New Decisions

December 4, 2015

Federal Circuit Patent Law: Quality Control Testing Is Not Patent Infringement; Does Not “Make” a Product as Contemplated Under § 271(g)

Washington, D.C. – The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard a patent infringement lawsuit styled Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc. on the issue of whether Defendants’ quality control procedures infringed the patent-in-suit. This appeal included a companion case, Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar et al. Both cases were heard at the trial court level in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts by Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton.

Momenta was the first to market enoxaparin, an anticoagulant drug, in generic form. Momenta also owns U.S. Patent No. 7,575,886 (“the ‘886 patent”), which includes claimed methods designed to ensure that every batch of enoxaparin was of sufficient quality. Momenta asserted the ‘886 patent against other manufacturers, including Teva and Amphastar, which also wanted to bring a generic version of enoxaparin to market. It contended that Defendants’ quality-control measures infringed the ‘886 patent.

In this litigation, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts determined that patent infringement had not taken place, listing two separate grounds. First, the asserted claims were directed towards analyzing enoxaparin for the purpose of quality control, not manufacture of the drug, which did not amount to patent infringement. Second, the district court found that use of the analytical methods of the ‘886 patent were protected under the safe harbor provisions of 35 U.S.C § 271(e)(1). Momenta appealed.

Circuit Judges Dyk, Moore and Wallach of the Federal Circuit ruled on this appeal in November. Writing for the court, Judge Wallach affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Defendants Teva and Amphastar had not infringed the ‘886 patent, holding that infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) occurs when “making” a product and that quality-control testing, thus, did not constitute patent infringement.

The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment that the activities were also protected under the “safe harbor” provisions within § 271(e)(1) and remanded this issue to the district court for further inquiry.

November 24, 2015

Indiana Patent Law: Request to Limit Discovery Denied but Judge Orders Reimbursement if Certain Discovered Evidence is Largely Duplicative

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Magistrate Judge Mark Dinsmore of the Southern District of Indiana denied Defendants’ motion to limit discovery in the patent infringement litigation between Knauf Insulation, LLC et al. and Johns Manville Corp. et al. Judge Dinsmore also recently denied Defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial.

This federal litigation alleges infringement of U.S. Patents Nos. 8,114,210; 8,940,089; D631,670; 9,039,827 and 9,040,652, which Plaintiffs Knauf Insulation, LLC, Knauf Insulation GmbH and Knauf Insulation SPRL contend were infringed by Defendants Johns Manville Corporation and Johns Manville, Inc.

This court order addresses Defendants’ motion, filed by patent attorneys for Defendants, for limitations on electronic discovery. Specifically, Defendants asked the court to implement a date cutoff of January 1, 2007 for all electronically stored discovery and to limit the number of e-mail custodians from which Defendants must produce e-mail. Defendants asserted that these restrictions would reduce its discovery-related expenses by approximately $49,400.

The request to limit the time was denied. The court noted that there was a high likelihood that relevant evidence that was not available from any other source would be found in Defendants’ materials prior to 2007. Further, the cost of obtaining that evidence was not excessive in light of the amount in controversy in the litigation. Consequently, the court held that Defendants had not met their burden of showing that the cost of the proposed discovery to Defendants outweighed the benefit to Plaintiffs.

Defendants also requested that the court limit electronic discovery to 10 of Defendants’ 38 e-mail custodians. Patent lawyers for Defendants argued that such a limitation would result in a savings of $18,000 and would also facilitate the predictive coding process.

The court was again unpersuaded. It noted that, while discovery couldn’t guarantee that 100% of responsive material would be produced, eliminating material held by 28 of Defendants’ 38 e-mail custodians from the scope of discovery would “guarantee a zero percent recall for the 28 custodians not chosen.” After asking itself the question, “how many relevant responsive documents are too many to voluntarily walk away from?,” the court concluded that it had insufficient evidence to weight the benefit of the e-mails that would be produced as a result of including the 28 custodians that Defendants proposed be omitted from discovery. Moreover, it opined that in high-value litigation such as this lawsuit, the burden of the additional $18,000 expense does not outweigh the potential benefit to Knauf of receiving those emails.

