New Decisions

July 23, 2014

Indiana Trademark Law: Trademark Infringement and Counterfeiting Defendants Held Liable for Both Damages and Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Fees

South Bend, Indiana – Chief Judge Philip P. Simon of the Northern District of Indiana ordered Defendants The Treasure Box, Inc. and Heather Hiatt, both of Elkhart, Indiana to pay statutory damages, attorney’s fees and costs to Coach, Inc. of New York, New York and Coach Services, Inc. of Jacksonville, Florida for trademark infringement and counterfeiting.

By way of summary judgment, the court had earlier determined in this Indiana trademark and counterfeit litigation that Defendants The Treasure Box and Hiatt were liable for the trademark infringement and trademark counterfeiting of Plaintiff Coach’s trademarks. The court’s summary judgment determinations also included a finding that “The Treasure Box and Heather Hiatt acted with knowledge and intent” that was sufficient to support enhanced statutory damages. In this opinion and order, the court fixed the amount due to Coach from Defendants.

Instead of requesting actual damages resulting from Defendants’ trademark infringement and counterfeiting within Indiana, Coach opted for statutory damages under §1117(c). It asked the court for damages of $100,000 for each of the 15 infringing marks, for a total of $1,500,000. The Treasure Box and Hiatt, unrepresented by counsel at the time, filed no response or opposition to Coach’s damages request.

The court first addressed the proper measure of damages. Statutory damages for trademark infringement and trademark counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. §1114 are limited to:

(1) not less than $1,000 or more than $200,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods…, as the court considers just; or
(2) if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful, not more than $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of good…, as the court considers just.

Because the statute provides little guidance regarding what constitutes a “just” award, the court referred to the relevant factors under the analogous statutory damages provision in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §504(c). These considerations include: the profits reaped by the infringer; the revenues lost by the plaintiff; the value of the trademarks; whether the infringing conduct was willful; the duration of the infringement; and the potential deterrent effect on the defendant and others.

The court considered each factor in turn. It found that, because The Treasure Box’s operations were both brief and “even trivial” in scale, neither Defendants’ profits nor Coach’s lost revenue supported a large statutory damages award. Instead, the court cited Nimmer on Copyright for the proposition that statutory damages “should be woven out of the same bolt of cloth as actual damages.” “Statutory damages,” said the court, “should represent some approximation of actual damages and are not to represent a windfall to a prevailing plaintiff.”

In contrast, the factors of “value of the trademarks” and “willful conduct” weighed against Defendants. The court acknowledged that the Coach trademarks were valuable and noted that, in determining statutory damages, other courts had valued the trademarks at between $2,000 per mark and $30,000 per mark, for an average of approximately $14,000 per mark. Moreover, it characterized Hiatt’s infringement as having been pursued with “bold willfulness” with regard to her efforts to sell what she knew was knock-off Coach merchandise.

The last two considerations – duration of infringement and potential deterrent effect on Defendant and others – weighed against a large award of damages. The Treasure Box had operated for only three months, closing in late 2011. Such a brief term of infringement, as well as the court’s conclusion that Hiatt and the defunct The Treasure Box were now apparently beyond deterrence, militated in favor of lower damages. Regarding deterrence for others, the court stated, “Mom & Pop operators such as the Hiatts could doubtless be deterred from similar conduct by much less frightful sums than the $1.5 million Coach requests.”

The court concluded that an award of $3,000 per trademark for each of the 15 counterfeited trademarks at issue, for a statutory damages award of $45,000, was appropriate.

The court was also asked to award to Coach attorney’s fees of $14,780 pursuant to §1117(a)(3). This section permits a court “in exceptional cases” to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. The court first noted the ambiguity inherent in the placement of §1117(a)(3) within the statute. Specifically, subsection (a) addresses recovery for actual damages, while subsection (c) allows a plaintiff to opt for statutory damages. Here, Coach chose an award of statutory damages under subsection (c), which raised the question of whether the provision for attorney’s fees under §1117(a)(3) could be applied.

The only Court of Appeals to have addressed the question was the Second Circuit. That court concluded that subsection (c) offers an election as to the basis for damages, but not an election regarding remedies, including attorney’s fees. Thus, it concluded, a court could award attorney’s fees in conjunction with an award for either actual or statutory damages. Chief Judge Simon adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning. He also determined that the definition of an “exceptional” case – for example, one in which “the losing party was the defendant and had no defense yet persisted in trademark infringement” – was also met, given the willfulness of Defendants’ knowing sale of counterfeit Coach goods and that Defendants had no viable defense.

In addition to the statutory damages award of $45,000, the court awarded attorney’s fees of $14,780 as well as expenses and costs of $1,076.16 to Coach. The judgments were entered against Treasure Box, Inc. and Heather Hiatt jointly and severally.

