Articles Posted in Patent Infringement

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Fort Wayne, Indiana – An Indiana patent attorney for Agri-Labs Holdings LLC of Auburn, Indiana filed a patent infringement lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that TapLogic, LLC of Murray, Kentucky infringed its patented “Soil Sample Tracking System and Method.”

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At issue in this Indiana patent litigation is U.S. Patent No. 8,286,857 (the “`857 Patent” or the “Patent-in-Suit”), to which Agri-Labs claims ownership. The patent-in-suit, which was issued based upon an application filed by inventor Tony Wayne Covely, has been registered by the U.S. Patent Office. The `857 Patent generally relates to a system and method for performing soil analysis that uses smart phones, applications for smart phones, soil containers having unique identifiers, and global positioning (“GPS”).

TapLogic is accused of selling and offering for sale in the United States its “Ag PhD Soil Test,” which Agri-Labs contends infringes the patent-in-suit. To implement its soil-testing system, TapLogic provides its customers with soil containers. Customers are instructed to manually pull soil samples from a field and place them in separate containers, each of which includes a unique identifier. TapLogic’s Ag PhD test obtains a GPS coordinate reading associated with a location in the field from where the soil sample is taken and associates the GPS coordinate reading with the soil container having the customer scan the barcode contained on the soil container.

In December 2014, Agri-Labs sent a letter to TapLogic “attempting to amicably resolve this matter.” Agri-Labs indicates that it received no meaningful reply from TapLogic in response to the letter.

In this Indiana patent infringement complaint, the patent lawyer for Agri-Labs asserts a single count: Infringement of the ‘857 Patent by TapLogic. Agri-Labs asks the court to adjudge that the ‘857 Patent has been infringed and to enjoin TapLogic and its agents from directly and/or indirectly infringing the patent. Agri-Labs also asks for an award of compensatory damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284, as well as enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and for an award of its costs.

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Washington, D.C. – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled on the patent infringement litigation between Zimmer of Warsaw, Indiana and Stryker of Kalamazoo, Michigan. The Federal Circuit upheld the jury’s finding that Zimmer had infringed three of Stryker’s patents but overturned the decision of the Western District of Michigan to triple the damage award, reducing the award from $228 million to $70 million, and vacated the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees.

Stryker and Zimmer are the two principal participants in the market for orthopedic pulsed lavage devices. A modern, orthopedic pulsed lavage device is a combination spray-gun and suction-tube, used by medical professionals to clean wounds and tissue during surgery.

In 2010, Stryker Corp, Stryker Puerto Rico, Ltd. and Stryker Sales Corp. (collectively, “Stryker”), sued Zimmer, Inc., Zimmer Surgical, Inc. and Zimmer Orthopaedic Surgical Products of Warsaw, Indiana (collectively, “Zimmer”) alleging that Zimmer’s line of Pulsavac Plus pulsed lavage devices infringed three of Stryker’s patents – U.S. Patent No. 6,022,329 (“the ‘329 patent”), U.S. Patent No. 7,144,383 (“the ‘383 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 6,179,807 (“the ‘807 patent”). A jury awarded $70 million in damages and the district court increased that figure by approximately $2.4 million to reflect sales made by Zimmer during a time period that had not been considered by the jury.

Stryker also moved for enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284, alleging willful patent infringement by Zimmer. Under § 284, “the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed” at trial. For this determination, the court referred to Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.. In Read, the Federal Circuit had held that the “paramount determination in deciding to grant enhancement and the amount thereof is the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all the facts and circumstances.” In evaluating the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct, courts typically rely on the nine Read factors, which are:

1. whether the infringer deliberately copied the patentee’s ideas or design;

2. whether the infringer investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or not infringed;

3. the infringer’s conduct during litigation;

4. the infringer’s size and financial condition;

5. closeness of the case;

6. duration of the infringing conduct;

7. remedial actions, if any, taken by the infringer;

8. the infringer’s motivation for harm; and

9. whether the infringer attempted to conceal its misconduct.