The court ordered Defendants to produce discovery from all 38 e-mail custodians but also ordered that, should the search of the additional 28 custodians yield fewer than 500 responsive documents, Plaintiffs must reimburse Defendants $18,000 for the cost of loading the additional data from those 28 e-mail custodians.

November 19, 2015

Indiana Patent Law: Bifurcation of Patent Infringement Trial Held to be Unwarranted

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Magistrate Judge Mark Dinsmore of the Southern District of Indiana denied a motion to bifurcate the patent infringement trial in ongoing litigation styled Knauf Insulation, LLC et al. v. Johns Manville Corp. et al.

This Indiana patent litigation began in January 2015 when Knauf Insulation, LLC, Knauf Insulation GmbH, and Knauf Insulation SPRL (“Plaintiffs”) sued Johns Manville Corporation and Johns Manville, Inc. (“Defendants”). Plaintiffs contended that Defendants had infringed U.S. Patents Nos. 8,114,210; 8,940,089; D631,670; 9,039,827 and 9,040,652 (“the ‘652 patent”).

Patent attorneys for Denver-based Defendants asked the court to bifurcate the trial, asking it to hear the claims of patent infringement of the ‘652 patent separately from the infringement claims regarding the other patents. Defendants supported its motion for bifurcation by asserting that the ‘652 patent is made from binding chemistry different from the other patents and that this difference might confuse the jury.

Whether or not to bifurcate a trial is within the discretion of the trial court, subject to certain conditions: (1) the bifurcation should avoid prejudice to a party or promote judicial economy; (2) the bifurcation should not unfairly prejudice the non-moving party; and (3) the bifurcation must not be granted if doing so would violate the Seventh Amendment.

The court noted that the burden of establishing that bifurcation is appropriate rests on the party seeking it and that “bifurcation remains the exception, not the rule.” It held that Defendants had failed to meet that burden. Instead, the difference in binder chemistry by itself did not outweigh the benefits of a single trial during which the finder of fact could evaluate the “many common facts” relating to all of the patents-in-suit.

The court finally noted that, even if bifurcation might at some point be appropriate, it was too early in the litigation for it to be ordered. The parties were advised that the court would review a motion for bifurcation, should a party choose to submit one, when the matter was closer to trial.

November 18, 2015

Indiana Copyright Law: Court Restricts Discovery in Copyright Infringement Litigation to Facts Regarding Jurisdiction

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – In the matter of Bell v. Find Tickets, LLC, the Southern District of Indiana quashed overbroad discovery requests and limited inquiries to those pertaining to the matter of personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Richard Bell of McCordsville, Indiana photographed the Indianapolis skyline in 2000 and copyrighted the work. In this copyright lawsuit, Bell, acting as his own copyright attorney, alleges that Defendant Find Tickets of Alpharetta, Georgia published the photo on a website without Bell’s permission.

As part of the litigation, Bell propounded multiple interrogatories to Defendant. Defendant asked the court to quash this discovery, characterizing it as “far exceed[ing] the scope of a reasonable jurisdictional inquiry.” Defendant also asked for a protective order prohibiting Bell from deposing Find Tickets’ officers.

Writing for the court, Magistrate Judge Mark Dinsmore noted that Defendant’s own affidavit had estimated that “less than 1% of Find Tickets [sic] income is from Indiana related sales.” Consequently, the court concluded that, while personal jurisdiction might eventually be found to be lacking, this small amount of business was sufficient as the required “colorable showing” that jurisdiction over Defendant might exist. Consequently, the court ruled that jurisdictional discovery would be permitted.

However, the court also found that the interrogatories that had been served had been too broad for the limited question of establishing whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant was proper. Judge Dinsmore ordered that the interrogatories be limited to inquiries that would support that “Defendant had extensive and pervasive contact with Indiana (general jurisdiction) or that Defendant ‘purposely availed’ itself of the privilege of conducting business in Indiana and the alleged copyright infringement arose from Defendant’s conducting business in Indiana (specific jurisdiction).” The court revised Plaintiff Bell’s interrogatories to limit them to the relevant jurisdictional matters, pending a ruling on Defendant’s separate motion to dismiss, and ordered that Defendant respond by December 1, 2015.