Practice Tip: Chief Judge Simon noted that Coach had a history of requesting statutory damages that were considerably in excess of what was eventually awarded by the courts in other cases. In Coach, Inc. v. Paula’s Store Sportwear LLC, 2014 WL 347893 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2014), Coach requested $800,000 in statutory damages – $100,000 for each of eight counterfeited marks – at a shop from which four counterfeit Coach wallets and two counterfeit Coach handbags had been seized. In that litigation for counterfeiting, the court noted that the retail value of the six counterfeit items was less than $1500 and awarded $5000 for each of the eight marks that had been counterfeited, multiplied by the two types of goods, for a total statutory damages award of $80,000.

June 26, 2014

Indiana Patent Law: Magistrate Declines to Grant Crime-Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Evansville, Indiana – In the matter of Berry Plastics Corp. v. Intertape Polymer Corp., Indiana patent attorneys for Berry Plastics Corporation (“Berry”) invoked the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, asking the court to compel Intertape Polymer Corporation (“Intertape”) to produce documents and testimony it had withheld as privileged. Magistrate Judge William G. Hussmann, Jr. of the Southern District of Indiana denied the request.

This Indiana patent lawsuit was filed in January 2010 and seeks a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff Berry of Evansville, Indiana requested a judgment that Patent No. 7,476,416, titled Process for Preparing Adhesive Using Planetary Extruder, was invalid and unenforceable due to inequitable conduct before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) by Intertape, a company located in Bradenton, Florida.

In this current order, Magistrate Judge Hussmann addresses Berry’s request to compel Intertape to produce documents and testimony that had been withheld as subject to attorney-client privilege. Indiana patent lawyers for Berry argued that this was proper because Intertape had engaged in inequitable conduct or defrauded the USPTO.

The Magistrate first emphasized that this ruling pertained only to discovery, as the question of whether Intertape had perpetrated a fraud upon the USPTO was one of the ultimate issues in the litigation. As such, that question of fact would be decided at trial by Chief Judge Richard L. Young.

The general rule in discovery is that a party to litigation is entitled to discover from his adversary “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” An exception to the attorney-client privilege is made when the communication between the attorney and the client is made in furtherance of a crime or fraud. To successfully invoke this exception, Berry must offer evidence demonstrating that:

1) Intertape made a false representation as to a material fact;
2) Intertape made its false representation with intent to deceive;
3) the USPTO justifiably relied upon Intertape’s false representation; and
4) the USPTO suffered an injury as a consequence of its reliance on Intertape’s false representation.

In an attempt to prove that the elements of the crime-fraud exception applied, Berry offered “numerous allegations and … extensive evidence suggesting Intertape engaged in inequitable conduct or defrauded” the USPTO. Intertape responded to each allegation with “numerous defenses and extensive evidence suggesting its dealings with the USPTO were lawful and forthright.”

The Magistrate held for Intertape. Citing Federal Circuit precedent, which governs the application of the crime-fraud exception to privilege in patent cases, the court called the piercing of the attorney-client privilege an “extreme remedy.” The rule in such cases is that, if the court were to find Intertape’s explanation satisfactory, it must leave the privilege intact. After an analysis of the defenses proffered by Intertape, the court found that Intertape’s explanation for each of the allegations of fraud sufficient to avoid a piercing of the privilege.

Practice Tip: Magistrate judges are adjuncts to Article III district judges. They often dispose of pretrial matters such as motions, evidentiary hearings and pretrial conferences. However, their authority, and thus their role, in federal litigation is constrained by constitutional and statutory limits. Because the factual issue of whether Intertape committed fraud against the USPTO was one of the ultimate issues in the litigation, Magistrate Hussman expressly limited his ruling in this opinion to the discovery dispute before him. At trial, Chief Judge Young, in his role as the ultimate finder of fact, may determine that Intertape did, indeed, commit fraud.

June 25, 2014

Indiana Trademark Law: Personal Jurisdiction Cannot be Based on Alter-Ego Theory

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – In the matter of American Petroleum Institute v. Bullseye Automotive Products, et al., Indiana trademark litigators Paul B. Overhauser and John M. Bradshaw of Overhauser Law Offices, attorneys for Carlos Silva, petitioned the court to dismiss Silva for lack of personal jurisdiction. District Judge Tanya Walton Pratt granted the motion to dismiss.

In July 2013, Indiana trademark attorneys for American Petroleum Institute (“API”) of Washington, D.C. sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Bullseye Automotive Products Inc. and Bullseye Lubricants Inc., both of Chicago, Illinois (collectively, “Bullseye”), and Carlos Silva of Chicago Ridge, Illinois infringed registered API “Starburst” and “Donut” trademarks, Registration Nos. 1864428, 1868779, and 1872999.

The Bullseye entities are Illinois corporations that bottle and sell motor oil. Defendant Silva is the sole incorporator and shareholder of the Bullseye entities. Plaintiff API is a trade association for the petroleum and natural-gas industry.

