Indiana State Law

September 19, 2014

Indiana Unfair Competition Litigation: Property Damage Appraisers Sues Clinton Body Shop and Its Owner

Indianapolis, Indiana – Texas defamation and franchise attorneys for Property Damage

Appraisers (“PDA”), in conjunction with Indiana co-counsel, sued alleging that John Mosley (“Mosley”), owner of the Clinton Body Shop, Inc. of Clinton, Mississippi, committed unfair competition under the Lanham Act by falsely representing the nature of an estimate made by one of PDA’s franchisees. Various state-law claims have also been pled to the court. This unfair competition lawsuit was initially filed in Indiana state court. It was removed from the Marion County Superior Court to the Southern District of Indiana by Indiana intellectual property attorneys for Defendants.

Plaintiff PDA is a national franchisor with a network of approximately 185 independent franchisees that are in the business of performing inspections on vehicles and other property. It has been in business for over 50 years. Defendant Mosley is the owner of the Clinton Body Shop. Clinton Body Shop advertises itself as a one-stop, full-service shop for automobile services.

Mosley is accused of inducing a PDA franchisee, John Larry Gentry, into providing a nonconforming auto-services estimate on PDA letterhead. PDA contends that Gentry was told that this estimate was only for comparison purposes and that it would be provided only to the Mississippi Attorney General’s office.

PDA claims that, instead, Mosley subsequently e-mailed this estimate to the Indiana Auto Body Association. PDA also asserts that Mosley mischaracterized the contents of, and process involved in writing, the estimate. According to the complaint, Mosley also delivered this nonconforming estimate to “other body shops around the country, making the same misrepresentations.”

In its complaint, filed by Texas defamation and franchise lawyers for PDA, in conjunction with Indiana co-counsel, the following counts are listed:

• Count I: Federal Unfair Competition (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))
• Count II: State Unfair Competition
• Count III: Defamation
• Count IV: Tortious Interference with Business Relationships

PDA asks the court for damages, including exemplary damages; interest; attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs; and a permanent injunction.

Practice Tip: The vast majority of Indiana intellectual property litigation takes place in federal court, as the intellectual property causes of action that are most often litigated creations of federal statutory law. Thus, they may be heard in federal court under federal-question jurisdiction. However, some intellectual property lawsuits – for example, litigation involving a trademark that is registered only with the state of Indiana and used solely within Indiana’s boundaries – may occur in Indiana state court.

September 11, 2014

Loretta Rush Sworn in as Chief Justice of Indiana Supreme Court

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Loretta H. Rush (pictured)succeeds former Chief Justice Brent Dickson as Chief

Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court.

Rush was appointed to the Indiana Supreme Court by then-Governor Mitch Daniels in 2012. Prior to her appointment, Rush was elected as a Tippecanoe Superior Court judge, where she served for 14 years. During her tenure as a Tippecanoe judge, Rush assisted with the creation of the county’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) program. During that time, she also helped initiate, develop and sustain more than twenty-five youth programs. In 2003, she was named the best juvenile court judge in the state.

August 7, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: Rieke Corporation Sues Riekes Packaging Corporation for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana – An Indiana trademark attorney for Rieke Corporation d/b/a Rieke Packaging Systems of Auburn, Indiana sued in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that Riekes Packaging Corporation of Nebraska infringed the trademark Rieke Packaging Systems®, Trademark No. 2742836, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Plaintiff Rieke Corporation states that it is one of the largest manufacturers of packaging components in the world. Its product line includes pumps, foamers, and sprayers for household dispensers as well as plastic and steel closures, caps, drum and pail enclosures, rings and levers for the industrial market. These products are used to store, transport, process and dispense various products in the agricultural, beverage, food, household products, industrial, medical, nutraceutical, personal care and pharmaceutical markets.

Plaintiff asserts that it has spent a considerable amount of money establishing the “Rieke Packaging Systems” trade name and trademark in the minds of customers as a source of high-quality and reliable packaging dispensers and closures. It claims that the trade name and trademark have become associated in the minds of purchasers with Plaintiff as “one of the largest and most reputable manufacturers and distributors of high quality and reliable packaging dispensers and closures in the world.”