Defendant’s motion to quash the deposition of the owner of Find Tickets was also granted as the court found that such a deposition was unnecessary under the circumstances.

October 21, 2015

Northern District Transfers Copyright Infringement Litigation for Lack of Venue

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana – District Judge Jon E. DeGuilio of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana transferred a lawsuit alleging copyright to the Southern District of Indiana, citing a lack of venue in the Northern District.

In this litigation, Angela E. Brooks-Nwenga, acting pro se, alleges that The Mind Trust, United Way of Central Indiana, Central Indiana Education Alliance, Phalen Leadership Academies and Indianapolis Public Schools, all of Indianapolis, Indiana, infringed her copyright work, “Transitioning Into Responsible Students.” Among the wrongdoings asserted are infringement involving Defendants’ use of “Bridges To Success Education School Model” and “Phalen Leadership Academies School Model”

This copyright lawsuit was filed in the Northern District of Indiana, with Brooks-Nwenga acting as her own copyright attorney. The court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the litigation should not be transferred to the Southern District of Indiana. Brooks-Nwenga argued to the court that she lived in Fort Wayne, Indiana, but the court was not persuaded by this, noting that the statute governing venue in a federal lawsuit, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), provides that:

a civil action may be brought in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

None of these criteria applied to this litigation. Brooks-Nwenga also contended that her prior litigation in the Southern District of Indiana had been excessively delayed and that her lawsuit had not received a fair and unbiased hearing. The court was similarly unswayed by this argument, stating that the court would “not hear appeals from other district courts.”

Finally, the court noted that, while venue in the Northern District was improper, “a substantial part, if not all, of the events or omissions giving rise to Ms. Brooks-Ngwenya’s claim seem to have occurred in the Southern District of Indiana.” Consequently, the court ordered the litigation transferred.

October 16, 2015

Indiana Trademark Law: Trademark Plaintiff Abused Legal Process; Trademark Defendant Awarded an Additional $175,000 in Attorneys’ Fees

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – In the trademark lawsuit between of Plaintiff Wine & Canvas Development, LLC (“WNC”) and Defendants Christopher Muylle, Theodore Weisser, YN Canvas CA, LLC and Weisser Management Group, LLC, the Southern District of Indiana found that Plaintiffs had engaged in abuse of process and awarded an additional $175,882.68 in attorneys’ fees and costs to Defendant Muylle.

Plaintiff WNC sued Defendants in 2011 on allegations of trademark infringement and false designation of origin after disputes arose regarding the parties’ franchising agreement. Defendants counterclaimed for abuse of process against WNC and its principals Anthony Scott (“Scott”), Tamara McCracken Scott (“Ms. McCracken”), and Donald McCracken (“Mr. McCracken”).

Following a November 2014 trial, the jury found in favor of Defendant Muylle, returning a verdict that there had been no trademark infringement or false designation of origin by Muylle. The jury also found for Muylle on his claim of abuse of process. It awarded him $81,000 from WNC, $81,000 from Scott, $81,000 from Ms. McCracken, and $27,000 from Mr. McCracken.

In this order, the court ruled on Muylle’s most recent petition for attorneys’ fees. These fees had been incurred after September 30, 2014 and consisted of attorneys’ fees that had been neither requested from the jury nor already paid as part of any of three prior payments of Muylle’s attorneys’ fees that had earlier been awarded by the court as sanctions against Plaintiff for failing to follow discovery or court rules.

The court evaluated both whether the fees should be awarded and, if so, whether the amount requested, $175,882.68, was reasonable. Under Seventh Circuit jurisprudence, attorneys’ fees are available when a trademark infringement lawsuit is deemed to be “exceptional.” An example of such an exceptional circumstance under the Lanham Act would be if the plaintiff lost and was also guilty of abuse of process.