API brought various claims against Bullseye and Silva as an individual, including trademark infringement and trademark dilution. It claimed that Bullseye’s labeling infringed on its “Starburst” and “Donut” certification marks. While Bullseye did not contest jurisdiction in Indiana, trademark lawyers for Silva asked the court to dismiss the claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction.

API countered that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Silva in Indiana was proper, contending that Silva personally directed the allegedly infringing activities, that he exercised complete control over Bullseye and that he and Bullseye were essentially the same entity for jurisdictional purposes. API made no argument that Silva personally had sufficient contacts with Indiana to permit an Indiana court to exercise personal jurisdiction.

The court rejected API’s “alter-ego” theory of personal jurisdiction, stating that this argument pertained to liability, not jurisdiction. Even if the court determined that Silva were the alter ego of Bullseye, a finding that the court explicitly declined to make, such potential for liability for corporate acts was held to be irrelevant to the question of personal jurisdiction. In so ruling, the court stated that it was refusing to disregard the corporate form and bypass the protections it offers, citing the longstanding rule that a “corporation exists separately from its shareholders, officers, directors and related corporations….”

The court then analyzed whether it would be appropriate to exercise personal jurisdiction over Silva based on his personal contacts with the state of Indiana. It concluded that Silva as an individual had not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within Indiana such that he would reasonably anticipate being haled into an Indiana court. Finding that the minimum contacts necessary had not been established, the court held that exercising personal jurisdiction over Silva would offend due process and the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” and dismissed Silva from the lawsuit.

Practice Tip: Many of the arguments API made – for example, that Silva personally selected the text and design for Bullseye’s labels, that he personally negotiated with suppliers and that he oversaw production – do not support an “alter ego” theory. Activities such as these must necessarily be carried out by the sole shareholder of a small corporation. To find that a small corporation is the alter ego of a sole shareholder merely because that shareholder acts on behalf of the company would violate the basic principles of corporation law.

Paul B. Overhauser, Managing Partner of Overhauser Law Offices, also recently prevailed on the issue of personal jurisdiction in the Seventh Circuit in another lawsuit alleging trademark infringement.

June 23, 2014

Indiana Copyright Law: Three Default Judgments of $2,500 Ordered for Copyright Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – In Bell v. Glacier International, District Judge Tanya Walton Pratt (pictured) of the Southern District of Indiana granted default judgments against three defendants, DiamondIndyLimo.com, Lon Dunn and Glacier International. In the three nearly identical opinions, the three defendants were each ordered to pay statutory damages of $2,500 for infringing a copyrighted photograph.

In January 2013, Indiana copyright attorney and professional photographer Richard N. Bell, acting as his own copyright lawyer, sued alleging copyright infringement under the Copyright Act and conversion under Indiana statutory law as a result of the allegedly unauthorized use of a photograph he had taken. This photograph had been registered with the United States Copyright Office.

In this lawsuit, Bell sued forty-eight Defendants: Jerry Gordon; Demand Media, Inc.; Bryce Welker; Royal Corniche Travel Ltd.; VRBO.com, Inc.; Experience Credit Unions, LLC; Jaclothing.com; Glacier International; ABNHotels.com; 1&1 Internet, Inc.; Conde Nast Digital; Flixter, Inc.; Financing-USA.com; SodaHead, Inc.; NuMedia Marketing, Inc.; Jynell Berkshire; Tzvetelin Petrov; Los Pentecostales del Area de la Bahia; 10Best, Inc.; Keyes Outdoor Advertising; Zoom Communications Inc.; Christine Nevogt; Zarzar, Inc.; Hydro-Gear; Tam T. Dang; Lon Dunn; William McLaws, Trustee; Natl-electronic Residential Payment History Recording Agency; CVI; Constant Contact, Inc.; Charles Lantz; Schumacher Cargo Logistics; Eventbrite, Inc.; Celebrity Entertainment Corp.; Association of Equipment Manufacturers; Yardi Systems Inc.; DiamondIndyLimo.com; Marcelo Santos; National Rural Recruitment & Retention Network; Anbritt Stengele; Pinnacle Sports Equipment, Inc.; Marygrove College; RunAnyCity.com; Buzzle.com, Inc.; Charles Onuska; University of Indianapolis; and PersephoneMagazine.com.

Bell alleged that each Defendant, independent of each other Defendant, “created a website to promote and advertise its own business” and placed Bell’s copyrighted photo on each of the Defendants’ respective websites. In addition to asserting copyright infringement, Bell also alleged criminal misconduct under Indiana statutory law. Bell requested an injunction and a declaratory judgment. He also asked the court for damages for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act as well as treble damages under an Indiana criminal statute prohibiting conversion.