Defendant Riekes Packaging Corporation has been manufacturing and selling packaging components since the corporation’s formation in 2012, according to Plaintiff. Rieke Corporation indicates that the “Riekes Packaging Corporation” name is shown on Defendant’s glass bottles, plastic bottles, plastic closures, caps, metal closures, dispensing closures and systems, tubes and other similar goods.

In this Indiana trademark lawsuit, Rieke Corporation accuses Riekes Packaging Corporation of knowing, deliberate, and intentional violations of Plaintiff’s trademark rights, stating Defendant’s use of the “Riekes Packaging Corporation” trade name or trademark with or on its products is likely to cause confusion in the marketplace regarding whether there is an association between Plaintiff and Defendant and as to the source or origin of Defendant’s goods. In their complaint, filed by an Indiana trademark lawyer, Plaintiff lists the following counts:

Count I-rademark Infringement under the Lanham Act
Count II-Unfair Competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Count III-Common Law Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition

Rieke Corporation asks the court to:

• enjoin Defendant and its agents from using “Riekes Packaging Corporation” as business name; in connection with sales or other commercial activities; or in a way that would be likely to lead others to believe that Defendant or its products were connected with Plaintiff;

• enjoin Defendant from engaging in any other activity that would constitute unfair competition;

• direct Defendant to recall infringing materials;

• declare that Defendant’s use of “Riekes Packaging Corporation” in connection with the sale of packaging products and components constitutes trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and the common law of the state of Indiana;

• direct that Defendant cancel or otherwise modify any trademark applications containing the “Riekes Packaging Corporation” name; and

• award to Rieke Corporation damages, including enhanced damages, costs and attorney’s fees.

Practice Tip: Under U.S. trademark law, trademarks that are primarily surnames, or which consist of a surname and other material that is not registrable as a trademark, are treated the same as descriptive trademarks. Thus, the trademark will not be protected as intellectual property until it has achieved secondary meaning through advertising and/or use over an extended period of time. Once that surname has acquired secondary meaning, it may be protectable as a trademark and others can be prevented from using the trademark on confusingly similar goods, even if that person has the same last name. So, for example, Joe McDonald could expect a legal challenge – presumably one that would succeed – if he opened a restaurant named “McDonald’s,” despite that “McDonald” is his last name.

August 4, 2014

Indiana Patent Litigation: Tippmann Family Dispute Regarding Patent Ownership and Validity Escalates to Litigation

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana – Indiana patent attorneys for Vincent P. Tippmann, Sr. Family, LLC and Tippmann Refrigeration, Inc., both of Fort Wayne, Indiana, filed an intellectual property lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana against Gerald Tippmann of Fort Wayne, Indiana to correct ownership of Patent No. 8,220,287, “Apparatus and Method for Blast Freezing or Thawing A Product,” which was issued by the U.S. Patent Office. In addition to listing requests regarding inventorship, this Indiana patent lawsuit asks the court to, in the alternative, grant a judgment under Indiana State law of negligent misrepresentation and constructive fraud on the part of Defendant, Gerald Tippmann, and for associated relief and damages.

Vincent P. Tippmann Sr. Family, LLC (“Tippmann Family, LLC”) claims ownership of the patent-in-suit, a technology that facilitates rapid and efficient freezing and thawing of food products. It also indicates that it is the inventing and owning company of various patents and patent applications related to apparatuses and methods for blast freezing and/or thawing of products.

Rapid freezing was historically done in blast freezers, which are expensive and result in irregular freezing rates across arranged product stacks. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Gerald Tippmann and Vincent P. Tippmann Jr. (presumably an employee of Tippmann Family, LLC) were the first to recognize, and jointly design, test and reduce to practice a new method and system for freezing and thawing boxes or pallets of a commodity more efficiently and rapidly through the strategic arrangement of product boxes and pallets to create a directional airflow.