The district court found that all nine Read factors favored substantial enhancement of the jury’s award and trebled both the jury’s award of $70 million and the court’s award of supplemental damages.

In the current opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s findings that Stryker’s patents were valid and had been infringed by Zimmer, as well as the jury’s award of damages to Stryker but reversed the district court’s judgment that Zimmer’s infringement was willful.

To establish willfulness, the patentee has the burden of showing “by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” If and only if the patentee establishes this “threshold objective standard” does the inquiry then proceed to the question of whether the objectively defined risk was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to a party accused of patent infringement.

The Federal Circuit noted that the district court had failed to undertake the required objective assessment of Zimmer’s specific defenses to Stryker’s claims. The Federal Circuit then considered the question of objective recklessness, which “will not be found where the accused infringer’s position is susceptible to a reasonable conclusion of no infringement.” The court held that the objective standard showed that Zimmer had presented reasonable defenses to all of the asserted claims of Stryker’s patents. Consequently, Zimmer was found not to have acted recklessly and the decision to award enhanced damages was reversed.

Because the appellate court reversed the trial court’s determination that the infringement of the patents had been willful – and because district court’s award of attorneys’ fees was based on that determination – the Federal Circuit vacated district court’s finding that the case was exceptional as well as the award of attorneys’ fees and remanded the issue to the trial court for further consideration.

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Washington, D.C. – The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case asking whether its decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), that a licensee’s obligations are absolved after the expiration of a patent, should be overruled. Kimble v. Marvel Ent. Inc., U.S., No. 13-720.


Ninth Circuit Decision

In this case, Kimble held a patent on a glove that allows its wearer to shoot pressurized foam string from the palm, mimicking a gesture of the comic-book hero “Spider-Man.” (Patent No. 5,072,856). Kimble met with Marvel’s predecessor to discuss his glove invention, which was then covered by his pending patent application. When Marvel began manufacturing a similar toy called the “Web Blaster,” Kimble sued in 1997 for patent infringement and for breach of contract based on an alleged oral agreement to compensate him for any use of his ideas.

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Indianapolis, Indiana – In conjunction with co-counsel, an Indiana patent attorney for Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging infringement by Sandoz Inc. of Princeton, New Jersey of ALIMTA®, Patent No. 7,772,209, which was issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

ALIMTA, which is licensed to Lilly, is a chemotherapy agent used for the treatment of various types of cancer. ALIMTA is composed of the pharmaceutical chemical pemetrexed disodium. It is indicated, in combination with cisplatin, (a) for the treatment of patients with malignant pleural mesothelioma, or (b) for the initial treatment of locally advanced or metastatic nonsquamous non-small cell lung cancer. ALIMTA also is indicated as a single agent for the treatment of patients with locally advanced or metastatic nonsquamous non-small cell lung cancer after prior chemotherapy. Additionally, ALIMTA is indicated for maintenance treatment of patients with locally advanced or metastatic nonsquamous non-small cell lung cancer whose disease has not progressed after four cycles of platinum-based first-line chemotherapy. One or more claims of the ‘209 patent cover a method of administering pemetrexed disodium to a patient in need thereof that also involves administration of folic acid and vitamin B12.

This Indiana patent infringement lawsuit arises out of the filing by Defendant of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) seeking approval to manufacture and sell generic versions of ALIMTA prior to the expiration of the ‘209 patent. Defendant filed as a part of that ANDA a certification of the type described in Section 505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 55(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), with respect to the patent-in-suit, asserting that the claims of the patent-in-suit are invalid, unenforceable, and/or not infringed by the manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale of Defendant’s ANDA products.

In its complaint, filed by an Indiana patent lawyer, Lilly states that Defendant intends to engage in the manufacture, use, offer for sale, sale, marketing, distribution, and/or importation of Defendant’s ANDA products and the proposed labeling therefor immediately and imminently upon approval of the ANDA i.e., prior to the expiration of the patent-in-suit. Lilly asserts that Defendant’s actions constitute and/or will constitute infringement of the patent-in-suit, active inducement of infringement of the patent-in-suit, and contribution to the infringement by others of the patent-in-suit.

