including handbags, wallets and accessories including eyewear, footwear, jewelry and watches. Coach products have become among the most popular in the world, with Coach’s annual global sales currently exceeding three billion dollars.

On October 17, 2012, a private investigator from Coach visited Maxx Tan and observed numerous trademarked handbags, sunglasses and accessories displayed for sale. These items bore the trademarks of many high-end brands, including Coach.

The investigator purchased a purse which bore a Coach trademark for $69 plus tax and left the store. The investigator then returned, explained the reason for the purchase, attempted to serve a cease-and-desist letter on McCarthy, and asked McCarthy to surrender the merchandise. McCarthy agreed to stop selling the merchandise but refused to surrender anything.

The investigator contacted the Logansport police. In the following weeks, Maxx Tan surrendered various purses, a pair of sunglasses and a sunglasses case to the police, all of which bore the Coach mark. All of the surrendered items are alleged to be counterfeit.

Coach, the owner of at least 47 trademarks, subsequently sued Maxx Tan and McCarthy, whom Coach contends is individually liable for any infringing activities. It alleges that Maxx Tan and McCarthy are engaged in designing, manufacturing, advertising, promoting, distributing, selling, and/or offering for sale products bearing logos and source-identifying indicia and design elements that are studied imitations of the Coach trademarks.

The complaint includes counts for trademark infringement, false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116, 1117, 1125(a) and (c); trademark infringement and unfair competition under the common law of the State of Indiana; and forgery under Indiana Code § 35- 43-5-2(b) as well as counterfeiting under Indiana Code § 35-43-5-2(a), pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-24-3-1. These counts are listed as:

· COUNT I (Trademark Counterfeiting, 15 U.S.C. § 1114)

· COUNT II (Trademark Infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114)

· COUNT III (False Designation of Origin and False Advertising, 15

U.S.C. § 1125(a))

· COUNT IV (Common Law Trademark Infringement)

· COUNT V (Common Law Unfair Competition)

· COUNT VI (Forgery Under Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(b))

· COUNT VII (Counterfeiting Under Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(a))

· COUNT VIII (Common Law Unjust Enrichment)

· COUNT IX (Attorneys’ Fees)

Coach asks the court, inter alia, to enter judgment against the defendants on all counts; for an injunction against further wrongful activity; to order that all infringing materials be recalled and disposed of; to award to Coach statutory damages of $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of good; to award punitive damages; and to award to Coach its costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip: Coach has been very aggressive in protecting its intellectual property rights in Indiana courts over the last few years. Coach’s intellectual property attorneys have filed numerous similar lawsuits in Indiana courts, several of which Indiana Intellectual Property Law and News has blogged about.

July 3, 2013

Sensory Technologies, LLC Sues Sensory Technology Consultants, Inc. for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana — Trademark lawyers for Sensory Technologies, LLC (“Sensory Indiana”) of Indianapolis, Indiana sued Sensory Technology Consultants, Inc. (“Sensory Utah”) of Morgan, Utah alleging infringement of Trademark Registration No. 3282956 for the mark “SENSORY TECHNOLOGIES®” which has been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

Sensory Indiana sued in the Southern District of Indiana for declaratory judgment, injunction and damages, alleging that Sensory Utah has committed trademark infringement, false designation of origin and unfair competition with its unauthorized use of “Sensory Technology Consultants,” a mark similar to Sensory Indiana’s “Sensory Technologies” trademark.

Sensory Indiana, which describes itself on its website as “a leading audio-visual, telepresence system and collaboration solutions provider” asserts that Sensory Utah used a mark which is visually and phonetically similar to the “Sensory Technologies” mark with the intent to trade on the goodwill with the public established by Sensory Indiana and to cause confusion, mistake or deception. Sensory Indiana further asserts that Sensory Utah is in the business of providing services similar to those provided by Sensory Indiana.

The “Sensory Technologies” mark is federally registered for audio-visual and video conferencing design services, integrating audio-visual and video conferencing systems, help desk technical consultation services, customized computer programming for others and technical consultation regarding audio-visual equipment and video conferencing systems. Sensory Indiana indicates that the mark has been used in commerce since March 2006 and that it is distinctive and/or has acquired secondary meaning and significance in the minds of the purchasing public.

