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November 13, 2013

Endotach’s Patent Infringement Lawsuit Against Cook Medical Dismissed for Lack of Standing

Indianapolis, Indiana – Endotach LLC of Plano, Texas sued Cook Medical Inc. of Bloomington, Indiana alleging infringement of Endovascular Bypass Graft, U.S. Patent No. 5,122,154 (the “‘154 patent”) and Endovascular Stent with Secure Mounting Means, U.S. Patent No. 5,593,417 (the “‘417 patent”; collectively, the “Rhodes patents”) issued by the U.S. Patent Office. Endotach filed its complaint in the Northern District of Florida. The case was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana upon Cook’s request.

The patents at issue, both of which were issued in the 1990s, were granted to Dr. Valentine Rhodes, an award-winning surgeon who practiced in the field of vascular medicine for over 30 years. The patents are directed to intraluminal and endovascular grafts for placement within a blood vessel, duct or lumen to hold it open. As it pertains to this lawsuit, the patents-in-suit are used for revascularization of aneurysms or stenosis occurring in blood vessels which includes anchoring projections to aid in securing the graft in place within the blood vessel.

Upon the death of Dr. Rhodes, the patents-in-suit passed as part of his estate. Dr. Rhodes’ Will bequeathed all “tangible personal property” to his wife, Brenda Rhodes (“Mrs. Rhodes”). However, there was no specific bequest of the Rhodes patents or mention of any intangible property. The Will’s residuary clause bequeathed “all the residue of [Dr. Rhodes’] estate, real and personal” to a Trust (the “Rhodes Trust”). Upon Dr. Rhodes’ death, his two daughters and Mrs. Rhodes became Co-Trustees of the Trust.

In November 2009, Mrs. Rhodes executed a document entitled “Exclusive License Agreement,” listing herself as the “patent owner.” The agreement purported to transfer an exclusive license on the ‘417 patent to Acacia Patent Acquisition LLC. That license was later assigned to Endotach and amended to include the ‘154 patent.

Endotach sued Cook in July 2012 asserting infringement of one or more claims in each of the patents-in-suit. In that complaint, it asserted that Mrs. Rhodes owned the patents-in-suit and that, as a result of the exclusive license Mrs. Rhodes had granted, Endotach had the right to enforce the patents against all infringers.

Cook moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing that Endotach did not have standing to bring suit. On July 12, 2013, presumably in response to the motion, an “amendment” to the exclusive licensing agreement transferred an exclusive license on the Rhodes patents to Endotach from the Rhodes Trust. It was signed by Mrs. Rhodes and the other Co-Trustees.

In this opinion, Senior Judge Larry J. McKinney addressed Cook’s contention that Endotach did not have standing to sue. The court concluded that Endotach did lack standing as Mrs. Rhodes did not have any individual property interest in the Rhodes patents at the time that she purported to convey an exclusive license. The court dismissed Endotach’s lawsuit without prejudice.

Practice Tip #1: The principle of standing that is important in this case is whether or not Endotach had any legal rights and interests to the Rhodes patents at the time it filed suit. While there are some exceptions, in general, a plaintiff may not sue to assert rights held by third parties.

Practice Tip #2: Apparently realizing that the earlier effort to convey the license might be successfully challenged (as it was) and the case dismissed as a result (as it was), an additional complaint was filed on July 16, 2013, shortly after a new attempt was made to convey to Endotach an exclusive license to the patents-in-suit, this time by the Rhodes Trust. See here.

November 7, 2013

WindStream Sues Rambo and Keebler for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

New Albany, Indiana – WindStream Technologies, Inc. of North Vernon, Indiana filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Rambo LLC, Rambo Montrow Corporation (collectively, “Rambo”) and Rick Keebler, all of Madison, Indiana, as well as ten unidentified John Does residing in Indiana, infringed its trademarked TurboMill, Trademark Registration No. 3,986,494, which has been registered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

WindStream manufactures wind turbines for municipal, residential and commercial use. Those turbines are shipped worldwide from its Indiana manufacturing facility. It contracted with Rambo and Keebler, who is asserted to be a principal of the Rambo entities, to provide component parts and to act as an authorized dealer of TurboMill turbines in certain territories.