The complaint lists a single claim: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,772,209. Lilly asks the court for the following relief:

(a) A judgment that Sandoz has infringed the ‘209 patent and/or will infringe, actively induce infringement of, and/or contribute to infringement by others of the ‘209 patent;

(b) A judgment ordering that the effective date of any FDA approval for Sandoz to make, use, offer for sale, sell, market, distribute, or import Sandoz’s ANDA Products, or any product the use of which infringes the ‘209 patent, be not earlier than the expiration date of the ‘209 patent, inclusive of any extension(s) and additional period(s) of exclusivity;

(c) A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Sandoz, and all persons acting in concert with Sandoz, from making, using, selling, offering for sale, marketing, distributing, or importing Sandoz’s ANDA Products, or any product the use of which infringes the ‘209 patent, or the inducement of or contribution to any of the foregoing, prior to the expiration date of the ‘209 patent, inclusive of any extension(s) and additional period(s) of exclusivity;

(d) A judgment declaring that making, using, selling, offering for sale, marketing, distributing, or importing of Sandoz’s ANDA Products, or any product the use of which infringes the ‘209 patent, prior to the expiration date of the ‘209 patent, infringes, will infringe, will actively induce infringement of, and/or will contribute to the infringement by other of the ‘209 patent;

(e) A declaration that this is an exceptional case and an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285; and

(f) An award of Lilly’s costs and expenses in this action.

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Indianapolis, Indiana – In conjunction with co-counsel, an Indiana patent attorney for Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana, Eli Lilly Export S.A. of Geneva, Switzerland (collectively, “Lilly”) and Acrux DDS Pty Ltd. of West Melbourne, Australia sued for patent infringement in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC of Bridgewater, New Jersey, infringed its patented product Axiron®, for which Plaintiffs claim patent protection under Patent Nos. 8,435,944; 8,419,307; 8,177,449 and 8,807,861, which have been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

Lilly is engaged in the business of research, development, manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products. Acrux is engaged in the development and commercialization of pharmaceutical products. They sell their products worldwide. Amneal is a pharmaceutical company that develops, manufactures, markets and distributes generic pharmaceutical products for sale in the United States.

Lilly is the holder of approved New Drug Application No. 022504 for the manufacture and sale of a transdermal testosterone solution made at a concentration of 30 mg/1.5L, which it markets under the trade name “Axiron®.” This drug is used to treat males for conditions associated with a deficiency or absence of endogenous testosterone.

This action relates to the Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) submitted by Amneal to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for approval to market a generic version of Lilly’s Axiron product. Defendant certified to the FDA that, in its opinion, the patents-in-suit were invalid, unenforceable and/or would not be infringed by the commercial manufacture, use or sale of the generic version of Axiron described in the ANDA.

Plaintiffs contend that the submission of the ANDA to the FDA constitutes infringement by Defendant of the patents-in-suit. In the complaint, patent lawyers for Lilly and Acrux assert sixteen separate counts related to patent infringement. Among the allegations listed for the patents-in-suit are counts of “Direct Infringement,” “Inducement to Infringe,” “Contributory Infringement” and for declaratory judgment.

The complaint asks for an injunction to stop Defendant from producing the generic version of Axiron until the expiration of Lilly’s patents-in-suit. In addition, Lilly asks that the court declare the patents to be valid and enforceable; that Defendant infringed upon all of the patents-in-suit by, inter alia, submitting Defendant’s ANDA to obtain approval to commercially manufacture, use, offer for sale, sell or import its generic version of the drug into the United States; that Defendant’s threatened acts constitute infringement of the patents-in-suit; that FDA approval of Defendant’s generic drug be effective no sooner than the expiration date of the patent-in-suit that expires last; and that this is an exceptional case. Plaintiffs also ask for costs and attorneys’ fees.