Several times in early 2013, Sensory Indiana alerted Sensory Utah that Sensory Utah’s use of “Sensory Technology Consultants” was unauthorized. The current lawsuit was commenced after those notices went unanswered. The complaint alleges:

· Count I: Trademark Infringement

· Count II: False Designation of Origin

· Count III: Unfair Competition

· Count VI [sic]: Declaratory Judgment

· Count VIII [sic]: Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief

Sensory Indiana seeks a judgment against Sensory Utah on counts I through III; injunctive relief; and damages, including punitive damages and damages for corrective advertising.

Practice Tip: According to its website, Sensory Utah has been in business since 2006, the same year in which Sensory Indiana’s mark was initially used in commerce. This may cause some difficulties for Sensory Indiana. While federal registration of a trademark has advantages, trademark protection may also be acquired by being the first to use a mark in commerce. As a result, an unregistered trademark may be more robust from a legal standpoint than one that has been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office. This makes it extremely important to do a comprehensive search for others’ potential trademark rights — including those that will not be evident from a search of the Trademark Electronic Search System database — before you begin to use a mark.

July 1, 2013

Coach Sues Downtown Gift Shop and Chun Ying Huang for Trademark Infringement, Forgery and Counterfeiting – 1

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

South Bend, Ind. — Trademark lawyers for Coach, Inc. of New York, N.Y. and Coach Services, Inc. of Jacksonville, Fla. (collectively, “Coach”) sued Downtown Gift Shop of Mishawaka, Ind. and Chun Ying Huang of Granger, Ind. (“Huang”) alleging various violations of intellectual-property law, including trademark infringement, forgery and counterfeiting.

Coach was founded more than 70 years ago as a family-run workshop in Manhattan. Since then, the company has been engaged in the manufacture, marketing and sale of fine leather and mixed-material products including handbags, wallets and accessories including eyewear, footwear, jewelry and watches. Coach products have also become among the most popular in the world, with Coach’s annual global sales currently exceeding three billion dollars.

On December 8, 2012, a private investigator from Coach visited the Downtown Gift Shop and observed thousands of handbags, boots, and accessories displayed for sale. These items bore the trademarks of many high-end brands including Coach, Louis Vuitton, Chanel and Tiffany.

On December 11, 2012, investigators from Coach accompanied officers from the St. Joseph County Police Department, Indiana State Police Department, and the Department of Homeland Security, to execute a search warrant on Downtown Gift Shop.

The investigators and officers identified, photographed, and seized over 3,000 counterfeit trademarked merchandize, including over 1,000 Coach handbags, wallets, scarves, sunglasses, jewelry, and hats. Coach contends that all of the seized items are counterfeit.

Coach, the owner of at least 47 trademarks, subsequently sued Downtown Gift Shop and Huang, whom Coach contends is individually liable for any infringing activities. It alleges that Downtown Gift Shop and Huang are engaged in designing, manufacturing, advertising, promoting, distributing, selling, and/or offering for sale products bearing logos and source-identifying indicia and design elements that are studied imitations of the Coach trademarks.

The complaint includes counts for trademark infringement, false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116, 1117, 1125(a) and (c); trademark infringement and unfair competition under the common law of the State of Indiana; and forgery under Indiana Code § 35- 43-5-2(b) as well as counterfeiting under Indiana Code § 35-43-5-2(a), pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-24-3-1. These counts are listed as:

· COUNT I (Trademark Counterfeiting, 15 U.S.C. § 1114)

· COUNT II (Trademark Infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114)

· COUNT III (False Designation of Origin and False Advertising, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))

· COUNT IV (Common Law Trademark Infringement)

· COUNT VII [sic] (Common Law Unfair Competition)

· COUNT VIII (Forgery Under Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(b))

· COUNT IX (Counterfeiting Under Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(a))

· COUNT X (Common Law Unjust Enrichment)

· COUNT XI (Attorneys’ Fees)

Coach asks the court, inter alia, to enter judgment against the defendants on all counts; for an injunction against further wrongful activity; to order that all infringing materials be recalled and disposed of; to award to Coach statutory damages of $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of good; to award punitive damages; and to award to Coach its costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip: Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”), a directorate of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is one of the agencies charged with investigating counterfeit goods. Much of the sales volume of counterfeit goods has moved to the Internet and, as part of its efforts, HSI is authorized to petition a court to order the seizure of domain names of websites selling counterfeit goods over the Internet.