In September 2013, the court entered default judgments against each of the three Defendants. Last week, the court issued three new opinions addressing the damages to be assessed against those Defendants.

The court first discussed the issue of damages for copyright infringement. Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), statutory damages, in lieu of actual damages and profits, may be awarded “in a sum not less than $750 or more than $30,000” for each finding of infringement. A determination of willful copyright infringement permits the court in its discretion to increase the award of statutory damages up to $150,000 per infringement.

In determining the appropriate measure of statutory damages, the court considers factors including: (1) the infringer’s state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and profits earned, by the infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) the deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties; (5) the infringer’s cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value of the infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the parties.

The court declined to find the copyright infringement to be willful, in part because Bell requested statutory damages well under $30,000.00 per instance of infringement. Instead, the court found that $2,500 per Defendant was an appropriate measure of damages. An injunction was also granted, as it would serve the public interest by protecting copyrighted material and encouraging compliance with federal law. The injunction will be lifted upon payment of the award of statutory damages.

A claim of conversion under Indiana state law, and treble damages awarded pursuant to such a claim, was denied as preempted by the Copyright Act. Indiana code § 35-43-4-3(a) provides that a “person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person commits criminal conversion.” However, section 310 of the Copyright Act preempts “all legal or equitable rights that are the equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright” and that “no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.” The court held that the photograph in question was clearly under the scope of the Copyright Act and that Bell had not sufficiently alleged a right apart from the Act. Thus, no damages were available under Bell’s state law conversion claim.

Practice Tip:

Deciding to simply ignore a complaint, as these defendants apparently did, can be a costly error. Failing to present the defendants’ versions of the facts and arguments results in the court considering only the plaintiff’s side of the story. Here, because the defendants chose to leave the complaint unanswered, the well-pled allegations of the plaintiff relating to liability were taken as true.

After the entry of default judgment, the court then conducted an inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages. Again, in such circumstances, it serves a defendant well to plead his case – to present the court with reasons that the plaintiff should not get 100% of what he requests.

Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), a copyright owner may elect actual or statutory damages. Statutory damages range from a sum of not less than $750 to not more than $30,000. The determination of the exact amount is left to the discretion of the court. In this case, Richard Bell asked the court for no less than $5,000. In some cases, courts in determining damages in cases of default judgment have granted the entire amount. In this case, the court took the additional step of considering the cost to purchase Plaintiff Bell’s picture – $200 – and incorporated that into its determination of the proper amount of damages to be awarded.

June 19, 2014

USPTO Cancels Redskins Trademark as “Disparaging” to Native Americans

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Washington, D.C. – The opinion in Blackhorse v. Pro Football, Inc., TTAB Cancellation No. 92046185, resolved the petition of five Native Americans who filed for the cancellation of six “Redskins” trademarks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).

Yesterday, in a 177-page opinion, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or “Board”) canceled six trademark registrations belonging to The Washington Redskins. All of the trademark registrations included the term “Redskins.”

Trademark attorneys for the petitioners argued that the term “Redskins” was disparaging of Native Americans. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1052, registration of a mark may be denied if that mark “Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”

June 16, 2014

Appeals Court Disallows Mass Joinder in Copyright Infringement Litigation

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Washington, D.C. – The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia handed copyright trolls a major defeat recently by removing one of their most powerful tactics: the ability to sue large groups of John Doe defendants together with minimal evidence.

The case, AF Holdings v. Does 1-1058, is one of the few mass copyright cases to reach an appellate court, and the first to look into fundamental procedural problems that have tilted the playing field firmly against the Doe Defendants. With this decision on the books, it appears likely that even more federal trial courts will disallow cookie-cutter lawsuits seeking cash payouts from dozens or even hundreds of Internet subscribers.

The appeal was brought by several internet service providers (Verizon, Comcast, AT&T and affiliates) with amicus support from copyright attorneys for the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), the ACLU, the ACLU of the Nation’s Capital, Public Citizen, and Public Knowledge.

May 28, 2014

Indiana Patent Law: Anchor Fails to Meet its Burden to Support Transfer of Indiana Patent Infringement Litigation

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana – Magistrate Judge Roger Cosbey of the Northern District of Indiana denied the motion for transfer filed by patent attorneys for Anchor Packaging, Inc. of St. Louis, Missouri (“Anchor”). Anchor sought a transfer of the declaratory judgment action filed by Mullinix Packages, Inc. of Fort Wayne, Indiana (“Mullinix”) to the Eastern District of Missouri where Anchor has a related, but later-filed infringement suit pending against Mullinix. Both patent infringement lawsuits pertain to the alleged infringement by Mullinix of Patent Nos. D679,587; D675,919 and D570,681, which were issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

Anchor and Mullinix are competitors in the commercial packaging industry. Prior to 2010, Anchor had been the primary supplier of mashed potato containers to Bob Evans Farms, Inc., a position now assumed by Mullinix. According to Mullinix, mashed potato container sales peak dramatically during the fourth quarter of the year and Mullinix’s ability to meet Bob Evans’s demand for containers during this period is critical to maintaining a successful relationship. It was around this time that patent lawyers for Anchor demanded that Mullinix cease and desist selling a tray that Anchor asserted was of a substantially similar design as trays claimed in three of Anchor’s patents.

