New Litigation

November 21, 2013

Joe Hand Promotions Again in Court Asserting Unlawful Interception

Hammond, Indiana – Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. of Feasterville, Pennsylvania has filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that Miguel Serrato and Miguel Mexican Fusion Grill, LLC, both d/b/a Miguel’s Mexican Fusion Grill, all of Schererville, Indiana unlawfully intercepted and televised the Ultimate Fighting Championship 139: Mauricio “Shogun” Rua v. Dan Henderson, Championship Fight Program.

Joe Hand Promotions, a commercial distributor of sporting events, was granted exclusive rights to distribute via closed-circuit television the Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”) Mauricio “Shogun” Rua v. Dan Henderson fight (the “Program”), which Joe Hand Promotions asserts was telecast nationwide on November 19, 2101 [sic].

In the complaint against Serrato and Miguel’s Mexican Fusion Grill, an intellectual property lawyer for Joe Hand Promotions has alleged such wrongful acts as interception, reception, publication, divulgence, display, exhibition, and “tortuous” [sic] conversion of the Program.

In addition to naming the separate legal entity which apparently owns Miguel’s Mexican Fusion Grill, Joe Hand Promotions has also sued Serrato as an individual, claiming that he had the right and ability to supervise the activities of Miguel’s Mexican Fusion Grill. Joe Hand Promotions asserts that those activities included the unlawful interception of its UFC Program.

Serrato and Miguel Mexican Fusion Grill, LLC have been accused of violating 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. The complaint also lists a count of conversion. Joe Hand Promotions seeks statutory damages of $100,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; $50,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; compensatory and punitive damages on the claim of conversion; costs, including costs incurred for the service of process and the investigation of potential wrongdoing; and attorney’s fees. These claims have been made both against Miguel Mexican Fusion Grill, LLC and as personal liability claims against Serrato.

Practice Tip #1: Joe Hand Promotions has sued two entities: a limited liability company and an individual who is apparently a principal in that company. While limited liability companies are intended, as the name suggests, to limit the liability of the principals, they are not always successful in doing so. Where a principal is personally involved in certain types of illegal activity, legal mechanisms (such as a limited liability company) that are designed to shield the principal from liability may fail to do so.

Practice Tip #2: While on the surface this appears to be a copyright case, an allegation of interception under 47 U.S.C. § 605 is a different cause of action from copyright infringement. However, a suit alleging interception does not preclude an additional lawsuit alleging different causes of action. For example, the copyright holder can also sue for copyright infringement, which could increase damages by as much as $150,000.

Practice Tip #3: In addition to misspelled words, incorrectly numbered paragraphs and an assertion that every page is numbered “Page PAGE 7” [sic], this complaint asserts wrongdoing which occurred on “November 19, 2101.” It is then dated as having been signed on “November 8, 20134.” Such inexactitude is perhaps due in part to Joe Hand Promotions having filed hundreds upon hundreds of similar lawsuits. Nonetheless, at least in this case, such flaws in pleading might present a creative attorney with the opportunity to make at least one novel argument: given that, in this filing it is admitted that more than 18,000 years have passed between the date of the alleged illegal act and the time when the lawsuit was/will be initiated (although all 18,000+ years have yet to occur), the statute of limitations surely has, or will have, run at the time of the filing of the complaint.

November 20, 2013

Eli Lilly Sues Pet Supply, Pet Products Net and Graham Nelson for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana (“Lilly”) has filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Graham Nelson, Zoja Pty Ltd. d/b/a Pet Supply International Ltd., and Pet Products Net, all of Australia, infringed the trademark COMFORTIS, Trademark Registration No. 3,370,168, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Lilly, through its Elanco Animal Health Division, manufactures, markets and sells pet medicines, including flea-control preparations and treatments for parasitic infestations. It contends that it has made long and continuous of the name and mark “Elanco” in connection with veterinary preparations. It also asserts that it has long used the “Comfortis” mark, which was registered by the U.S. Trademark Office in 2008. Lilly claims that it has sold tens of millions of dollars’ worth of veterinary preparations, pet medicines and related goods and services under the Elanco and Comfortis marks.