This Indiana patent litigation concerns that invention, U.S. Patent No. 8,220,287 (the “‘287 Patent”), for which Tippmann Family, LLC is the assignee. According to Plaintiffs, the inventor declaration for the patent-in-suit that was signed by Gerald Tippmann averred that he and Vincent P. Tippmann Jr. were co-inventors and that the invention “was not in public use or on sale in the United States of America more than one year prior to filing this application.”

In May 2012, Gerald Tippmann left the employ of Tippmann Refrigeration, and became associated with Tippmann Construction, LLC (“Tippmann Construction”), a competitor of Tippmann Family, LLC. The owners of the Tippmann Family, LLC and the competing Tippmann Construction are relatives.

In June 2013, Gerald Tippmann and the Indiana patent lawyer for Tippmann Construction prepared a supplemental inventor declaration and disclosure statement to “clarify” statements Gerald Tippmann had made in his previous disclosures in the Tippmann Family, LLC applications. According to Plaintiffs, this supplemental declaration directly contradicts all previous declarations made by Gerald Tippmann with regard to his joint inventorship with Vincent P. Tippmann Jr., especially including its assertions that Gerald Tippmann was the sole inventor of the patent-in-suit.

In this supplemental declaration, Gerald Tippmann also indicates that he had been “mistaken” regarding the initial public display of the invention. Specifically, he claims that he had commercialized and publically used the underlying invention while in the employ of an unrelated Florida company called Citrus World on or about 1996-97.

The complaint, filed by Indiana intellectual property counsel, lists the following causes of action:

• Declaratory Judgment of Joint Inventorship, Correction of Inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256
• Negligent Misrepresentation under Indiana State Law
• Constructive Fraud under Indiana State Law

Plaintiffs ask that the court:

(a) Find that Gerald Tippmann and Vincent P. Tippmann Jr. are the true inventors of the ‘287 Patent;
(b) Find that Gerald Tippmann’s actions at Citrus World were an experimental use, not a public use or a commercialization, and that the invention was not ready for patenting at that time;
(c) Estop Gerald Tippmann from declaring the assertions set forth in his Declaration in the related continuation and divisional applications associated with the ‘287 Patent and any future related patents that he has assigned to the Tippmann Family, LLC;
(d) Award to Tippmann Family, LLC all costs and attorney’s fees;
(e) Alternatively to (a)-(d), find that Gerald Tippmann has committed negligent misrepresentation with respect to the actions described above, and that the Tippmann Family, LLC be awarded costs, attorney’s fees, and damages; and
(f) Alternatively to (a)-(d), find that Gerald Tippmann has committed constructive fraud with respect to the actions described above, and that the Tippmann Family, LLC be awarded costs, attorney’s fees, and damages.

Practice Tip: Public disclosure – as Gerald Tippmann has apparently claimed – is often, but not always, a bar to patentability. Indiana inventors are advised to consult with an Indiana patent lawyer to determine whether their invention(s) can be protected under U.S. patent law.

July 25, 2014

Indiana Passes New Statute Criminalizing Offenses Against Intellectual Property

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Indiana Code § 35-43-1-7 has been made effective as of July 1, 2014.

This new criminal statute, enacted by P.L.158-2013, SEC. 458, covers certain computer-related offenses against intellectual property. It takes the place of 35‐43‐1‐4, which was repealed.

Indiana Code § 35-43-1-7 reads, in full:

June 23, 2014

Indiana Copyright Law: Three Default Judgments of $2,500 Ordered for Copyright Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – In Bell v. Glacier International, District Judge Tanya Walton Pratt (pictured) of the Southern District of Indiana granted default judgments against three defendants, DiamondIndyLimo.com, Lon Dunn and Glacier International. In the three nearly identical opinions, the three defendants were each ordered to pay statutory damages of $2,500 for infringing a copyrighted photograph.

In January 2013, Indiana copyright attorney and professional photographer Richard N. Bell, acting as his own copyright lawyer, sued alleging copyright infringement under the Copyright Act and conversion under Indiana statutory law as a result of the allegedly unauthorized use of a photograph he had taken. This photograph had been registered with the United States Copyright Office.