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Indianapolis, Indiana – Indiana patent attorneys for Intex Recreation Corporation (“Intex”) of Long Beach, California filed a patent infringement complaint in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Bestway (USA), Inc. (“Bestway”) of Phoenix, Arizona infringed “Inflatable Flotation Device Having Removable Canopy,” Patent No. 6,749,474, which has been registered by the U.S. Patent Office.

Intex and Bestway compete in the business of selling inflatable pool products and accessories. In this Indiana patent lawsuit, Intex contends that Bestway has made, used, offered to sell, sold, and/or imported into the United States, inflatable products that infringe one or more claims of United States Patent No. 6,749,474 (“the ‘474 Patent”), which relates to an inflatable flotation device having a removable canopy and which Intex indicates it owns. Intex claims that Bestway’s accused products are or were available, and are or were being offered for sale and sold, via the internet on at least Amazon.com and at Kmart stores and/or Kmart’s website, including to customers located within Indiana. Intex claims that one example of an infringing product offered by Bestway’s is Bestway’s UV Careful™ Baby Care Seats.

In this Indiana patent litigation, a single count is alleged: infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,749,474. Intex contends that Bestway’s infringement of the ‘474 Patent is willful and justifies a trebling of damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284. Further, it asserts that is an exceptional case supporting an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285. Intex, via its Indiana patent lawyers, asks that the court:

  1. Order, adjudge, and decree that U.S. Patent 6,749,474 is valid, enforceable, and infringed by Bestway;
  2. Enter a permanent injunction against Bestway enjoining it, its directors, officers, agents, employees, successors, subsidiaries, assigns, and all persons acting in privity or in concert or participation with Bestway from making, using, selling, or offering for sale in the United States, or importing into the United States, any and all products and/or services embodying the patented inventions claimed in the ‘474 Patent;
  3. Award Intex its damages for patent infringement, and prejudgment and post-judgment interest, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §284;
  4. Order, adjudge, and decree that Bestway’s infringement of the ‘474 Patent has been deliberate and willful, and award Intex treble damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284; and
  5. Find that this case is “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and award Intex its costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as provided in 35 U.S.C. § 285.

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Washington, D.C. – In the matter of Ultramercial Inc. v. Hulu, LLC et al., a patent attorney for Ultramercial, Inc. and Ultramercial, LLC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit asserting that the District Court for the Central District of California erred in granting Defendant Wildtangent, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Applying the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 2014 ruling in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, the Federal Circuit concluded that a method of offering free, streamed video in exchange for viewing an advertisement is not patent eligible. According to the court, the claims were directed to abstract ideas containing no element or combination of elements to ensure that the patent claims significantly more than the abstract idea itself.

While the court’s opinion disclaimed any intent of holding that all claims in all software-based patents will necessarily be directed to an abstract idea, it said this conclusion is warranted as to this claim. In a concurring opinion, Judge Mayer made three points: (1) patent eligibility is a threshold question, (2) there is no presumption of eligibility, and (3) Alice set out a technological arts test for patent eligibility.

Claims Direct to Patent-Ineligible Concept

Under Alice, the first step of the analysis is to determine if the claim was directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the court began.  The method claim in question set out eleven steps, including receiving media, selecting an ad, offering sale on the Internet, limiting public access, offering for sale to the public in exchange for the selected ad, receiving the consumer’s request to view the ad, facilitating display of the ad, allowing consumer access to the media and if the ad is interactive, updating an activity log, and receiving payment from the ad sponsor.

In his opinion for the Court, Judge Lourie wrote “[t]his combination of steps recites an abstraction–an idea, having no particular concrete or tangible form.” The steps all describe an abstract idea, “devoid of a concrete or tangible application,” he explained, adding the following: “Although certain additional limitations, such as consulting an activity log, add a degree of particularity, the concept embodied by the majority of the limitations describes only the abstract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free content.”