WindStream has multiple contractual disputes with Defendants and Defendants’ predecessors in interest and asserts that component parts in which WindStream has an interest are being held “hostage” in an attempt to renegotiate the terms of one of the contracts. Further, WindStream contends that the failure of Defendants to deliver the parts has damaged its business. WindStream also charges Defendants with unfair competition, claiming that they are selling WindStream products, including WindStream’s TurboMill, as their own. Finally, it asserts that, among the prospective customers that Keebler and Rambo are targeting are individuals and entities that had previously been identified by WindStream as potential customers.

In its complaint, filed by the trademark attorney for WindStream, the following counts are alleged:

• Federal Unfair Competition and Passing Off (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))
• Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114)
• Breach of Contract (Dealer Agreement)
• Breach of Contract (Purchase Orders)
• Interference with Contract and Prospective Economic Advantage

WindStream asks the court for an injunction prohibiting trademark infringement and similar conduct; damages, including treble damages; punitive damages for Defendants’ willful and malicious acts; and attorney’s fees and costs of the lawsuit.

Practice Tip: The complaint asserts that the trademark for TurboMill was registered on June 28, 2001 and that the mark has been used in commerce since at least 2009. In contrast, the registration is listed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as having occurred on June 28, 2011 with the mark shown as having first been used in commerce in 2011, the same year in which WindStream began manufacturing its wind turbines. While the former inconsistency, which adds exactly ten years to the apparent life of the trademark, can be assumed to be a typographical error, the origin of the latter inconsistency, which adds another two years to the period during which the TurboMill mark is claimed to have been used in commerce, in unclear.

October 24, 2013

BMI Asserts Copyright Infringement Against Blu

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana — Broadcast Music, Inc. of New York, New York (“BMI”) has filed a copyright infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that SC Entertainment, LLC d/b/a Blu and Shawn Cannon (“Cannon”), both of Indianapolis, Indiana, infringed the copyrighted works LAST NIGHT A D.J. SAVED MY LIFE, SHOW ME LOVE, and I’LL BE AROUND which have been registered by the U.S. Copyright Office. Five other Plaintiffs,Comart Music, EMI Virgin Songs, Inc. dba EMI Longitude Music, EMI Blackwood Music, Inc, Song A Tron Music, and Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corporation, are also listed in the complaint.

Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) is a “performing rights society” under 17 U.S.C. § 101 that operates on a non-profit-making basis and licenses the right to publicly perform copyrighted musical works on behalf of the copyright owners of these works. The other Plaintiffs in this action are the copyright owners of the three compositions at issue in this lawsuit.
SC Entertainment is an Indiana limited liability company that operates Blu, an establishment which is asserted to publicly perform musical compositions and/or cause musical compositions to be publicly performed.

BMI asserts that Cannon is a member of SC Entertainment and that he has primary responsibility for the operation and management of the company and of Blu. Cannon also allegedly has the right and ability to supervise the activities of SC Entertainment and a direct financial interest in the company and in Blu.

BMI and the other Plaintiffs, via copyright counsel, have asserted willful copyright infringement of the three copyrights-in-suit in their complaint. They further claim that the Defendants’ entire course of conduct, including the ongoing unauthorized public performances of the copyrighted works, has caused and is continuing to cause the Plaintiffs great and incalculable damage.

Practice Tip:

The Copyright Act empowers a plaintiff to elect to receive an award of statutory damages between $750 and $30,000 per infringement in lieu of an award representing the plaintiffs’ actual damages and/or the defendants’ profits. In a case where the copyright owner proves that infringement was committed willfully, the court may increase the award of statutory damages to as much as $150,000 per infringed work. A finding of willful infringement will also support an award of attorney’s fees.

Furthermore, not only is the performer liable for infringement, but so is anyone who sponsors the performance. A corporate officer will be found jointly and severally liable with his corporation for copyright infringement if he (1) had the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity, and (2) has a direct financial interest in such activities.