In this lawsuit, Bell sued forty-eight Defendants: Jerry Gordon; Demand Media, Inc.; Bryce Welker; Royal Corniche Travel Ltd.; VRBO.com, Inc.; Experience Credit Unions, LLC; Jaclothing.com; Glacier International; ABNHotels.com; 1&1 Internet, Inc.; Conde Nast Digital; Flixter, Inc.; Financing-USA.com; SodaHead, Inc.; NuMedia Marketing, Inc.; Jynell Berkshire; Tzvetelin Petrov; Los Pentecostales del Area de la Bahia; 10Best, Inc.; Keyes Outdoor Advertising; Zoom Communications Inc.; Christine Nevogt; Zarzar, Inc.; Hydro-Gear; Tam T. Dang; Lon Dunn; William McLaws, Trustee; Natl-electronic Residential Payment History Recording Agency; CVI; Constant Contact, Inc.; Charles Lantz; Schumacher Cargo Logistics; Eventbrite, Inc.; Celebrity Entertainment Corp.; Association of Equipment Manufacturers; Yardi Systems Inc.; DiamondIndyLimo.com; Marcelo Santos; National Rural Recruitment & Retention Network; Anbritt Stengele; Pinnacle Sports Equipment, Inc.; Marygrove College; RunAnyCity.com; Buzzle.com, Inc.; Charles Onuska; University of Indianapolis; and PersephoneMagazine.com.

Bell alleged that each Defendant, independent of each other Defendant, “created a website to promote and advertise its own business” and placed Bell’s copyrighted photo on each of the Defendants’ respective websites. In addition to asserting copyright infringement, Bell also alleged criminal misconduct under Indiana statutory law. Bell requested an injunction and a declaratory judgment. He also asked the court for damages for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act as well as treble damages under an Indiana criminal statute prohibiting conversion.

In September 2013, the court entered default judgments against each of the three Defendants. Last week, the court issued three new opinions addressing the damages to be assessed against those Defendants.

The court first discussed the issue of damages for copyright infringement. Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), statutory damages, in lieu of actual damages and profits, may be awarded “in a sum not less than $750 or more than $30,000” for each finding of infringement. A determination of willful copyright infringement permits the court in its discretion to increase the award of statutory damages up to $150,000 per infringement.

In determining the appropriate measure of statutory damages, the court considers factors including: (1) the infringer’s state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and profits earned, by the infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) the deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties; (5) the infringer’s cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value of the infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the parties.

The court declined to find the copyright infringement to be willful, in part because Bell requested statutory damages well under $30,000.00 per instance of infringement. Instead, the court found that $2,500 per Defendant was an appropriate measure of damages. An injunction was also granted, as it would serve the public interest by protecting copyrighted material and encouraging compliance with federal law. The injunction will be lifted upon payment of the award of statutory damages.

A claim of conversion under Indiana state law, and treble damages awarded pursuant to such a claim, was denied as preempted by the Copyright Act. Indiana code § 35-43-4-3(a) provides that a “person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person commits criminal conversion.” However, section 310 of the Copyright Act preempts “all legal or equitable rights that are the equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright” and that “no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.” The court held that the photograph in question was clearly under the scope of the Copyright Act and that Bell had not sufficiently alleged a right apart from the Act. Thus, no damages were available under Bell’s state law conversion claim.

Practice Tip:

Deciding to simply ignore a complaint, as these defendants apparently did, can be a costly error. Failing to present the defendants’ versions of the facts and arguments results in the court considering only the plaintiff’s side of the story. Here, because the defendants chose to leave the complaint unanswered, the well-pled allegations of the plaintiff relating to liability were taken as true.

After the entry of default judgment, the court then conducted an inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages. Again, in such circumstances, it serves a defendant well to plead his case – to present the court with reasons that the plaintiff should not get 100% of what he requests.

Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), a copyright owner may elect actual or statutory damages. Statutory damages range from a sum of not less than $750 to not more than $30,000. The determination of the exact amount is left to the discretion of the court. In this case, Richard Bell asked the court for no less than $5,000. In some cases, courts in determining damages in cases of default judgment have granted the entire amount. In this case, the court took the additional step of considering the cost to purchase Plaintiff Bell’s picture – $200 – and incorporated that into its determination of the proper amount of damages to be awarded.