The court acknowledged that, at some level, all inventions reflect abstract ideas, and said this decision does not purport to say that all claims in all software-based patents will necessarily be directed to an abstract idea. Other cases may turn out differently, but the claims in this patent are directed to an abstract idea, Judge Lourie observed, which is a method of using advertising as an exchange or currency.

Nor does the addition of merely novel or non-routine components to the claimed idea necessarily turn an abstraction into something concrete, the court added. In any event, the novelty in implementation of the idea was a factor to be considered only in the second step of the Alice analysis, Judge Lourie wrote.

No Elements Transform Claims to Patent-Eligible Subject Matter

For the second step of the analysis–determining if elements or a combination of elements transform the claims to patent-eligible subject matter–the court examined the limitations of the claim, noting that they must disclose features that are more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.”

None of the 11 individual steps, viewed both individually and as an ordered combination, transformed the nature of the claim into patent-eligible subject matter, the court concluded.The majority of those steps comprised the abstract concept of offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement. Adding routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and use of the Internet did not transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. Instead, the claimed sequence of steps comprised only “conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality,” which is insufficient to supply an “inventive concept.” Instead, the steps of consulting and updating an activity log represented insignificant “data-gathering steps” and, thus, added nothing of practical significance to the underlying abstract idea. Further, that the system was active, rather than passive, and restricted public access also represented only insignificant “[pre]-solution activity,” which was also not sufficient to transform an otherwise patent-ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.

The invocation of the Internet added no inventive concept, the court explained, observing that, as an attempt to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, it was also insufficient to save the claim. “Given the prevalence of the Internet, implementation of an abstract idea on the Internet in the case is not sufficient to provide any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself,” Judge Lourie wrote. The fact that some of the eleven steps were not previously employed in this art, standing alone, was not enough to confer patent eligibility here, he added.

While the “machine or transformation” test can provide a useful clue to patent eligibility, Judge Lourie acknowledged, he pointed out that this claim was not tied to any machine other than a general purpose computer. Nor was there any sufficient “transformation” insofar as the subject matter of claim merely involved the granting of access and the exchange of money. These were insufficient, according to the court, because they were neither physical objects or substances nor representative of physical objects or substances.

Concurring Opinion

In his concurring opinion, Senior Judge Mayer stressed three separate points: (1) the subject matter requirements of 35 U.S.C. §101 were a threshold matter to be addressed at the outset of the litigation; (2) the issues of Section 101 were not subject to a presumption of patent eligibility; and (3) the Alice decision, for all intents and purposes, set out a technological arts test for patent eligibility.

To read the opinions in this case, click here.

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Washington, D.C. – The United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Alice Corporation Pty. LTD v. CLS Bank International et al., Case No. 13-298. At issue was software that allows a neutral third party to ensure that all parties to a financial transaction have fully performed their obligations. The Court held that Alice Corporation’s patents should not have been issued because they (1) consisted of software created to implement an abstract idea but (2) lacked an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.

Alice Corporation owned several patents that covered a manner for mitigating “settlement risk,” i.e., the risk that one or more parties to an agreed-upon financial exchange will not satisfy their obligations. Alice Corporation’s patent claims consisted of computer software that facilitated the exchange of financial obligations between the parties. The patents-in-suit claimed (1) a method for exchanging financial obligations, (2) a computer system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obligations, and (3) a computer-readable medium containing program code for performing the method of exchanging obligations.

Respondents (collectively, “CLS Bank“), which operate a global network that facilitates currency transactions, sued Alice Corporation, arguing that the patent claims at issue were invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Alice Corporation counterclaimed, alleging infringement.

All of the claims were held to be ineligible for patent protection by the district court because they purported to protect to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, although, of the ten judges, only five agreed on the reasoning behind the holding.

The Supreme Court held for CLS Bank, affirming the Federal Circuit, and held that the patent claims were drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and, thus, could not be patented.

In this opinion, the Court defined the Section 101 framework as having two parts. First, the court must determine if the patent claim at issue is directed toward an abstract idea. Second, it must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.