September 13, 2013

Steak n Shake Sues for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Denver, Colorado — Intellectual property lawyers for Steak n Shake Enterprises, Inc. and Steak n Shake, LLC of Indianapolis, Indiana (collectively “Steak n Shake”) sued in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging that Globex Company, LLC; Springfield Downs, LLC; Christopher Baerns; Larry Baerns; Kathryn Baerns and Control, LLC, all of Colorado, are infringing the “Steak n Shake” marks, which have been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Non-party Steak n Shake Operations, Inc., Steak n Shake Enterprises’ parent company, has continuously operated Steak n Shake restaurants specializing in burgers and milkshakes since 1934. There are currently 415 company-owned Steak n Shake restaurants in 15 states across the country. In addition, Steak n Shake Enterprises grants franchises to establish and operate Steak n Shake restaurants pursuant to written franchise agreements with Steak n Shake Enterprises, and written license agreements with Steak n Shake, LLC. There are currently 100 franchised Steak n Shake restaurants operating in 23 states, including Colorado. Steak n Shake asserts that the Steak n Shake trademarks, and the products and services offered in association with those marks, have been extensively promoted throughout the United States for many years.

This action against Defendants arose subsequent to the termination of franchise and license agreements between Plaintiffs Steak n Shake Enterprises, Inc., as franchisor, and Steak n Shake, LLC, as licensor, and Defendants as franchisees, licensees and/or guarantors. Steak n Shake contends that Defendants materially breached their obligations under the franchise and license agreements and failed to cure such breaches. As a result, Steak n Shake terminated the agreements.

Steak n Shake alleges that, notwithstanding the termination of the franchise and license agreements, Defendants continue to use the Steak n Shake name and marks in connection with the operation of competitive restaurants at the same locations as their former franchised Steak n Shake restaurants, and to hold their restaurants out to the public as authentic Steak n Shake restaurants.

In the complaint, trademark attorneys for Steak n Shake assert the following:

· Count I – Trademark Infringement

· Count II – Unfair Competition

· Count III – Breach of Contract – Specific Performance

· Count IV – Breach of Contract – Damages

· Count V – Breach of Guaranty – Damages

Steak n Shake seeks the following relief against Defendants, jointly and severally: preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendants’ trademark infringement and unfair competition, and ordering Defendants to perform their post-termination obligations under their franchise and license agreements and area development agreement, including their noncompetition covenants; recovery of the amounts owed to them by Defendants, including the damages each has sustained by reason of Defendants’ breaches and the resulting termination of the franchise and license agreements and area development agreement; and an award of the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Steak n Shake.

Practice Tip: Franchise agreements typically require the franchisee to cease using all of the franchise marks, as well as return all items bearing the franchise marks, in the event the franchise agreement is terminated. Failure to comply promptly with these provisions can lead to liability for trademark infringement, among other claims.

September 6, 2013

Texas Roadhouse Sues Multiple Restaurants Operating as “Texas Corral” or “Amarillo Roadhouse”

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Grand Rapids, Michigan — Trademark lawyers for Texas Roadhouse, Inc. and Texas Roadhouse Delaware LLC, both of Louisville, Kentucky (collectively, “Texas Roadhouse”) sued for trademark infringement in the Western District of Michigan alleging that the Defendants, including those doing business as multiple Texas Corral restaurants located in Indiana (collectively “Texas Corral”), as well as one Amarillo Roadhouse restaurant, also located in Indiana, infringed the service mark TEXAS ROADHOUSE, Trademark Registration Nos. 1,833,533; 2,231,309; and 2,250,966, which have been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Texas Roadhouse operates a Texas-themed restaurant chain. The first Texas Roadhouse restaurant opened in Clarksville, Indiana in 1993. As of March 2013, there were 397 Texas Roadhouse restaurants in 47 states and three countries.