Among Lilly’s products is Trifexis, a once-monthly veterinary medication, which contains the veterinary chemicals spinosad and milbemycin oxime. Trifexis is for the prevention of heartworms, fleas and intestinal worms. It is sold in the United States with what Lilly contends to be an inherently distinctive and non-functional trade dress. Trifexis is available only by prescription through licensed veterinarians. Lilly sells a similar product in Australia, with similar trade dress, under the name “Panoramis.”

Defendants Nelson, Zoja, Pet Supply and Pet Products Net do business over the Internet, including at the website www.bestvaluepetsupplies.com. Among the products listed on their website is “Panoramis aka Trifexis.” While the companies are apparently based in Australia, the website indicates that they ship to the United States.

Lilly has sued Defendants over the sale of Panoramis to the United States. It asserts that units designed for sale in markets such as Europe and Australia are neither intended nor authorized for sale in the United States. Lilly further indicates that the Elanco- and Comfortis-branded pet medicines are tailored to meet the requirements of different geographic regions and countries to reflect the differences in language, climate, government regulations, units of measure, local addresses and telephone numbers, among other things.

Lilly objects to the Defendants’ purported advertisement of units designed for the Australian and European markets as identical to or interchangeable with the units designed for sale in the United States. It states that that the Elanco-branded “Panoramis” pet medicines are materially different from its Elanco-branded “Trifexis” pet medicines sold in the United States.

Trademark attorneys for Lilly assert that Defendants are not authorized to use Lilly’s Elanco or Comfortis names and trade dress in connection with the sale of once-monthly spinosad and milbemycin oxime pet medicines outside of Australia. Lilly has sued Defendants, asserting willful infringement of its trademarks. It asserts the following in its complaint:

• First Claim for Relief: Trademark Infringement in Violation of Section 32 of the Lanham Act
• Second Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Third Claim for Relief: False Advertising in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Fourth Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Indiana Common Law

Lilly asks for preliminary and permanent injunctions; damages, including treble damages; the Defendants to be required to notify all purchasers of the accused products, request the return of the products and refund the price paid; pre- and post-judgment interest and costs of the suit.

Practice Tip:

Lilly is objecting to the so-called “grey market” for its veterinary pharmaceuticals. Prices for drugs can vary considerably between countries, often as a result of government intervention in the market. As a result, a “grey market” – selling a drug intended for use in one country to consumers in another country – can emerge. In this complaint, Lilly has framed its objection to a grey market for its pet-care pharmaceuticals as an intellectual property dispute.

Intellectual property law requires a balancing of competing interests. On the one hand, innovation will be discouraged if inventors, authors and other creators of intellectual property are not allowed to benefit from their labors. Such a problem arises if others are allowed to use creators’ ideas without compensating them (the “free-rider problem”). On the other hand, the public good is promoted by encouraging free competition in the marketplace and easy alienability of property.

Under the first-sale defense to infringement, once a copy of an item protected by intellectual property laws has been sold to a purchaser, the creator of the intellectual property generally may not prevent that purchaser from reselling or otherwise disposing of the item. In patent and copyright law, the first-sale rule in most cases provides an absolute defense against infringement. In patent law, this is also referred to as “patent exhaustion.” As a result, the purchaser of a copy of the work and the owner of the intellectual property rights to that work may become competitors in the marketplace if the purchaser goes to resell a copy of the work.

The first-sale defense is not as broad in a trademark context. Enunciated in 1924 by the U.S. Supreme Court, the general rule for the resale of a trademark item provides that, after a trademark owner has sold a trademarked product, the buyer ordinarily may resell that product under the original mark without incurring any trademark liability. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). However, unlike patent or copyright law, trademark law has as one of its primary goals preventing confusion among potential purchasers. Typically, but not always, such confusion will not exist where a genuine article bearing an authentic trademark is sold. While there is a split among the circuits concerning the extent to which consumer confusion is a relevant factor, some hold that certain types of confusion about a product’s origin cause the first-sale defense to be inapplicable to the resale of a trademarked good. See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 2010).