The Court concluded that, in the case of the software patents-in-suit, “the method claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to transform [an] abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”

Practice Tip: Patent lawyers hoped that this much-anticipated case would clarify the extent to which software is patentable. The Supreme Court had a difficult task in drawing these lines. A ruling that allowed ideas that were overly broad and/or vague to be patented would have encouraged lawsuits by “patent trolls” and inhibited innovation by inventors who might fear that implementing their ideas would subject them to liability for patent infringement. On the other hand, a ruling that restricted the patentability of software too much could nullify thousands of existing patents and could also discourage innovation because an inventor’s resulting creation would be more difficult to patent.

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South Bend, Indiana – Indiana patent lawyers for Lippert Components Manufacturing, Inc. of Elkhart Indiana sued in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that MOR/ryde International Inc. and MOR/ryde Inc., both of which are also from Elkhart Indiana, infringed “Equalizer for Suspension System,” Patent Nos. 7,918,478 and 7,296,821, which have been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

At issue in this litigation are U.S. Patent Nos. 7,918,478 (“the ‘478 Patent”) and 7,296,821 (“the ‘821 Patent”). These inventions pertain to “equalizers” that dampen vibrations for recreational vehicle trailers. Plaintiff Lippert contends that Defendants MOR/ryde International Inc. and MOR/ryde Inc. (collectively, “MOR/ryde”) have infringed, and continue to infringe, these patents. The accused products include MOR/ryde’s CRE/3000 and SRE/4000 equalizer products.

Lippert states that MOR/ryde knew of Lippert’s intellectual property rights in the ‘478 Patent and that, despite this knowledge, MOR/ryde infringed at least claim 1 of that patent. Lippert also asserts that MOR/ryde induced infringement by others as well as contributed to others’ infringement of at least claim 15 of the ‘478 Patent.

Lippert makes similar allegations regarding its ‘821 Patent, stating that MOR/ryde knew of Lippert’s patents rights in that patent and that MOR/ryde nonetheless infringed at least claim 1. Finally, Lippert contends that MOR/ryde induced infringement by others and contributed to others’ infringement of at least claim 14 of the ‘821 Patent.

In this Indiana patent infringement lawsuit, the following claims are asserted:

• Count I: ‘478 Patent Infringement

• Count II: ‘821 Patent Infringement

Lippert asserts that Defendants’ acts have been willful and contend that those actions render this an “exceptional case” as that term is defined in 35 U.S.C. §285.

Lippert asks, via its Indiana patent counsel, that the court:

• Preliminarily and permanently enjoin both MOR/ryde entities and their agents from infringing, or from contributing to or inducing others to infringe, Lippert’s ‘478 Patent and ‘821 Patent;

• Award Lippert monetary damages adequate to compensate Lippert for past infringement consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 284, up to and including treble the amount of actual damages assessed, together with costs and prejudgment interest;

• Award Lippert its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §285; and

• Order MOR/ryde to provide notice to their customers of the infringing systems and of MOR/ryde’s unlawful acts.

Practice Tip #1:  A court may award increased damages for willful infringement. These extra damages are known as punitive damages. An award of punitive damages, up to and including a trebling of damages, is appropriate when an infringer has acted in wanton disregard of the patentee’s intellectual property rights. In determining whether the infringing behavior supports increased damages, the court will consider the “totality of the circumstances.”

Potential exposure for increased damages may be reduced by seeking – and acting on – timely advice from a competent patent lawyer. In contrast, the failure to seek and heed such advice may increase the probability that the court will find that the defendants have acted willfully.

Practice Tip #2: Lippert is not new to patent litigation. In fact, it has sued various competitors for patent infringement in 2003, 2008, 2012 and again in 2013. Lippert dropped the first three lawsuits. While the 2003 litigation lasted about a year and a half, the infringement actions filed in 2008 and 2012 were dropped only two months after the complaints were filed. The 2013 patent infringement lawsuit is ongoing.