The Plaintiff in this litigation lost. At trial, Muylle contended that the trademark infringement lawsuit had been brought for the purpose of causing him to incur considerable litigation costs to put on a defense and, thus, force the closing of the business. Muylle claimed that Scott had told him during a telephone conversation that Scott expected to lose the lawsuit against Muylle but that winning was not the goal of the litigation. Instead his goal was to put Defendants out of business. The jury found that Plaintiff had engaged in abuse of process.

The court also considered whether the amount of the fees was unreasonable. Judge Walton Pratt admitted that, at first blush, the fees did seem questionable for two months of legal services. Upon reviewing the detailed time records, however, the court found that neither the amount of time nor the rates charged per hour were unreasonable. The full amount of attorneys’ fees was awarded to Defendant.

October 12, 2015

Federal Circuit Law: Laches Preserved as a Defense to Patent Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Washington, D.C. – The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided the matter of SCA Hygiene v. First Quality Baby Products, a case about adult incontinence products.

At issue in the case was the legal doctrine of “laches.” The laches doctrine penalizes a plaintiff who “sleeps on” his or her rights by waiting a long time to file a lawsuit after learning of a violation of those rights. Laches, an equitable defense, protects those who would be harmed by the assertion of those rights after a plaintiff’s delay. For example, in the case of a lawsuit asserting patent infringement, laches could work against a patent owner who saw an infringing product emerge in 2000 but waited until 2015 to sue, after a significant investment of time and resources had been put into the product.

The Federal Circuit had long recognized laches as a limitation on patent owners’ rights. But a recent Supreme Court case, Petrella v. MGM, called the doctrine into question. In Petrella, the Supreme Court held that laches was not a defense in copyright cases. Given the ruling in Petrella, the Federal Circuit opted to hear this litigation en banc to determine whether laches should still be a defense in patent cases.

The court held that the defense should be preserved. Proponents of laches in the patent-infringement context (see, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation‘s friend-of-the-court brief), contend that patent defendants and copyright defendants are in very different positions when it comes to defending against stale claims. Patent defendants, unlike their copyright counterparts, often defend themselves by showing that the patent owner’s claimed invention was obvious at the time of filing (thus making the patent invalid). But, by delaying a lawsuit, a patent owner can make it difficult for the defendant to find evidence of what people in the field knew about or would have found obvious back when the application was filed. This is especially true in the Internet age, those proponents argue. Websites are constantly rewritten. Software code gets lost or is not documented. In sum, without the defense of laches, patent owners can sit and wait for time to destroy the evidence that an alleged infringer needs to defend herself.

The decision came out 6-5, meaning five judges of the Federal Circuit think Petrella changed the availability of the doctrine of laches in both copyright infringement and patent infringement lawsuits. Given the closeness of the decision, this case may go to the Supreme Court.

This edited article was provided by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit group which advocates for innovators and users of technology. The article has been licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License.

September 28, 2015

Copyright Law: Important Win for Fair Use in ‘Dancing Baby’ Lawsuit

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

San Francisco, California – Federal court of appeals affirms that copyright owners must consider fair use in online copyright takedowns.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed that copyright holders must consider whether a use of material is fair before sending a takedown notice. The ruling came in Lenz v. Universal, often called the “dancing baby” lawsuit.

In 2007, Stephanie Lenz posted a 29-second video to YouTube of her children dancing in her kitchen. The Prince song “Let’s Go Crazy” was playing on a stereo in the background of the short clip. Universal Music Group sent YouTube a notice under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), claiming that the family video infringed the copyright in Prince’s song. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) sued Universal on Lenz’s behalf, arguing that Universal abused the DMCA by improperly targeting a lawful fair use.

September 24, 2015

Indiana Copyright Law: Court Will Not Reconsider Dismissal of Pro Se Litigant’s Lawsuit

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – The Southern District of Indiana denied Plaintiff Larry Philpot’s

motion to reconsider the dismissal of his 2014 lawsuit alleging copyright infringement.