While the cease-and-desist letter sent by Anchor’s patent counsel indicated that Anchor’s “interest is a resolution of this matter and not litigation,” Mullinix filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Northern District of Indiana shortly thereafter. Several weeks later, Anchor responded by filing a complaint for patent infringement in the Eastern District of Missouri.

In this opinion, Magistrate Judge Roger Cosbey, writing for the Northern District of Indiana, addresses Anchor’s motion to transfer Mullinix’s Indiana complaint for declaratory judgment for patent non-infringement to Missouri.

Anchor argued that the case should be transferred because (1) Mullinix filed its declaratory judgment action in anticipation of Anchor’s infringement suit, (2) a critical non-party witness is outside this Court’s subpoena power, but within the range of the Eastern District of Missouri, and (3) the Eastern District of Missouri is a more convenient forum.

The court evaluated Anchor’s request for transfer under § 1404(a) under precedent set by the Seventh Circuit. Under § 1404(a), a court may transfer a case if the moving party shows that: (1) venue was proper in the transferor district, (2) venue and jurisdiction would be proper in the transferee district, and (3) the transfer will serve in the convenience of the parties and the witnesses as well as the interests of justice.

As neither party disputed that both the Indiana and Missouri courts have jurisdiction and are proper venues, the court focused its analysis on the third factor. As the party requesting transfer, Anchor has the burden to show that the Eastern District of Missouri would be “clearly more convenient” than the Northern District of Indiana. In evaluating convenience, the factors to consider are: “(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the situs of the material events, (3) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the convenience of the parties, and (5) the convenience of the witnesses.”

The first factor, the plaintiff’s choice of forum, was held to be neutral. In general, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference, particularly where the chosen forum is the plaintiff’s home forum. However, the court found that this factor did not weigh in either direction. In this case, there are two plaintiffs in two different fora. As a result, one of them will necessarily be disturbed.

The evaluation of the situs of the material events weighed against transfer. In patent infringement actions “the situs of the injury is the location, or locations, at which the infringing activity directly impacts on the interests of the patentee.” Mullinix is headquartered in Fort Wayne, Indiana, which is in the Northern District of Indiana, and keeps its documents pertaining to the accused infringing products in Fort Wayne. Additionally, two of the individuals who worked on the accused infringing products work and reside within the district.

For similar reasons, the court held the third factor, relative ease of access to sources of proof, to weigh against transfer.

The court briefly addressed the fourth factor, the convenience of the parties, noting that there was no way to avoid inconveniencing either one party or the other. In such a circumstance, the court held that “when the inconvenience of the alternative venues is comparable there is no[] basis for a change of venue; the tie is awarded to the plaintiff[.]”

Finally, the court addressed the fifth factor, the convenience of non-party witnesses, noting that this element was “often considered the most important factor in the transfer analysis.” The court noted with some displeasure that the parties had perhaps been disingenuous in arguing this factor. After a discussion of the evidence that had been submitted, it concluded that the parties had failed to provide it with much enlightenment on the subject and, as a result, the court was largely left to speculate about the convenience of non-party witnesses. The court thus held that this analysis-of-transfer factor was neutral.

In sum, it was found that the convenience factors did not support transfer.

The court also evaluated the interests-of-justice inquiry. On the whole, these factors – the speed to trial, familiarity with the applicable law, desirability of resolving controversies and relation of each community to the controversy – also weighed against transfer.

Finally, the court addressed the first-filed analysis under Federal Circuit precedent, which governs declaratory judgment actions in patent cases. Given that no “sound reason” for transfer had been found in the earlier analysis, court dismissed the first-filed analysis as “ancillary” and largely non-dispositive.

Practice Tip #1: The first-to-file rule is a doctrine of federal comity that generally favors pursuing only the first-filed action when multiple lawsuits involving the same claims are filed in different jurisdictions. It was designed to avoid conflicting decisions and promote judicial efficiency. Finding an exception to the first-to-file rule requires a “sound reason that would make it unjust or inefficient to continue the first-filed action.”

Practice Tip #2: A court may also consider the extent to which a declaratory judgment action is anticipatory and motivated by forum shopping. However, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that a finding that a filing was anticipatory does not in itself constitute sufficient legal reason to transfer or dismiss the first-filed case.