November 15, 2013

Ambre Blends Sues doTERRA For Trademark Infringement of “Solace”

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Ambre Blends, LLC of Fishers, Indiana has filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that doTERRA, Inc., doTERRA International, LLC, both of Orem, Utah (collectively, “doTERRA”) and Kerry Dodds d/b/a Kerry Essentials of Indianapolis, Indiana (“Kerry”) infringed SOLACE®, Trademark No. 4266473, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

In its complaint, Ambre Blends claims to have been producing organic body products since 2001. It offers four fragrances which are designed to be worn by both women and men. Founded in 2008, doTERRA offers essential oils both as single oils and as proprietary essential oil blends via independent product consultants. Both companies claim rights in the mark “Solace” in connection with essential oil products.

Ambre Blends asserts that it has used the Solace mark continuously in commerce since at least as early as February 2007. It holds a federally registered trademark on the mark in connection with “Aromatic preparations, namely, oils, body creams, body sprays, soaps, shower gel; Beauty creams; Body and beauty care cosmetics; Body cream; Body sprays; Essential oils for use in aromatherapy; Essential oils for use in manufacturing of candles, lip balm, shower gel, shampoo, conditioner; Face and body lotions; Non-medicated skin creams with essential oils for use in aromatherapy; Oils for perfumes and scents; Perfume; Perfume oils; Perfumed creams; Perfumed soaps; Scented body spray; Skin soap.” It describes its essence as having been “created for the sole purpose of comfort and attraction” and marks its products with “Solace®”.

According to the doTERRA website, doTERRA sells its product, a blend for women, as “Solace™”. It describes its oil as “a proprietary blend of Certified Pure Therapeutic Grade® essential oils carefully formulated to balance hormones and manage symptoms of PMS and the transitional phases of menopause.” (It also provides the disclaimer, required by the Food and Drug Administration, that the “product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent disease.”)

In its complaint, Ambre Blends contends that doTERRA willfully and intentionally used the Solace mark knowing both that the mark was the property of Ambre Blends and that such a use was unlawful. It further asserts that doTERRA’s use of the mark was intended to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the general public and that doTERRA acted in bad faith.

The complaint asserts, inter alia, violations of the Lanham Act and unfair competition:

• Count I: Trademark Infringement
• Count II: False Designation of Origin
• Count III: Unfair Competition
• Count IV: Forgery
• Count V: Corrective Advertising Damages
• Count VI: Declaratory Judgment
• Count VII: Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief

Trademark counsel for Ambre Blends seeks a declaratory judgment; a preliminary injunction; a permanent injunction; damages, including treble damages; costs and attorney’s fees; the transfer to Ambre Blends of any domain name that includes “Solace”; and corrective-advertising damages.

Practice Tip #1: From the complaint, this appears to be a straightforward case of infringement. However, Ambre Blends may have a tougher case than is obvious from the complaint itself. It appears from doTERRA’s sales literature that doTERRA has used the mark “Solace” along with “™”, thus claiming rights in the mark, at least as early as 2011. In contrast, Ambre Blends did not file its application until April 4, 2011; it was published for opposition on October 16, 2012. A federal registration confers a presumption of validity. However, here, the right to use the mark “Solace” may result in a battle of the facts.

Practice Tip #2: This complaint highlights the difference between the “®” mark and the “™” mark. While the former may not be used until a mark has been granted a federal registration, the latter has no such requirement. Instead, it may be used whenever a business wishes to put competitors on notice that it considers the mark to be its intellectual property.

Practice Tip #3: doTERRA is currently embroiled in litigation in both state and federal court in Utah with Young Living, another giant in the essential-oil industry.

November 11, 2013

J & J Sports Sues Wing’N It and its Owners for Unlawful Interception and Broadcast of Championship Fight

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – J & J Sports Productions, Inc. of Campbell, California (“J & J Sports”) has sued Joseph M. Hubbard and Alison Kay, LLC, both of Indianapolis, Indiana and d/b/a Wing’N It in the Southern District of Indiana alleging the unlawful interception and broadcast of the Manny Pacquiao v. Juan Manuel Marquez, WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program.