One such seized domain name, http://designsfauxreal.com/, has been redesigned by HSI as a warning for visitors and includes such advertising copy as “FREE identity theft with every purchase” and “LOOK! Low quality counterfeit product. On closer inspection, alligator may resemble a tadpole.”

June 26, 2013

Microsoft Sues Mister HardDrive and Mark Cady for Copyright and Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

New Albany, Ind. — Intellectual property lawyers for Microsoft Corp. of Redmond, Wash. sued Mister HardDrive and Mark Cady of Scottsburg, Ind. alleging infringement of copyrighted work TX 5-407-055 titled Microsoft Windows XP Professional : version 2002 registered with the U.S. Copyright Office; and Trademark Registration Nos. 1,200,236; 1,256,083; 1,872,264 and 2,744,843 registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

Microsoft, the seventh largest publically traded company in the world, has sued Mister Harddrive, a business entity of unknown legal structure that is also known as Mister HardDrive’s Wipe and Restore (“Mister HardDrive”), and Mark Cady, an individual, alleging that they engaged in copyright and trademark infringement; false designation of origin, false description and representation; and unfair competition.

Microsoft develops, markets, distributes and licenses computer software. Microsoft’s software programs are recorded on discs, and they are packaged and distributed together with associated proprietary materials such as user’s guides, user’s manuals, end user license agreements, and other components. Mister HardDrive is engaged in the business of advertising, marketing, installing, offering, and distributing computer hardware and software, including products sold as Microsoft software.

In its complaint, Microsoft alleges that Mister HardDrive and Mark Cady offered, installed, and distributed unauthorized copies of Microsoft software and thereby infringed Microsoft’s copyrights, trademarks and/or service mark. Infringement and/or misappropriation of Microsoft’s copyrights, advertising ideas, style of doing business, slogans, trademarks and/or service mark in defendants’ advertising is also alleged.

Microsoft asserts that in December 2012, defendants were found to have distributed computer systems with unauthorized copies of Windows XP installed on them. Microsoft asked defendants to stop making and distributing infringing copies of Microsoft software but claims that additional computers with unauthorized copies of Windows XP were subsequently distributed by defendants. Microsoft claims that such distribution of counterfeit and infringing copies of their software — along with related infringing items — is ongoing.

The complaint lists the following counts:

· First Claim [Copyright Infringement – 17 U.S.C. § 501, et seq.]

· Second Claim [Trademark Infringement – 15 U.S.C. § 1114]

· Third Claim [False Designation Of Origin, False Description And Representation –

· 15 U.S.C. § 1125 et seq.]

· Fourth Claim [Indiana Common Law Unfair Competition]

· Fifth Claim [For Imposition Of A Constructive Trust Upon Illegal Profits]

· Sixth Claim [Accounting]

Microsoft asks that the court adjudge that the defendants have willfully infringed its federally registered copyright; that the defendants have willfully infringed several of its federally registered trademarks and one of its service marks; that the defendants have committed and are committing acts of false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, and false or misleading representation against Microsoft; and that the defendants have engaged in unfair competition in violation of Indiana common law.

Microsoft seeks damages, an accounting, the imposition of a constructive trust upon defendants’ illegal profits, and injunctive relief.

Practice Tip: Microsoft has named as defendants both the business entity and the individual who has been identified as related to Mister HardDrive as “an owner, operator, officer, [or] shareholder, [who] does business as and/or otherwise controls” the business. A corporate officer, director or shareholder is, as a general matter, personally liable for all torts which he authorizes or directs or in which he participates, even if he acted as an agent of the corporation and not on his own behalf.