June 18, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: Liquid Palace Sues E Liquid Palace for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

New Albany, Indiana – Trademark attorneys for Liquid Palace, LLC and Robert W. Kaiser, Jr., both of New Albany, Indiana, filed an intellectual property lawsuit alleging that E Liquid Palace, LLC and Austin Simon, both of Jeffersonville, Indiana, and Russell Simon of Louisville, Kentucky infringed registered trademarks “Genie” and “Liquid Genie“, serial numbers 86107913 and 86107799 by using the registered trademark “Electric Genie“, serial number 86194345. This Indiana trademark litigation, initially filed in Indiana state court, was removed to the Southern District of Indiana.

Liquid Palace manufactures, distributes and sells electronic cigarettes, also known as e-cigarettes, and related products through brick-and-mortar and e-commerce channels. Liquid Palace indicates that it began conducting business on or around March 21, 2013. It claims that, in the next few days, it registered the domain name “liquidpalace.com” and began using the trademark “Liquid Genie” along with an accompanying image of a genie. Liquid Palace submitted applications for trademarks to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for the “Genie” and “Liquid Genie” word marks, with an accompanying image, in November 2013.

E Liquid Palace, which does business as “Electric Genie,” engages in a similar business approximately 6 miles from Liquid Palace’s retail store. Defendant Austin Simon is asserted to be the sole member of E Liquid Palace. On April 4, 2013, two weeks after Plaintiffs’ claimed business-opening date, Defendants submitted articles of organization to the Indiana Secretary of State to form E Liquid Palace, LLC, while Defendant Russell Simon is listed as the owner of the “Electric Genie” trademark.

Liquid Palace contends that it owns rights to the marks “Genie”, “Liquid Genie” and “Electronic Genie”. It claims that Defendants are using those marks and/or marks that are substantially similar. Liquid Palace asserts that these actions violate its trademark rights.

In its complaint, filed by trademark attorneys for Plaintiffs, the following counts are alleged:

• Count I: Violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
• Count II: Common Law Trademark Infringement
• Count III: Intentional Interference with Prospective Business Advantage and/or Intentional Interference with Business Relationships
• Count IV: Unfair Competition
• Count V: Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs seek damages, including compensatory and punitive damages; statutory and/or liquidated damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1051; interest; injunctive relief and costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip:

Plaintiffs may have a difficult case to prove. They claim that at “the time the Defendants’ submitted articles of organization for [E Liquid Palace], the Defendants knew or should have known that the Plaintiff’s [sic] claimed a right to use ‘Liquid Palace’ in its business operations and that the intentional registration of ‘E Liquid Palace, LLC’ would confuse and/or mislead the consuming public.” However, Plaintiffs’ entity, Liquid Palace, LLC, is shown on the website of the Indiana Secretary of State to have been created in Kentucky on April 9, 2013, after the creation of E Liquid Palace, LLC.

Moreover, given that E Liquid Palace, LLC is the Defendants’ legal name, not the name under which they present themselves to the public, Liquid Palace is going to have a hard time showing confusion in the marketplace resulting from any similarities between the legal names of the entities.

It will also be interesting to see how the court handles any competing rights conferred by the registration of the marks at issue, given that both Plaintiff(s) and Defendant(s) have rights in federally registered marks.

Finally, the core infringement standard for trademark law is the “likelihood of confusion” test. This test imposes liability if a substantial number of consumers are likely to be confused by a defendant’s use of a trademark in which the plaintiff in the litigation has intellectual property rights. Given the exceedingly short period of time for which Plaintiffs here claim exclusive use of any mark in question, proving that consumers have come to identify Plaintiffs’ marks exclusively with their goods will be challenging.

May 23, 2014

Indiana Copyright Law: Court Orders Severance of Misjoined Copyright Infringement Complaint

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Magistrate Judge Denise K. LaRue, writing for the Southern District of Indiana, directed the Clerk of the Court to sever all but one defendant from the copyright infringement complaint of Richard Bell, an Indiana copyright attorney. Bell was also ordered by the court to pay separate filing fees for each new cause of action.