May 23, 2014

Indiana Copyright Law: Court Orders Severance of Misjoined Copyright Infringement Complaint

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Magistrate Judge Denise K. LaRue, writing for the Southern District of Indiana, directed the Clerk of the Court to sever all but one defendant from the copyright infringement complaint of Richard Bell, an Indiana copyright attorney. Bell was also ordered by the court to pay separate filing fees for each new cause of action.

Bell is a copyright lawyer and a professional photographer. He contends that he is the owner of two copyrighted photographs of Indianapolis taken in March 2000. The photos have been registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.

In April, Bell filed another copyright infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging copyright infringement of his photos by numerous Defendants. The Defendants were: Diversified Vehicle Services of Marion County, Indiana; Cameron Taylor and Taylor Computer Solutions of Indianapolis, Indiana; Rhonda Williams of Indianapolis, Indiana; Forensic Solutions, Inc. of Waterford, New York; Heath Garrett of Nashville, Tennessee; CREstacom, Inc. of Fishers, Indiana; American Traveler Service Corp LLC, location unknown; Mike Cowper of Martinsville, Indiana; Kimberly Hinds of Indianapolis, Indiana; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute of Troy, New York; EasyStreet Realty of Indianapolis, Indiana; Drohan Management of Reston, Virginia; Metal Markets of Indianapolis, Indiana; Mattison Corporation of Indianapolis, Indiana; Industrial Heating Equipment Association of Taylor Mill, Kentucky; Junk Dawgs of Indianapolis, Indiana and WRTV of Indianapolis, Indiana. Bell is both the copyright lawyer and Plaintiff in this lawsuit.

In this earlier complaint, Bell alleged that each Defendant, independent of each other Defendant, “created their individual website to promote and market their business” and placed the Plaintiff’s copyrighted photo on each of the Defendants’ respective websites. Claiming copyright infringement, unfair competition and theft, Bell asked the court for, inter alia, the maximum allowable statutory damages for each copyright violation.

The court ordered Bell to show cause why all defendants but one should not be severed for misjoinder. Bell argued that the rules regarding joinder should be given a broad scope so that multiple lawsuits could be avoided.

The court was not persuaded. In addressing Bell’s contention that joinder of the unrelated Defendants was proper, it was Bell’s own language, and the factual underpinnings of that language, to which the court pointed in denying joinder. The court noted that Bell’s “complaint alleges that ‘[e]ach defendant, independently of each other, created or had created a website to promote and advertise the business of each Defendant,’ and that Plaintiff discovered that ‘the website [of] each of these Defendants contained [one of the photographs].'” The court also noted that “[e]xcept for defendants Cameron Taylor and Taylor Computer Solutions, the Complaint contains no allegation that any defendant acted in concert with another defendant in appropriating Plaintiff’s photographs and it does not allege any transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences in which two or more defendants participated.” (Citations omitted.)

The court then reviewed the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2)(A) that a Plaintiff’s claims against defendants joined in the same action must respect or arise out of the same occurrence or the same series of occurrences. While Bell had alleged copyright infringement of the same copyrighted material against all Defendants, the court held this to be insufficient. Similarly, while the same types of questions of fact would arise against each Defendant – “e.g., how did the defendant find Plaintiff’s photograph, what did the defendant know about the photograph’s copyright status, did the defendant make commercial use of the photograph, and did the defendant pay for the use of the photograph” – those similar questions of fact provided no logical relationship among the Defendants that would support joinder.

Instead, the court found that each Defendant was accused of independently committing separate and distinct acts of copyright infringement that happened to involve the same photograph.

The court then directed the Clerk of the Court to sever all defendants other than Diversified Vehicle Services from the complaint as it had been filed and to open separate causes for each of the severed defendants, with the exception of defendants Cameron Taylor and Taylor Computer Solutions, which the court directed to be joined in one cause. WRTV was dropped, as Bell indicated that it had been included as a defendant inadvertently.

The court also ordered Bell to pay the $400 filing fee for each of the 15 severed causes of action no later than June 2, 2014.

Practice Tip #1: There has been a growing trend of attempting to monetize copyright infringement. In this particular case, the docket for the initial complaint showed Bell’s demand to be $5,000,000 for the alleged infringing activities. In ruling that “unrelated claims against unrelated defendants belong in different suits, in part to ensure that plaintiffs pay the required filing fees” and subsequently ordering the Plaintiff to pay a separate filing fee for each of the Defendants, Magistrate Judge LaRue has employed one approach that may be useful in combatting such copyright trolling.

Practice Tip #2: Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), a copyright owner may elect actual or statutory damages. Statutory damages range from a sum of not less than $750 to not more than $30,000 per infringed work.

Practice Tip #3: The claims of this case appear calculated to trigger the “advertising injury” clause of many general business liability insurance policies. If a defendant has applicable business insurance, this may allow Bell to negotiate quicker settlements. Overhauser Law Offices, publisher of this Site, counsels clients on insurance coverage for insurance claims.