Texas Roadhouse contends that each of the restaurants is required to comply with strict exterior and interior design requirements so that the look and feel is substantially identical across all Texas Roadhouse locations. It lists three U.S. Service Mark Registrations that include the mark “Texas Roadhouse” and asserts that each of them is incontestable. Texas Roadhouse also claims ownership of various unregistered marks that include the word “Texas” and “Roadhouse” as well as copyright protection, including a U.S. Copyright registration, of its marquee. Finally, Texas Roadhouse claims intellectual-property rights in the trade dress of its restaurants, including the look of the exterior design of the building, the interior décor, the music and the menu.

Texas Corral, against which Texas Roadhouse filed this complaint, also operates casual, western-themed, family restaurants. It owns and operates nine restaurant locations doing business under the name “Texas Corral.” A total of ten locations are at issue in this lawsuit. Six Indiana cities have “Texas Corral” restaurants: Highland, Merrillville, Portage, Michigan City, Martinsville and Shelbyville. Texas Corral also purportedly owns and operates a location that does business as “Amarillo Roadhouse” in Indiana, which is also at issue in this trademark-infringement lawsuit. In addition, three other Texas Corral restaurants have been listed in the complaint: two in Michigan and one in Illinois.

Also listed in the complaint are Paul Switzer, asserted to be the franchisor/licensor of Texas Corral restaurants and Victor Spina, asserted to be a franchisee/licensee. “John Doe Corp.,” a fictitious name intended to represent entities or individuals whose actual identity is not currently known to Texas Roadhouse, is also listed as a Defendant.

In the complaint, trademark attorneys for Texas Roadhouse assert that Texas Corral and Amarillo Roadhouse routinely use trade dress, trademarks, service marks, trade names, designs or logos that are confusingly similar to or copies of intellectual property owned by Texas Roadhouse. This purportedly infringing use is asserted to be visible in signage, print and electronic promotional materials, menus, décor, building design and websites.

Texas Roadhouse’s complaint against Texas Corral and Amarillo Roadhouse lists the following:

· Count I: Trade Dress Infringement

· Count II: Federal Trademark Infringement

· Count III: Trademark Infringement Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 429.42

· Count IV: Trademark Infringement Under Ind. Code § 24-2-1-13

· Count V: Trademark Infringement Under Common Law

· Count VI: Copyright Infringement Under 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

· Count VII: Unfair Competition Under Michigan and Indiana Common Law

Texas Roadhouse asks for a judgment that Texas Roadhouse owns enforceable rights in the Texas Roadhouse intellectual property and that all registrations for the Texas Roadhouse intellectual property are valid; a judgment that the Defendants have been and are directly or indirectly infringing the Texas Roadhouse intellectual property; a judgment that the Defendants have been and are engaging in unfair competition by their unauthorized use of the Texas Roadhouse intellectual property; a judgment that Defendants acted deliberately, willfully, intentionally or with malicious intent; an injunction against Defendants prohibiting infringement; damages, including treble damages; a judgment that this case is exceptional and that the Defendants be ordered to pay all of Texas Roadhouse’s attorney fees associated with this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and 17 U.S.C. § 505; and a judgment that the defendants be ordered to pay all costs and expenses incurred by Texas Roadhouse in this action.

Practice Tip:

The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the requirements for trade dress protection in a similar context. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). At issue in Two Pesos was similar restaurant décor. Taco Cabana had sued rival Two Pesos for copying the look of its restaurant, described as “a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior and exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being sealed off from the outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of the building is a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.” The lawsuit alleged that Two Pesos had imitated this scheme and had thereby infringed on Taco Cabana’s trade dress. Among the issues considered was whether trade dress which was inherently distinctive must also be shown to have secondary meaning to be granted protection under the Lanham Act. The Supreme Court held that trade dress which is inherently distinctive is protectable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act without a showing that it has acquired secondary meaning, since such trade dress itself is capable of identifying products or services as coming from a specific source.

Also at issue in this case, among other matters, will be the eligibility of the words “Texas” and “Roadhouse” for protection under federal and Indiana intellectual-property laws. Under the Lanham Act, a federal law, the holder of a mark may ask the United States Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark on the principal register. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051, et seq. Marks that are “primarily descriptive” and “primarily geographically descriptive” of the goods or services with which they are associated are not eligible for registration on the principal register unless they have “become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(e), (f). Thus, registration of a descriptive mark on the principal register requires a showing of secondary meaning.