J & J Sports states that it is the exclusive domestic commercial distributor of the Manny Pacquiao v. Juan Manuel Marquez, WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program (the “program”). It has sued Alison Kay, which is listed on the complaint as the name of a limited liability company, as well as Joseph M. Hubbard as an individual, under the Communications Act of 1934 and The Cable & Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.

Specifically, Defendants have been accused of violating 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553 by displaying the program on November 12, 2011 without a commercial license. Regarding the claim under 47 U.S.C. § 605, the complaint alleges that with “full knowledge that the Program was not to be intercepted, received, published, divulged, displayed, and/or exhibited by commercial entities unauthorized to do so, each and every one of the above named Defendants . . . did unlawfully intercept, receive, publish, divulge, display, and/or exhibit the Program” for the purpose of commercial advantage and/or private financial gain.

A count of conversion is also included which asserts that Defendants’ acts were “willful, malicious, egregious, and intentionally designed to harm Plaintiff J & J Sports” and that, as a result of being deprived of their commercial license fee, J & J Sports suffered “severe economic distress and great financial loss.”

In addition to naming the separate legal entity, Alison Kay, LLC, which apparently owns the restaurant, Plaintiff has also sued Hubbard alleging that he had the right and ability to supervise the activities of Wing’N It. J & J Sports asserts that those activities included the unlawful interception of Plaintiff’s program.

J & J Sports also contends that Hubbard specifically directed the employees of Wing’N It to unlawfully intercept and broadcast Plaintiff’s program at Wing’N It or, if he did not, that the actions of the employees of Wing’N It are directly imputable to Hubbard by virtue of his purported responsibility for the activities of Wing’N It. Hubbard has also been named individually as a result of J & J Sports’ contention that he is a managing member of Alison Kay, LLC. J & J further asserts that Hubbard, as an individual specifically identified on the liquor license for Wing’N It, had an obvious and direct financial interest in the activities of Wing’N It.

In the complaint, the intellectual property attorney for J & J Sports listed the following counts and requests for redress:

•Count I: Violation of Title 47 U.S.C. § 605. For this count, J & J Sports requests (a) statutory damages for each willful violation in an amount to $100,000.00 pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. 605(e)(3)(C)(ii), and (b) the recovery of full costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).

•Count II: Violation of Title 47 U.S.C. § 553. For this count, J & J Sports asks the court for (a) statutory damages for each violation in an amount to $10,000.00 pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii); (b) statutory damages for each willful violation in an amount to $50,000.00 pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B); (c) the recovery of full costs pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 553 (c)(2)(C); and (d) and in the discretion of the court, reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 553 (c)(2)(C).

•Count III: Conversion. For this count, the court is requested to order both compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants as the result of the Defendants’ allegedly egregious conduct, theft, and conversion of the program and deliberate injury to the Plaintiff.

Practice Tip #1: While on the surface this appears to be a copyright case, an allegation of interception under 47 U.S.C. § 605 is a different cause of action from copyright infringement. However, a suit alleging interception does not preclude an additional lawsuit alleging different causes of action. For example, the copyright holder can also sue for copyright infringement, which could increase damages by as much as $150,000.

Practice Tip #2: As part of its complaint, J & J Sports claims that the Defendants’ actions have subjected it to “severe economic distress and great financial loss.” It will be interesting to see what evidence it offers as proof that, as a result of allegedly not receiving its full commercial fee for the programming purportedly displayed by the Defendants – a circumstance presumably known to few other than the Defendants themselves – it has suffered severe economic distress and great financial loss.

November 8, 2013

Joe Hand Promotions Sues Bucks Tavern and its Owner for Unlawful Interception and Broadcast of Championship Fight

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – An intellectual property lawyer for Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. of Feasterville, Pennsylvania has sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Alice Baldwin and two limited liability companies, all of Evansville, Indiana and doing business as Bucks Tavern, unlawfully intercepted and broadcast the “Rousey v. Carmouche” championship fight.

Joe Hand Promotions was granted rights to distribute via closed-circuit television and encrypted satellite signal the Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”) “Rousey v. Carmouche” fight (the “Program”), which was telecast nationwide on February 23, 2013.