Practice Tip #4: These latest causes of actions represent the most recent of three ongoing cases filed by Bell asserting infringement of his photos. We have blogged about his copyright infringement litigation before. See here. The Indiana Lawyer also wrote recently about Bell’s copyright litigation. That article includes an interview with Paul B. Overhauser, Managing Partner of Overhauser Law Offices.

May 16, 2014

Indiana Trademark Law: Seventh Circuit Holds Indiana Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction Over RAP4

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Chicago, Illinois – Indiana trademark attorney Paul B. Overhauser, on behalf of K.T. Tran and Real Action Paintball, Inc., a California corporation (collectively “RAP4”), argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the trademark infringement suit brought in the Northern District of Indiana by Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, LLC, an Indiana corporation (“ATO”), was not properly before the Indiana court, as it lacked personal jurisdiction over RAP4. The Seventh Circuit agreed and instructed the district court to dismiss the complaint.

RAP4 and ATO are competitors in the “irritant projectile” market. Unlike the more familiar game of paintball, in which a paint-filled sphere is shot at opponents as part of a war game, these irritant projectiles are used by the police and military to intervene in hostile situations where lethal force is unnecessary. While paintballs are filled with paint, irritant projectiles use capsaicin, the active ingredient in pepper spray. Irritant projectiles, thus, allow law enforcement personnel to use less-than-lethal force from a distance.

Among the many issues in this lawsuit, including assertions by ATO of trade-dress infringement, unfair competition and misappropriation of trade secrets, were allegations that RAP4 had infringed the trademarked term “PEPPERBALL,” to which ATO claimed ownership. That trademark, Registration No. 2716025, was issued in 1999 by the U.S. Trademark Office to a non-party to this suit.

The trouble began when another company, non-party PepperBall Technologies, Inc. (“PTI”), began to have financial problems. PTI had also been a competitor in the irritant-projectile market. To address its difficulties, PTI held a foreclosure sale, the validity of which was hotly contested. ATO claimed that it had purchased PTI’s trademarks – including “PEPPERBALL” – and other property during this foreclosure sale.

During the time that PTI ceased its operations and was attempting to convey its assets, RAP4 was contacted by an executive of non-party APON, a company which had manufactured some of PTI’s irritant projectiles. He asked if RAP4 was interested in acquiring irritant projectiles from APON.

RAP4 agreed to purchase irritant projectiles from APON. After having negotiated this access to APON’s machinery, recipes, and materials – which had had at one time been used by PepperBall Technologies Inc. – RAP4 announced this fact to the people on its e-mail list. Specifically, it stated in its e-mail that it had acquired access to, “machinery, recipes, and materials once used by PepperBall Technologies Inc.” It was this language to which ATO, which claimed to be the successor in interest to PTI, particularly objected.

ATO sent a cease-and-desist letter to RAP4. In response, RAP4 added a disclaimer that it was not affiliated with PTI. ATO then sued in the Northern District of Indiana. It claimed several different theories of recovery, including intentional violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1111 et seq., common law trademark infringement and unfair competition, trade dress infringement, and misappropriation of trade secrets.

Of particular interest to the Seventh Circuit in addressing this Indiana trademark litigation was the issue of personal jurisdiction over RAP4 in the Northern District of Indiana. RAP4 contested that such jurisdiction over it was lacking. ATO countered that RAP4 had sufficient contacts, including a “blast e-mail” announcement from RAP4 that would suffice for jurisdiction in Indiana, stating that “many [RAP4 customers] are located here in the state of Illinois. I mean, state of Indiana.” It also contended that RAP4 regularly e-mailed customers or potential customers from all over the United States, including Indiana, and that RAP4 had made at least one sale to an Indiana resident.

ATO conceded that it lacked general jurisdiction. Thus, the Seventh Circuit turned to an analysis of specific jurisdiction. “For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State,” noted the appellate court. Moreover, the relation between the defendant and the forum “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum.”

In determining that personal jurisdiction existed, the Indiana district court had relied on several facts: “first, [RAP4] fulfilled several orders of the allegedly infringing projectiles for purchasers in Indiana; second, it knew that Advanced Tactical was an Indiana company and could foresee that the misleading emails and sales would harm Advanced Tactical in Indiana; third, it sent at least two misleading email blasts to a list that included Indiana residents; fourth, it had an interactive website available to residents of Indiana; and finally, it put customers on its email list when they made a purchase, thereby giving the company some economic advantage.”

The Seventh Circuit held that these facts were insufficient to support specific jurisdiction. The only Indiana sales that would have been relevant were those that related to RAP4’s allegedly unlawful activity. ATO failed to meet its burden of proof of any such Indiana sales. Similarly, the court held that any effects that were purportedly felt in Indiana by ATO did not support specific jurisdiction. Instead, the relation between RAP4 and the Indiana forum “must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State.”