Acting as his own copyright lawyer, Philpot, a professional photographer of Indianapolis, Indiana filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against Music Times, LLC of New York, New York. He alleged that Defendant infringed his copyright on a photograph of Norah Jones taken during a performance in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The photo had been registered with the U.S. Copyright Office as Certificate No. VAu 1-164-648.

Prior to this motion to reconsider, Philpot had last taken on the case on December 15, 2014. He had then failed to prosecute the case further. On April 17, 2015, the court set an April 30th deadline by which Philpot must show good cause for his failure to take additional actions to advance the copyright infringement lawsuit. Philpot did not respond and, on August, 26, 2015, the court dismissed the litigation.

Plaintiff Philpot, upon being notified of the court’s dismissal of the lawsuit, filed a motion asking the court to reconsider. He stated that he had not received notice of the court’s April 17th order and that his failure to prosecute had been a result of being “completely overwhelmed” due to having filed “too many actions.” On these grounds, he asked the court to reverse its earlier entry of judgment against him.

The court declined to do so. Under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(e), a court is permitted to alter or amend its judgment “only if the petitioner can demonstrate a manifest error of law or present newly discovered evidence.” Because Plaintiff did not demonstrate either – and because his failure to do so would not be excused merely due to his pro se status – the court denied the motion to reconsider.

September 21, 2015

Indiana Copyright Litigation: CelebrityCafé.com Dismissed from Copyright Lawsuit; Court Allows New Defendants to be Added

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – The Southern District of Indiana has granted a motion by Defendant The Celebrity Café.com, Inc. (“Celebrity”) to dismiss the copyright infringement complaint filed by Larry G. Philpot of Indianapolis, Indiana. The court also granted Philpot’s motion to amend his complaint.

Plaintiff Philpot is a professional photographer who photographs concert events across the country. He copyrights his photographs and licenses them to others. In December 2014, Philpot sued Celebrity of Oceanside, New York asserting that it had infringed his copyrights by posting two photographs that Philpot had registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. The photos at issue are a 2009 photograph of Willie Nelson and a 2013 photo of Kid Rock.

An Indiana copyright attorney for Defendant Celebrity moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Indiana and that the Southern District of Indiana was an improper venue. A short time later, Philpot asked the court’s permission to amend his complaint to include additional defendants. By this order, the court granted both parties’ requests.

On the issue of jurisdiction, the court held that Philpot had failed to meet his burden to demonstrate the necessary minimum contacts between Celebrity and the State of Indiana. The court found Celebrity to be a New York business that “is not registered to do business in Indiana. It does not have any offices, paid employees, members, agents, or operations in Indiana. Celebrity has no telephone or fax listings in Indiana. It also has no bank accounts in Indiana, has never paid taxes in Indiana, and does not own, lease, or control any property or assets in Indiana. Dominick Miserandino, Celebrity’s sole member, has been to Indiana only twice in his life….”

Moreover, the court held that Celebrity’s use of its website, which it had owned and operated from January 2003 to December 3, 2014, was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon an Indiana court. Quoting the Seventh Circuit, it stated:

Courts should be careful in resolving questions about personal jurisdiction involving online contacts to ensure that a defendant is not haled into court simply because the defendant owns or operates a website that is accessible in the forum state, even if that site is interactive. Beyond simply operating an interactive website that is accessible from the forum state, a defendant must in some way target the forum state’s market. If the defendant merely operates a website, even a highly interactive website, that is accessible from, but does not target, the forum state, then the defendant may not be haled into court in that state without offending the Constitution.

be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The court noted that, while it might appear that advertisements on Celebrity’s webpages were targeting Indiana residents due to Indiana-specific content, those advertisements were not the result of Celebrity’s actions to target Indiana. Instead, the advertisements were shown as a result of internet “cookies” that tracked the location of internet end users and then selected and displayed location-specific content from third parties, including content that was specific to Indiana.

Thus, an exercise of personal jurisdiction over Celebrity in Indiana was found to be improper. For similar reasons, venue in the Southern District of Indiana was also held to be improper. The court did, however, permit Philpot to amend his complaint, finding that his request to do so had been timely filed.