In the complaint against Baldwin and Bucks Tavern, intellectual property counsel for Joe Hand Promotions has alleged such wrongful acts as interception, reception, publication, divulgence, display, exhibition, and “tortuous” [sic] conversion of the Program.

In addition to naming the separate legal entities which apparently own Bucks Tavern, Joe Hand Promotions has also sued Baldwin as an individual, claiming that she owns those legal entities and that she had the right and ability to supervise the activities of Bucks Tavern. Plaintiff asserts that those activities included the unlawful interception of its UFC Program. It further claims that Bucks Tavern and Baldwin received financial benefit from the unlawful display of the Program.

Baldwin and the Bucks Tavern entities have been accused of violating 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. The complaint also lists a count of conversion. Joe Hand Productions seeks statutory damages of $110,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; $60,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; compensatory and punitive damages on the claim of conversion; and costs and attorney’s fees. These claims have been made both against Bucks Tavern and as personal liability claims against Baldwin.

Practice Tip #1: Joe Hand Productions has sued three entities: two limited liability companies and an individual who is allegedly a principal in both. While limited liability companies are intended, as the name suggests, to limit the liability of the principals, they are not always successful in doing so. Where a principal is personally involved in certain types of illegal activity, legal mechanisms (such as a limited liability company) that are designed to shield the principal from liability may fail to do so. Unfortunately for Baldwin, it is likely that she, as an individual, will be the primary target of this lawsuit as, according to the complaint, it seems that both of the limited liability companies have been administratively dissolved, making their inclusion as defendants likely irrelevant.

Practice Tip #2: While on the surface this appears to be a copyright case, an allegation of interception under 47 U.S.C. § 605 is a different cause of action from copyright infringement. However, a suit alleging interception does not preclude an additional lawsuit alleging different causes of action. For example, the copyright holder can also sue for copyright infringement, which could increase damages by as much as $150,000.

Practice Tip #3: Joe Hand Promotions is a frequent litigant and has brought several cases in recent years against defendants alleged to have illegally intercepted and/or broadcast UFC fights. Indiana Intellectual Property Law News has previously blogged on the cases below:

• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Fishbowl Pub and its Owners for Unlawful Interception and Broadcast of UFC Fight
• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Ho Bo Jungle Bar Over Unauthorized Interception of the Ultimate Fighting Championship Broadcast
• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Lawrenceburg, Indiana Bar for Showing UFC Fight Without Authorization
• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Beerbelly’s over Interception of Broadcast Signal
• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Longwell and Pitt Stop Pub & Grill for Intercepting UFC Broadcast

November 7, 2013

WindStream Sues Rambo and Keebler for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

New Albany, Indiana – WindStream Technologies, Inc. of North Vernon, Indiana filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Rambo LLC, Rambo Montrow Corporation (collectively, “Rambo”) and Rick Keebler, all of Madison, Indiana, as well as ten unidentified John Does residing in Indiana, infringed its trademarked TurboMill, Trademark Registration No. 3,986,494, which has been registered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

WindStream manufactures wind turbines for municipal, residential and commercial use. Those turbines are shipped worldwide from its Indiana manufacturing facility. It contracted with Rambo and Keebler, who is asserted to be a principal of the Rambo entities, to provide component parts and to act as an authorized dealer of TurboMill turbines in certain territories.

WindStream has multiple contractual disputes with Defendants and Defendants’ predecessors in interest and asserts that component parts in which WindStream has an interest are being held “hostage” in an attempt to renegotiate the terms of one of the contracts. Further, WindStream contends that the failure of Defendants to deliver the parts has damaged its business. WindStream also charges Defendants with unfair competition, claiming that they are selling WindStream products, including WindStream’s TurboMill, as their own. Finally, it asserts that, among the prospective customers that Keebler and Rambo are targeting are individuals and entities that had previously been identified by WindStream as potential customers.

In its complaint, filed by the trademark attorney for WindStream, the following counts are alleged:

• Federal Unfair Competition and Passing Off (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))
• Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114)
• Breach of Contract (Dealer Agreement)
• Breach of Contract (Purchase Orders)
• Interference with Contract and Prospective Economic Advantage

WindStream asks the court for an injunction prohibiting trademark infringement and similar conduct; damages, including treble damages; punitive damages for Defendants’ willful and malicious acts; and attorney’s fees and costs of the lawsuit.