Bell is a copyright lawyer and a professional photographer. He contends that he is the owner of two copyrighted photographs of Indianapolis taken in March 2000. The photos have been registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.

In April, Bell filed another copyright infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging copyright infringement of his photos by numerous Defendants. The Defendants were: Diversified Vehicle Services of Marion County, Indiana; Cameron Taylor and Taylor Computer Solutions of Indianapolis, Indiana; Rhonda Williams of Indianapolis, Indiana; Forensic Solutions, Inc. of Waterford, New York; Heath Garrett of Nashville, Tennessee; CREstacom, Inc. of Fishers, Indiana; American Traveler Service Corp LLC, location unknown; Mike Cowper of Martinsville, Indiana; Kimberly Hinds of Indianapolis, Indiana; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute of Troy, New York; EasyStreet Realty of Indianapolis, Indiana; Drohan Management of Reston, Virginia; Metal Markets of Indianapolis, Indiana; Mattison Corporation of Indianapolis, Indiana; Industrial Heating Equipment Association of Taylor Mill, Kentucky; Junk Dawgs of Indianapolis, Indiana and WRTV of Indianapolis, Indiana. Bell is both the copyright lawyer and Plaintiff in this lawsuit.

In this earlier complaint, Bell alleged that each Defendant, independent of each other Defendant, “created their individual website to promote and market their business” and placed the Plaintiff’s copyrighted photo on each of the Defendants’ respective websites. Claiming copyright infringement, unfair competition and theft, Bell asked the court for, inter alia, the maximum allowable statutory damages for each copyright violation.

The court ordered Bell to show cause why all defendants but one should not be severed for misjoinder. Bell argued that the rules regarding joinder should be given a broad scope so that multiple lawsuits could be avoided.

The court was not persuaded. In addressing Bell’s contention that joinder of the unrelated Defendants was proper, it was Bell’s own language, and the factual underpinnings of that language, to which the court pointed in denying joinder. The court noted that Bell’s “complaint alleges that ‘[e]ach defendant, independently of each other, created or had created a website to promote and advertise the business of each Defendant,’ and that Plaintiff discovered that ‘the website [of] each of these Defendants contained [one of the photographs].'” The court also noted that “[e]xcept for defendants Cameron Taylor and Taylor Computer Solutions, the Complaint contains no allegation that any defendant acted in concert with another defendant in appropriating Plaintiff’s photographs and it does not allege any transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences in which two or more defendants participated.” (Citations omitted.)

The court then reviewed the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2)(A) that a Plaintiff’s claims against defendants joined in the same action must respect or arise out of the same occurrence or the same series of occurrences. While Bell had alleged copyright infringement of the same copyrighted material against all Defendants, the court held this to be insufficient. Similarly, while the same types of questions of fact would arise against each Defendant – “e.g., how did the defendant find Plaintiff’s photograph, what did the defendant know about the photograph’s copyright status, did the defendant make commercial use of the photograph, and did the defendant pay for the use of the photograph” – those similar questions of fact provided no logical relationship among the Defendants that would support joinder.

Instead, the court found that each Defendant was accused of independently committing separate and distinct acts of copyright infringement that happened to involve the same photograph.

The court then directed the Clerk of the Court to sever all defendants other than Diversified Vehicle Services from the complaint as it had been filed and to open separate causes for each of the severed defendants, with the exception of defendants Cameron Taylor and Taylor Computer Solutions, which the court directed to be joined in one cause. WRTV was dropped, as Bell indicated that it had been included as a defendant inadvertently.

The court also ordered Bell to pay the $400 filing fee for each of the 15 severed causes of action no later than June 2, 2014.

Practice Tip #1: There has been a growing trend of attempting to monetize copyright infringement. In this particular case, the docket for the initial complaint showed Bell’s demand to be $5,000,000 for the alleged infringing activities. In ruling that “unrelated claims against unrelated defendants belong in different suits, in part to ensure that plaintiffs pay the required filing fees” and subsequently ordering the Plaintiff to pay a separate filing fee for each of the Defendants, Magistrate Judge LaRue has employed one approach that may be useful in combatting such copyright trolling.