Although the Lanham Act protects both registered and unregistered marks, registration is desirable because it constitutes prima facie evidence of the mark’s validity. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a). Thus, federal registration of a mark “‘entitles the plaintiff to a presumption that its registered trademark is not merely descriptive or generic, or, if merely descriptive, is accorded secondary meaning.'” The plaintiff bears the burden, however, of establishing that an unregistered mark is entitled to protection.

The Indiana Trademark Act is similar, and in some respects identical, to the Lanham Act. Although Indiana’s body of trademark law is relatively undeveloped, the General Assembly has specified that the Indiana Trademark Act “is intended to provide a system of state trademark registration and protection that is consistent with the federal system of trademark registration and protection under the Trademark Act of 1946.” Ind. Code Ann. § 24-2-1-0.5. Moreover, “[a] judicial or an administrative interpretation of a provision of the federal Trademark Act may be considered as persuasive authority in construing a provision of the Indiana Trademark Act.

The Indiana Trademark Act’s definitions of “trademark” and “service mark” track the Lanham Act’s definitions of those terms nearly verbatim. See I.C. § 24-2-1-2(8), (9). Like the Lanham Act, the Indiana Trademark Act does not adversely affect common-law trademark rights. See I.C. § 24-2-1-15. Registration of a trademark or service mark with the office of the Indiana Secretary of State provides a registrant with a remedy for the infringement thereof under the Indiana Trademark Act. I.C. § 24-2-1-14(a). Like the Lanham Act, the Indiana Trademark Act prohibits the registration of marks that are “primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively geographically misdescriptive of the goods or services[.]” I.C. § 24-2-1-3. This provision does not, however, prevent the registration of a mark that is used in Indiana by the applicant and has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods or services. In other words, a geographically descriptive mark may be registered under the Indiana Trademark Act if it has acquired secondary meaning.
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July 10, 2013

BMI Wins on Summary Judgment in Infringement Case

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana — The Southern District of Indiana has granted a motion by New York-based Broadcast Music, Inc. et al. for summary judgment against Diamond Investments, Inc. and Salvatore Mazza of Franklin, Indiana for copyright infringement for the unlicensed use of copyrighted musical compositions in live performances at The Juke Box Live.

Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) is a “performing rights society” under 17 U.S.C. § 101 that operates on a non-profit-making basis and licenses the right to publicly perform copyrighted musical works on behalf of the copyright owners of these works. The other plaintiffs in this action are the copyright owners of the eight compositions at issue in this lawsuit.

Diamond Investments, Inc. (“Diamond”) is an Indiana corporation that operated The Juke Box Live, a “nightclub restaurant entertainment venue.” Musical compositions were publicly performed at The Juke Box Live in connection with Diamond’s operation of that business.

Salvatore T. Mazza (“Mazza”) was an officer of Diamond with primary responsibility for the operation and management of Diamond and The Juke Box Live. Mazza also had a direct financial interest in the corporation and The Juke Box Live.

Prior to February 2010, BMI learned that The Juke Box Live was offering musical entertainment without a license from BMI and without permission from the copyright owners whose music was being publicly performed. Between February 4, 2010 and May 31, 2011, BMI repeatedly informed Diamond and Mazza (collectively, “defendants”) in writing of the need to obtain permission for public performances of copyrighted music and offered to enter into a license agreement with defendants, but they refused. BMI also sent four letters instructing defendants to cease unauthorized public performances of BMI’s music and telephoned on 55 occasions to advise defendants of the need to enter into a license agreement.

Nonetheless, the infringement continued. On March 19, 2011, a BMI investigator went to The Juke Box Live and recorded the performance of songs owned by the various non-BMI plaintiffs. An action for copyright infringement of eight works performed at The Juke Box Live, brought pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (the “Copyright Act”), followed.

BMI later moved for summary judgment and the defendants, although represented by counsel, did not respond. The court held that, due to their failure to answer or object to BMI’s requests for admissions, defendants were deemed to have tacitly admitted to copyright infringement.