Practice Tip: The complaint asserts that the trademark for TurboMill was registered on June 28, 2001 and that the mark has been used in commerce since at least 2009. In contrast, the registration is listed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as having occurred on June 28, 2011 with the mark shown as having first been used in commerce in 2011, the same year in which WindStream began manufacturing its wind turbines. While the former inconsistency, which adds exactly ten years to the apparent life of the trademark, can be assumed to be a typographical error, the origin of the latter inconsistency, which adds another two years to the period during which the TurboMill mark is claimed to have been used in commerce, in unclear.

November 6, 2013

Silver Streak Industries Sues Squire Boone Caverns for Copyright Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

New Albany, Indiana – Silver Streak Industries, LLC of Tempe, Arizona (“Silver Streak”) has filed a copyright infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Squire Boone Caverns, Inc. of Floyd County, Indiana (“Squire Boone”) infringed the copyrighted work Ore Car display and game card which has been registered by the U.S. Copyright Office.

Silver Streak’s Ore Car display and game card (the “Work”), a whimsical representation of a mining ore car used to display polished stones and an accompanying brochure that lists the type of stones displayed, was copyrighted in 1995. Retail consumers may select stones for purchase. They are able to keep track of each type of stone collected with the brochure. Silver Streak generates revenue through the sales of copies of the Work to third parties retail establishments, such as travel centers, and through re-supply of the polished stones displayed with the Work.

Silver Streak alleges that, within the nine-month period prior to the filing of this action for copyright infringement, Squire Boone deliberately and willfully infringed Silver Streak’s copyright in the Work by producing an “Ore Car and Tumbled Stone” product, which it claims infringes the copyrighted Ore Car display.

Intellectual property attorneys for Silver Streak contend that Squire Boone offered its purportedly infringing product to one of Silver Streak’s existing customers at a retail-merchandise trade show in early 2013 at a deeply discounted price. It also asserts that Squire Boone has made at least one sale of the Ore Car to Six Flags, a potential customer of Silver Streak.

In its complaint, Silver Streak lists two causes of action:

• Count I: Copyright Infringement
• Count II: Tortious Interference with Contract

Silver Streak asks the court to impound and destroy all copies of the allegedly infringing work;
enjoin Squire Boone from further infringement; enjoin Squire Boone from unlawfully interfering with existing or prospective contracts between Silver Streak and its customers; order an accounting of profits and other damages that resulted from copyright infringement or interference with contract and prospective advantage; award to Silver Streak actual damages and profits under 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) and § 504(b), or in the alternative, statutory damages for copyright infringement pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504 (a)(2) and § 504(c); award punitive damages; and award to Silver Streak its costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees.

Practice Tip: The Copyright Act empowers a plaintiff to elect to receive an award of statutory damages between $750 and $30,000 per infringement in lieu of an award representing the plaintiff’s actual damages and/or the defendant’s profits. In a case where the copyright owner proves that infringement was committed willfully (as was asserted here), the court may increase the award of statutory damages to as much as $150,000 per infringed work. A finding of willful infringement will also support an award of attorney’s fees.

October 31, 2013

Joe Hand Promotions Sues Fishbowl Pub and its Owners for Unlawful Interception and Broadcast of UFC Fight

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. of Feasterville, Pennsylvania has sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Timothy H. Fishburn of Marion County, Indiana; David M. Rickelman of Morgan County, Indiana and MWCC, Inc. d/b/a Fishbowl Pub At Midwest Sports Complex of Indianapolis, Indiana unlawfully intercepted and broadcast the Ultimate Fighting Championship “Aldo v. Hominick” Program.

Joe Hand Promotions was granted rights to distribute via closed-circuit television and encrypted satellite signal the Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”) “Aldo vs. Hominick” fight (“the Program”), which was telecast nationwide on April 30, 2011.