Practice Tip #3: Under U.S. patent law, a trial court may award attorneys’ fees in cases of patent infringement litigation that it deems “exceptional.” Two recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings revisited how “exceptional” is defined. In part as a result of these rulings, plaintiffs filing questionable patent infringement lawsuits must exercise greater caution, as trial judges will now have greater latitude to award attorneys’ fees – including awarding fees to prevailing defendants – in those cases in which they determine that the conduct of the losing party “stands out from others.”

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SolarDockLightPicture.pngFort Wayne, Indiana – A patent and copyright attorney for Lake Lite Inc. of Laotto, Indiana filed a complaint in the Northern District of Indiana asserting, inter alia, that Universal Forest Products, Inc. of Grand Rapids, Michigan (“UFP”); Universal Consumer Products, Inc., also of Grand Rapids, Michigan (“UCP”); and Maine Ornamental, LLC of Greene, Maine infringed “Solar Dock Light” and “Low Profile Solar LED Lamp,” Patent Nos. D697,246 and 8,845,126, which have been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

Lake Lite is in the business of designing and selling dock lights and other related products and accessories in the boating/dock industry. Its product line includes solar-related dock lights.

In April 2012, Lake Lite first began to offer a “Solar Dot” line of products. Lake Lite indicates that UFP inquired about collaborating with Lake Lite to offer the Solar Dot products to UFP’s customers and that, in November 2012, a mutual non-disclosure agreement was entered so that confidential information regarding Lake Lite’s Solar Dot products could be disclosed and the potential collaboration evaluated. The disclosed information included Lake Lite’s copyright applications to now-copyrighted materials, registered as U.S. Copyright Nos. VAu001118627 and VAu001156962.

Lake Lite asserts that, during these negotiations, it made numerous modifications requested by UFP for which it was not compensated. Lake Lite and UFP failed to reach an agreement about licensing terms and discontinued negotiations. Instead, Lake Lite asserts, UFP has now wrongfully begun offering its own “Solar Deck and Dock Lights.”

In this Indiana copyright and patent litigation, Plaintiff Lake Lite’s specific complaints include that Defendants have been unjustly enriched as a result of their manufacture, importing, marketing and sale of their solar deck and dock light products. Lake Lite contends that Defendants’ acts include infringement of Lake Lite’s copyrights and patents, unauthorized use and misappropriation of Lake Lite’s confidential information and trade secrets and violation of the mutual non-disclosure agreement between Lake Lite and UCP.

The complaint, filed by a copyright and patent lawyer for Lake Lite, alleges the following:

• Count One – Copyright Infringement

• Count Two – Infringement of U.S. Patent No. D697,246

• Count Three – Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,845,126

• Count Four – Breach of Contract

• Count Five – Breach of Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

• Count Six – Violation of Indiana Uniform Trade Secret Act

• Count Seven – Unjust Enrichment

Lake Lite asks for a judgment of infringement of its copyrights-in-suit, of infringement of its patents-in-suit, that the non-disclosure agreement was violated by Defendants, that Defendants violated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in their dealings with Lake Lite regarding the Solar Dot products, that Defendants have misappropriated Lake Lite’s trade secrets and that Defendants have been unjustly enriched.

Lake Lite seeks injunctive relief; damages, including punitive damages; costs and fees, including attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip:

Indiana Code Section 24-2-3-2 defines a trade secret as:

information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:

1. derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and

2. is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

The four general characteristics of a trade secret are:

1. it is information;

2. that derives independent economic value;

3. that is not generally known, or readily ascertainable by proper means by others who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and

4. that is the subject of efforts, reasonable under the circumstances, to maintain its secrecy.

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Contact Information
Indiana Intellectual Property: IP Litigation, Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights
  • Seventh Circuit
  • Northern District of Indiana
  • Southern District of Indiana
Paul B. Overhauser
Overhauser Law Offices, LLC
Greenfield
18 E Main St #202
Greenfield, IN 46140
Phone: 317.467.9100
Fax: 866.283.8549
Indianapolis
101 W Ohio St #2000
Indianapolis, IN 46204
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