The court awarded $3,000.00 for each of the eight findings of infringement in this case, for $24,000.00 in total, for the infringement itself. It also found that the infringement had been willful and consequently awarded to the plaintiffs $17,985.55, to cover in full plaintiff’s costs and attorney’s fees. The court also ordered that post-judgment interest be paid. These damages and costs were assessed against Diamond and Mazza jointly and severally.

Finally, the court ordered that Diamond and Mazza, each individually, as well as all persons acting under their permission or authority, be permanently enjoined from infringing the copyrighted musical compositions licensed by BMI.

Practice Tip:

The Copyright Act empowers a plaintiff to elect to receive an award of statutory damages between $750 and $30,000 per infringement in lieu of an award representing the plaintiffs’ actual damages and/or the defendants’ profits. In a case where the copyright owner proves that infringement was committed willfully, the court may increase the award of statutory damages to as much as $150,000 per infringed work. A finding of willful infringement will also support an award of attorney’s fees.

Here, the court awarded $3,000 per infringement plus attorney’s fees. Courts considering awards of statutory damages have recognized that awards in the range of $3,000 to $7,000 or higher per infringement are appropriate in cases where the infringement resulted from deliberate indifference toward copyright laws.

Furthermore, not only is the performer liable for infringement, but so is anyone who sponsors the performance. A corporate officer will be found jointly and severally liable with his corporation for copyright infringement if he (1) had the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity, and (2) has a direct financial interest in such activities.

February 28, 2013

Lilly Sues Genentech to Invalidate Cabilly Patents

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

San Jose, CA – Lilly of Indianapolis, Indiana filed a declaratory judgment suit against Genentech asking the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California to invalidate Genentech’s recombinant-antibody patents.

This suit, filed by patent attorneys for Eli Lilly & Company (“Lilly”) and its subsidiary ImClone Systems LLC, of Delaware, included as defendants both Genentech, Inc. (“Genentech”) and City of Hope National Medical Center (“City of Hope”).

Genentech, also known as “Genetic Engineering Technology, Inc.” is a wholly owned subsidiary of F. Hoffmann-La Roche Holding AG engaged in biotechnology research.

It has won numerous awards as an employer and corporate citizen, including earning the number-one spot on Fortune Magazine’s “100 Best Companies To Work For” in 2006.

City of Hope is a private, not-for-profit clinical research center, hospital and graduate medical school located in Duarte, California.

The suit involves two patents held by Genentech: 6,331,415: “Methods of producing immunoglobulins, vectors and transformed host cells for use therein” (“Cabilly II”) and 7,923,221: “Methods of making antibody heavy and light chains having specificity for a desired antigen,” (“Cabilly III”), together known as the “Cabilly patents” after one of the inventors. They have been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

At issue is the drug Erbitux (cetuximab), made by Lilly’s ImClone unit. Genentech claims that the drug, approved in the U.S. to treat colon cancer and tumors of the head and neck, infringes the Cabilly patents through the unlicensed use of a patented process and various patented starting materials.

Despite that Lilly already has a non-exclusive license to the Cabilly patents, it filed a declaratory judgment action. It asserts that it has no obligation to pay royalties on the sale of Erbitux, arguing that the Cabilly patents are invalid and unenforceable, and, further, not infringed by Lilly. It alleges that Cabilly patents are invalid for, among other reasons, lack of inventorship, inequitable conduct and violation of 35 U.S.C. § 135(c) (which relates to the filing of settlement agreements with the PTO in interference actions). Lilly also alleges that Genentech deceived the U.S. Patent Office into issuing the Cabilly patents.

Lilly seeks a declaratory judgment that the Cabilly patents are invalid and unenforceable, and are not implicated in the manufacture of Erbitux.

Practice Tip: The Cabilly patents have a potentially broad scope and could confront any manufacturer of recombinant antibodies. Genentech has been quoted as stating that the patents broadly cover the co-expression of immunoglobulin heavy and light genes in a single host cell, and are not limited by the type of antibody or host cell. Genentech has also been quoted as stating that the Cabilly II patent is “the backbone of recombinant antibody production in the biotech industry.” Given Genentech’s history of actively litigating this family of patents (see, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc, et al., which was litigated to the U.S. Supreme Court), and the purported broad scope of the Cabilly patents, it seems that litigation regarding these patents may continue for quite some time.