Practice Tip #2: Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), a copyright owner may elect actual or statutory damages. Statutory damages range from a sum of not less than $750 to not more than $30,000 per infringed work.

Practice Tip #3: The claims of this case appear calculated to trigger the “advertising injury” clause of many general business liability insurance policies. If a defendant has applicable business insurance, this may allow Bell to negotiate quicker settlements. Overhauser Law Offices, publisher of this Site, counsels clients on insurance coverage for insurance claims.

Practice Tip #4: These latest causes of actions represent the most recent of three ongoing cases filed by Bell asserting infringement of his photos. We have blogged about his copyright infringement litigation before. See here. The Indiana Lawyer also wrote recently about Bell’s copyright litigation. That article includes an interview with Paul B. Overhauser, Managing Partner of Overhauser Law Offices.

May 1, 2014

Insurance Coverage for Advertising Injury: Allstate Held to Have No Duty to Defend or Indemnify Against Allegations of False Advertising

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – An insurance attorney for Allstate Insurance Company of Northbrook, Illinois (“Allstate”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the Southern District of Indiana. Allstate asked the court to declare that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the defendants in a putative class action lawsuit proceeding against the defendants in the Middle District of Georgia. The Indiana court ruled against Defendants Preferred Financial Solutions, Inc. (“PFS”) of Indianapolis, Indiana; Credit Card Relief, Inc. (“CCR”) of Indianapolis, Indiana; Jeffery Brooks, President of PFS and CCR of Zionsville, Indiana and Thomas P. Dakich, d/b/a Dakich & Associates, of Indianapolis, Indiana.

This lawsuit concerns Allstate’s obligations to the defendants with respect to a class action lawsuit filed in Georgia against the defendants and others (the “underlying litigation”). The complaint in the underlying litigation, filed by the underlying plaintiffs, alleges that the defendants are interrelated entities that collectively comprise a debt-adjustment-services operation that targets financially troubled customers and extracts fees for worthless services.

In this litigation, which the underlying plaintiffs are attempting to classify as a class action, it is alleged that the defendants promote themselves in print, on the internet, and in broadcast media as a provider of debt-settlement services, debt-elimination services and debt-reduction services. The underlying plaintiffs contend that the defendants never made any attempts to pay or settle the debts of at least some members of the putative class.

The defendants tendered the complaint to Allstate for defense, asserting that the claims in the underlying litigation triggered potential coverage as a covered peril – an “advertising injury” – under the provisions of their insurance contracts with Allstate.

This issue – whether Allstate’s contract for insurance coverage for an “advertising injury” required them to defend and indemnify the defendants – was submitted to the Indiana District Court. Allstate moved for judgment as a matter of law, asserting that the conduct at issue did not qualify as an advertising injury. It contended that it thus had no duty to provide a defense in the underlying litigation.

Under the terms of the insurance agreement, an “advertising injury” was defined in the insurance contract as an “injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses:

1. Oral or written publication of advertising material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services;
2. Oral or written publication of advertising material that violates a person’s right to privacy;
3. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of business; [and/or]
4. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan as a result of your advertising.”

Excluded from coverage was “[a]ny advertising injury arising out of…[i]ncorrect description of or mistake in advertised price of goods, products or services sold, offered for sale or advertised.”

The Indiana court, in an opinion written by Magistrate Judge Debra McVicker Lynch, noted that there had been no allegation of defamation, violation of privacy, misappropriation of advertising ideas or infringement of intellectual property in defendants’ advertising. As a result, the court concluded that no “advertising injury,” as it was defined in the insurance contract, had occurred. As that holding was dispositive, the court did not reach the issue of whether the exclusion to coverage for “incorrect description” would have applied. As no coverage was found to exist, Allstate was determined to have neither the duty to defend nor to indemnify the defendants.

Practice Tip:

Exclusions to coverage in insurance policies are narrowly construed. However, it seems likely that, had the court not disposed of this matter as not fitting within the definition of “advertising injury,” it would have instead concluded that there was no coverage upon construing the exclusion for “incorrect description” of goods or services offered.