In the complaint against Fishburn, Rickelman and Fishbowl Pub, intellectual property counsel for Joe Hand Promotions has alleged such wrongful acts as interception, reception, publication, divulgence, display, exhibition, and “tortuous” [sic] conversion of the Program.

In addition to naming the separate legal entity, MWCC, Inc., which apparently owns Fishbowl Pub, Plaintiff has also sued Fishburn and Rickelman as individuals, claiming that they own MWCC and that they had the right and ability to supervise the activities of Fishbowl Pub. Plaintiff asserts that those activities included the unlawful interception of its Program. It further claims that Fishbowl Pub and its owners received financial benefit from the unlawful display of the Program.

Defendants have been accused of violating 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. The complaint also lists a count of conversion. Joe Hand Productions seeks statutory damages of $110,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; $60,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; compensatory damages on the claim of conversion; and costs and attorney’s fees. These claims have been made both against Fishbowl Pub and as personal liability claims against the owners.

Practice Tip #1: Among its assertions of wrongdoing, Joe Hand Productions has alleged interception of the Program under 47 U.S.C. § 605, which is a different cause of action from copyright infringement.

Practice Tip #2: When Congress passed the Cable Communication Act, a statute of limitations was not included. Some federal courts have determined that a two-year statute of limitation is appropriate while other federal courts have used a three-year statute of limitations. The alleged wrongdoing here occurred on April 30, 2011. If the court interprets the interception claim to have a two-year statute of limitations, this may pose a problem for the Plaintiff, as the complaint was filed on October 15, 2013.

Practice Tip #3: It is unclear precisely what unlawful act is being alleged in this complaint. In the paragraph 12, it is asserted that Defendants wrongfully intercepted and broadcast the UFC “Aldo vs. Hominick” fight. However, in paragraph 32, the Plaintiff requests a finding of unauthorized exhibition of the “St-Pierre v. Sheilds Broadcast,” which is presumably a different program.

Overhauser Law Offices, the publisher of this website, has represented several hundred persons and businesses accused of infringing satellite signals.

October 24, 2013

BMI Asserts Copyright Infringement Against Blu

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana — Broadcast Music, Inc. of New York, New York (“BMI”) has filed a copyright infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that SC Entertainment, LLC d/b/a Blu and Shawn Cannon (“Cannon”), both of Indianapolis, Indiana, infringed the copyrighted works LAST NIGHT A D.J. SAVED MY LIFE, SHOW ME LOVE, and I’LL BE AROUND which have been registered by the U.S. Copyright Office. Five other Plaintiffs,Comart Music, EMI Virgin Songs, Inc. dba EMI Longitude Music, EMI Blackwood Music, Inc, Song A Tron Music, and Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corporation, are also listed in the complaint.

Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) is a “performing rights society” under 17 U.S.C. § 101 that operates on a non-profit-making basis and licenses the right to publicly perform copyrighted musical works on behalf of the copyright owners of these works. The other Plaintiffs in this action are the copyright owners of the three compositions at issue in this lawsuit.
SC Entertainment is an Indiana limited liability company that operates Blu, an establishment which is asserted to publicly perform musical compositions and/or cause musical compositions to be publicly performed.

BMI asserts that Cannon is a member of SC Entertainment and that he has primary responsibility for the operation and management of the company and of Blu. Cannon also allegedly has the right and ability to supervise the activities of SC Entertainment and a direct financial interest in the company and in Blu.

BMI and the other Plaintiffs, via copyright counsel, have asserted willful copyright infringement of the three copyrights-in-suit in their complaint. They further claim that the Defendants’ entire course of conduct, including the ongoing unauthorized public performances of the copyrighted works, has caused and is continuing to cause the Plaintiffs great and incalculable damage.

Practice Tip:

The Copyright Act empowers a plaintiff to elect to receive an award of statutory damages between $750 and $30,000 per infringement in lieu of an award representing the plaintiffs’ actual damages and/or the defendants’ profits. In a case where the copyright owner proves that infringement was committed willfully, the court may increase the award of statutory damages to as much as $150,000 per infringed work. A finding of willful infringement will also support an award of attorney’s fees.