February 22, 2013

BMI and Copyright Owners Sue Carey Tavern and its Owners for Copyright Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, IN – Copyright lawyers for Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”), of New York, NY and eight other plaintiffs have sued VAT, Inc. (“VAT”) d/b/a Carey Tavern and its owners, Matthew and Valerie Schachte of Westfield, IN, for copyright infringement in the Southern District of Indiana.

In its complaint, BMI states that it has been granted the right to license the public performance rights of more than seven million copyrighted musical compositions, including the compositions at issue. The other plaintiffs are the owners of the copyrighted music that was allegedly infringed and include such artists as Dolly Parton, via her sole proprietorship Velvet Apple Music, and R.E.M., via Night Garden Music, a division of R.E.M./Athens LTD. Also plaintiffs in this case are: Sony/ATV Songs, LLC d/b/a Sony/ATV Tree Publishing, Moebetoblame Music, Sony/ATV Songs LLC, ECAF Music, Blues Traveler Publishing Corporation, and Universal Music-Z Tunes LLC d/b/a Universal Music Z Songs.

The suit, brought under The Copyright Act, alleges that the defendants infringed multiple songs in BMI’s repertoire by performing the copyrighted songs and/or causing the copyrighted songs to be performed publically in Carey Tavern. It alleges that there were seven instances of infringement, with each artist-plaintiff having at least one copyrighted song infringed by the defendants.

Plaintiffs allege that VAT has a direct financial interest in Carey Tavern, as do Matthew and Valerie Schachte. Further, it is alleged that Matthew and Valerie Schachte are officers of VAT, with primary responsibility for the operation, management and supervision of the activities of VAT.

The plaintiffs claim that further acts of infringement will injure them irreparably and ask that the court enjoin the defendant from committing further acts of infringement. The plaintiffs also seek statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §504(c) and costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip #1: BMI has a history of actively pursuing litigation in cases where copyrighted songs were performed in bars or restaurants without authorization.

We have previously blogged about BMI:

– BMI Sues Indianapolis Bar for Copyright Infringement of Honky Tonk Women

– BMI Sues Elkhart Bar for Copyright Infringement of Achy Breaky Heart and Other Songs

– BMI Sues Fishers Bar for Copyright Infringement of Counting Crow’s Mister Jones and Other Songs

– Broadcast Music, Inc. et al Sues Bertee’s Inc. et al for Copyright Infringement of Musical Composition

– BMI Sues Diamond Investments Inc. D/B/A The Juke Box Live for Copyright Infringement of Eight Songs

– BMI Sues Olive’or Twist Bar for Copyright Infringement of Unlicensed Performance of Five Songs

– BMI sues Shenanigans for Infringement of Song Copyrights

– BMI Sues R House of Brews for Musical Composition Copyright Infringement

– BMI Sues Bugsy’s Entertainment Group for Copyright Infringement

Practice Tip #2: The plaintiffs have sued not only the business entity but also its two owners as individuals. Copyright laws allow an officer of a corporation to be held liable for the corporation’s copyright infringement if the officer contributes to the infringement by inducing or encouraging the infringement. An officer can also be liable for copyright infringement if the officer supervises the infringing conduct and has a direct financial benefit from the infringement.

June 26, 2012

Dillinger Sues Pour House on Lincoln for Trademark Infringement of PUBLIC ENEMY

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis; IN – Trademark attorneys for Dillinger, LLC of Mooresville, Indiana filed a complaint for injunctive relief and damages in alleging The Pour House on Lincoln, Inc. d/b/a Dillinger’s Chicago Bar & Grill, Inc. of Chicago, Illinois infringed trademark registration nos. 3,483,359 for the mark DILLINGER’S and no. 4,091,160 for the mark PUBLIC ENEMY which have been registered by the US Trademark Office.