Further, neither RAP4’s e-mail communications nor its website were held to create specific jurisdiction. If such contacts were sufficient, the court held, there would be no limiting principle on personal jurisdiction and a plaintiff could sue almost any defendant with an Internet presence or which utilized e-mail in almost any forum in the United States or the world. To find jurisdiction on such vanishingly small contacts would offend the long-held and traditional “notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the Indiana district court with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Practice Tip #1: RAP4’s references to “Pepperball Technologies, Inc.” could not as a matter of law constitute trademark infringement, counterfeiting or false advertising. Instead, RAP4’s use of its competitor’s name is a merely a wholly permissible nominative use of that mark. As a matter of law, a “nominative use of a mark – where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service – lies outside the strictures of trademark law.”

Practice Tip #2: Personal jurisdiction is an essential element of federal court jurisdiction, without which the court is powerless to adjudicate the matter before it. However, a defendant’s argument that personal jurisdiction does not exist can easily be waived inadvertently by the incautious litigant. In this case, an evidentiary hearing regarding personal jurisdiction was conducted in December 2012. It was only by careful preservation of this argument by trademark counsel for RAP4 while litigating in the district court that the appellate court was able to hear RAP4’s claim and reverse the district court.

Practice Tip #3: This case was successfully argued before the Seventh Circuit by Paul B. Overhauser, Managing Partner of Overhauser Law Offices.

May 7, 2014

U.S. Supreme Court Holds Commercial Injury and Proximate Cause Necessary for False Advertising Claim Under Lanham Act

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Washington, D.C. – The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a Sixth Circuit ruling that intellectual property lawyers for defendant Static Control Components, Inc. of Sanford, North Carolina had properly pled a counterclaim for false advertising under the Lanham Act against Lexmark International, Inc. of Lexington, Kentucky. The Court held that a Lanham Act claim under §1125(a) may be asserted by plaintiffs who are within the zone of interests protected by the Lanham Act and whose injury was proximately caused by a violation of that statute.

Lexmark sells both printers and toner cartridges for those printers. In addition to selling new Lexmark-branded toner cartridges, it refurbishes used Lexmark cartridges. Those refurbished products are sold in competition with the new cartridges. To hinder others from reusing its cartridges, Lexmark includes a microchip that disables an empty cartridge until Lexmark replaces the chip. Respondent Static Control, a maker and seller of components for the remanufacture of Lexmark cartridges, developed a microchip that enabled empty Lexmark cartridges to be refilled and used again.

Lexmark sued for both copyright infringement and patent infringement. It also informed Static Control’s customers that Static Control had infringed its patents. Static Control counterclaimed, alleging that Lexmark had engaged in false or misleading advertising in violation of §43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. §1125(a). Static Control alleged that Lexmark’s misrepresentations had damaged Static Control’s business reputation and impaired its sales.

The Supreme Court was asked to decide what had been styled by the District Court as a “prudential standing issue”: whether Static Control fell within the class of potential Lanham Act plaintiffs. Arguments that Lanham Act plaintiffs may assert standing under the Second Circuit‘s test – requiring a “reasonable interest” and a “reasonable basis” for the plaintiff’s claim of harm – were rejected by the Court.

Instead, in determining the appropriate reach of the Lanham Act, the Court relied on the traditional principles of statutory interpretation. It acknowledged the longstanding principle that the question for courts in determining who was a proper plaintiff was not a matter of judicial “prudence” but rather one of determining the intent of Congress when it authorized certain plaintiffs to sue under §1125(a): “We do not ask whether in our judgment Congress should have authorized Static Control’s suit, but whether Congress in fact did so.”

The Court thus held that, in a statutory cause of action, protection is extended only to those plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Because the Lanham Act lists among its purposes the protection of “persons engaged in [interstate commerce] against unfair competition,” and because “unfair competition” is interpreted to be concerned with injuries to business reputation and present and future sales, a lawsuit for false advertising must allege injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales.

The Court then considered whether the harm alleged in this case was sufficiently similar to the conduct that the Lanham Act prohibits. It held that the harm is required to have been proximately caused by violations of the statute. In the case of a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act, a commercial injury caused by deceiving consumers was held to be a sufficient link between the wrongful act (the false advertising) and the injury (damage to a business’ reputation and/or sales).

The Court concluded that Static Control had adequately pleaded all elements of a Lanham Act cause of action for false advertising.

Practice Tip: The Court held that, in the case of a Lanham Act claim for false advertising, “a direct application of the zone-of-interests test and the proximate-cause requirement supplies the relevant limits on who may sue.” This test excludes as Lanham-Act plaintiffs some who have indisputably been damaged by false advertising. For example, the Lanham Act does not apply to non-business consumers who have been the victims of false advertising, as the Act restricts its class of plaintiffs to those who have suffered an injury to a “commercial interest” in reputation or sales.