In contrast, businesses sued for defamation, invasion of privacy, misappropriation of advertising ideas and/or infringement of intellectual property, would be wise to consult their commercial general liability insurance policies to evaluate whether such an advertising injury is considered a covered peril.

April 16, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: Roche Diagnostics Sues Polymer Technology Systems for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – An Indiana trademark attorney for Roche Diagnostics GmbH of Roche Picture.jpg Germany and Roche Diagnostics Operations, Inc. of Indianapolis, Indiana (collectively “Roche Diagnostics”) filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Polymer Technology Systems, Inc. d/b/a CHEK Diagnostics of Indianapolis, Indiana (“PTS”) infringed the trademarked “ACCU-CHEK“, Registration Nos. 1,277,867; 2,403,536; 2,628,696; 2,651,417; 2,681,644; 2,703,048; 2,732,629; 3,071,846; 3,076,905; 3,127,170; 3,194,287; 3,199,675; 3,202,402; 3,256,740; 3,411,797; 3,481,185; 3,595,149; 3,602,825; 3,609,052; 3,676,782; 3,703,434; 3,991,903; 3,749,950; 4,214,217; 4,230,563; and 4,226,844, which have been issued by the U.S. Trademark Office.

The Roche Diagnostics entities are global providers of medical products that help healthcare providers and consumers to prevent, diagnose, treat and manage diseases and other medical conditions. Included in the Roche Diagnostics offerings are products and services relating to diabetes care, including blood-glucose testing, monitoring and analysis. In connection with these products and services, Roche Diagnostics owns and uses numerous registrations for the federally registered trademark Accu-Chek and related marks.

Defendant PTS is a manufacturer of point-of-care diagnostic products headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana. PTS designs, manufactures, and markets products for distribution in over 120 countries around the world and has sales offices in Europe, Latin America, and the Pacific Rim, and manufacturing facilities in Indianapolis, Indiana and Sunnyvale, California.

For several years prior to this trademark infringement complaint by Roche Diagnostics, PTS had sold a product under the name CardioChek, a medical device that measures blood cholesterol. Roche Diagnostics states that it did not assert its trademark rights to oppose the sale of CardioChek when it was marketed under the business name “Polymer Technology Systems.”

In March 2014, PTS announced that it was making two changes. According to a press release, it would be changing its business name to “CHEK Diagnostics” and would begin offering a line of diabetes-care products, the AICNow® family of products, which PTS had purchased from Bayer Diabetes Care. This new line of products would be offered under the CHEK Diagnostics business name. Roche Diagnostics contends the expansion into this new market, in conjunction with Defendants’ changed business name, violates its trademark rights and is likely to cause confusion, mistake and/or deception as to the source of PTS’s diabetes-care goods.

In its complaint, filed by an Indiana trademark lawyer, Roche Diagnostics asserts trademark infringement of its Accu-Chek trademarks under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) and § 1125 (a) of the Lanham Act, as well as trademark infringement and unfair competition in violation of the common law of the State of Indiana.

Roche Diagnostics requests that the court enjoin PTS from using “CHEK Diagnostics” as a company name or in a manner in any way related to the promotion or sale of diabetes-care products. It asks that the court direct PTS to immediately recall any materials bearing the “CHEK” business name and to order PTS to cancel or modify any pending trademark registrations that include the CHEK name.

Roche Diagnostics also seeks monetary damages as well as a declaration by the court that the use of “CHEK Diagnostics” as a company name, or in a manner in any way related to the sale or promotion of diabetes-care products, would constitute trademark infringement and unfair competition under both federal and Indiana-state law.

Practice Tip: The protection afforded to a registered trademark is not exhaustive in scope. Among the limits to its applicability are restrictions based on the type of business and product to which the trademark pertains. In this case, while Roche may have declined to object to PTS’s use of “CHEK” in conjunction with the sale of a non-diabetes-related product (here, a cholesterol-measuring product), that failure to object is unlikely to waive its right to assert infringement later if the word “CHEK” is used to market a product that is allegedly related to the product for which Roche Diagnostics owns a trademark (here, the purportedly similar line of diabetes products to be offered by PTS).