Dillinger, LLC is owned and operated by Jeff Scalf and, according to the Complaint, is the descendant of gentleman bandit John Dillinger. Dillinger, LLC owns numerous trademark registrations for DILLINGER, JOHN DILLINGER, PUBLIC ENEMIES, and many other trademarks related to the life of John Dillinger. Dillinger, LLC is also the owner of all rights, title, and interest to both DILLINGER’S and PUBLIC ENEMIES and both marks have been used in interstate commerce in connection with restaurant and bar services as early as 2002. According to the Complaint, Dillinger, LLC has never authorized The Pour House on Lincoln d/b/a Dillinger’s Chicago Bar & Grill to use the DILLINGER or PUBLIC ENEMIES marks in any way and also alleges that in July 2010 it came to their attention that the Defendants were operating a restaurant using the DILLINGER and PUBLIC ENEMIES trademarks. Upon their knowledge of the trademark usage, Dillinger, LLC alleges that The Pour House was contacted about the infringement and in August of the same year they traveled to Indianapolis for the purpose of obtaining a license for the use of the trademarks. The Complaint states that an oral agreement was reached and reduced to writing, but never executed and yet The Pour House willfully continued its infringing usage of the DILLINGER and PUBLIC ENEMIES trademarks, specifically on their website, food and drink menus and the menus posted on the storefront. Dillinger, LLC asserts five counts for the violations of the defendants, including demand for preliminary and permanent injunction; federal trademark infringement; cybersquatting; false designation of origin, false descriptions and unfair competition; and dilution by blurring. In order to avoid any irreparable harm from the loss of reputation the DILLINGER names could suffer as a result of the unauthorized use of the trademarks and the accrual thereof, Dillinger, LLC is seeking to permanently enjoin The Pour House from using the DILLINGER and PUBLIC ENEMIES trademarks or inducing such belief, actual damages suffered as a result of the alleged trademark violations, statutory and exemplary damages, and the profits derived from the infringing activities.

Practice Tip: U.S.C. title 15, chapter 22 governs trademarks, and §1117 specifically details the relief which can be granted as a result of trademark violation.
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May 10, 2012

Southern District Grants Preliminary Injunction for American Petroleum Institute in Trademark Infringement Suit Over API Logo

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis; IN – Judge Tanya Walton Pratt of the Southern District of Indiana has issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Tailor Made Oil Company of Cambridge City, Indiana, TM Oil, LLC of Fishers, Indiana, Circle Town Oil of Fishers, Indiana, et al from infringing trade names API and AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE and trademark registration nos. 1,864,428, 1,868,779 and 1,872,999, which have been registered with the US Trademark Office by the American Petroleum Institute (API) of Washington, DC.

Trademark lawyers for American Petroleum Institute (“API”) of Washington, D.C. filed a trademark infringement suit in alleging Tailor Made Oil Co., LLC of Cambridge City, Indiana, TMO Oil, LLC of Fishers, Indiana, Circle Town Oil of Fishers, Indiana, William R. Selkirk and Rebecca Selkirk of Cambridge City, Indiana, Lincoln R. Schneider of Fishers, Indiana and Jafarikal Corporation of Rosedale, New York infringed trademark. The complaint alleges that the individual defendants own and operate the corporate defendants as an interrelated business that offers low quality engine oil for sale. In March 2010, Tailor Made obtained certification for its engine oil, and a one year license to use the starburst mark on its products. In order to renew the one year license, Tailor Made was required to report its sales and to pay a renewal fee to API. Tailor Made failed to comply with these requirements and has continued to sell products bearing the trademarked starburst without authorization. We blogged about the case when it was filed.

The court’s order states that the defendants did not contest API’s motion for preliminary injunction. The parties submitted a joint proposed order, but did not agree on all aspects of the proposed order. The injunction ordered by the court prevents the defendants from registering or using any infringing marks. It also requires that the Jafarikal Corporation must notify API of its intent to distribute engine oil bearing the API marks and allow API to test any engine oil it distributes bearing the API marks.

Practice Tip: The order ordered that the defendants submit an affidavit of compliance within 10 business days of the injunction.