Furthermore, not only is the performer liable for infringement, but so is anyone who sponsors the performance. A corporate officer will be found jointly and severally liable with his corporation for copyright infringement if he (1) had the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity, and (2) has a direct financial interest in such activities.

October 18, 2013

Aiuppy Sues Jeepers Dollhouse Miniatures for Infringing Copyrighted Photos

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Laurance B. Aiuppy of Park County, Montana (“Aiuppy”) has sued Ufnowski Enterprises, LLC of Morgantown, Indiana (“Ufnowski”) d/b/a “Jeepers Dollhouse Miniatures” in the Southern District of Indiana alleging infringement of a copyrighted photograph or photographs which have been registered by the U.S. Copyright Office.

Plaintiff Aiuppy (also referred to in the complaint as “Plaintiff Auippy”) provides entertainment-related photojournalism goods and services featuring celebrities, which it licenses to online and print publications.

Defendant Ufnowski, which offers miniatures, dollhouses, and related accessories, is asserted to own and operate the website http://www.jeepersminiatures.com and to have copied, modified and displayed Aiuppy’s photograph or photographs on the Jeepers Dollhouse Miniatures website without Aiuppy’s permission. It is further contended that this conduct was knowing and in violation of U.S. copyright laws. The complaint also asserts that Ufnowski received a financial benefit directly attributable to the alleged infringement(s), and claims that as a result of the display of the photographs, the website had increased traffic and, in turn, realized an increase in their advertising revenues and/or merchandise sales.

The complaint, filed by the intellectual property counsel for Aiuppy, states the following claims:

· First Count: Direct Copyright Infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.

· Second Count: Contributory Copyright Infringement

· Third Count: Vicarious Copyright Infringement

· Fourth Count: Inducement of Copyright Infringement

· Fifth Count: Injunction Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502

· Sixth Count: Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505

Aiuppy asks for a judgment that Ufnowski has infringed directly, contributorily and/or vicariously; for a judgment that Ufnowski has induced others to violate Aiuppy’s copyrighted photographs(s); for statutory damages against Ufnowski of $150,000 per infringement, or actual damages and Ufnowski’s profits; for a permanent injunction pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502; and for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Practice Tip: As part of its complaint, Aiuppy has asserted that Ufnowski had “red flag” knowledge under 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(i) (sic) of the alleged infringements and yet failed to remove the allegedly infringing photographs. The “red flag” provision, codified as 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(ii), is part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).

Title II of the DMCA, separately titled the “Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act” (“OCILLA”), was designed to clarify the liability faced by service providers who transmit potentially infringing material over their networks.

But rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification of various copyright doctrines, Congress elected to leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a series of “safe harbors” for certain common activities of service providers. To that end, under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d), OCILLA established a series of four “safe harbors” that allow qualifying service providers to limit their liability for claims of copyright infringement based on (a) transitory digital network communications, (b) system caching, (c) information residing on systems or networks at [the] direction of users, and (d) information location tools.

To qualify for protection under any of the safe harbors, a party must meet a set of threshold criteria. First, the party must in fact be a “service provider,” defined, in pertinent part, as “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). A party that qualifies as a service provider must also satisfy certain “conditions of eligibility,” including the adoption and reasonable implementation of a “repeat infringer” policy that “provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network.” Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). In addition, a qualifying service provider must accommodate “standard technical measures” that are “used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.” Id. § 512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2).

Beyond the threshold criteria, a service provider must satisfy the requirements of a particular safe harbor. In this case, the safe harbor presumably at issue is § 512(c), which covers infringement claims that arise “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.” The § 512(c) safe harbor will apply only if the service provider:

(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing;

(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or

(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;

(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and

(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.

It is in § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) that the so-called “red flag” knowledge exception to the safe harbor provision for service providers is found.

As the safe harbor acts as an affirmative defense, and the “red flag” knowledge, in turn, is available to defeat that defense, it is interesting that this seems to have been included in the complaint as part of the prima facie case against Ufnowski. Moreover, it will be interesting to see what use Plaintiff’s copyright attorney makes of this assertion, given that Ufnowski appears from the complaint to be a merchant of dollhouse miniatures, not an Internet service provider.