Articles Posted in Patent Infringement

Indianapolis, IN – Boston Scientific Corporation (“Boston Scientific”) of Natik, Massachusetts, was granted three of its four requests to exclude Defendant’s expert testimony in its declaratory judgment suit against Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC (“Mirowski”) of Bethesda, Maryland.

The litigation surrounding the Boston Scientific/Guidant Corp. (“Guidant”) / Mirowski / St. Jude Medical, Inc. (“St. Jude”) matter began in the Southern District of Indiana (and also in Delaware) as a patent infringement suit regarding an implantable cardioverter defibrillator. It was appealed to the Federal Circuit, reversed and returnedBoston.JPG to the Southern District of Indiana. It was later appealed again to the Federal Circuit. The second ruling of the Federal Circuit was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case. The matter was finally settled and the case dismissed but a subsequent dispute regarding the settlement resulted in the commencement of the current litigation.

In 1996, patent attorneys for Guidant (Boston Scientific’s predecessor) sued St. Jude for infringement of, inter alia, Mirowski’s Patent No. 4,407,288 (“the ‘288 patent”) which had been issued by the U.S. Patent Office, and for which Guidant had an exclusive license. Mirowski was added as a Plaintiff in 2001. That same year, a jury found that St. Jude had infringed the ‘288 patent that had been licensed to Guidant and jointly awarded Guidant and Mirowski $140 million in damages.

The court disagreed with the jury’s conclusions and, in 2002, entered a judgment as a matter of law for St. Jude on most issues, including finding both the ‘288 patent and another of Mirowski’s patents invalid. It granted a new trial on many of the issues on which St. Jude had not prevailed. The court also sanctioned Guidant $300,000 for misconduct relating to a Guidant expert witness.

Mirowski and Guidant appealed. Guidant also ceased royalty payments to Mirowski, as the agreement for royalties was limited to only those devices that were covered by a valid, unexpired patent. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s determination of invalidity of the ‘288 patent and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2010, Boston Scientific (which had acquired Guidant in 2006), Mirowski and St. Jude entered into a stipulation of dismissal and the case was closed. Boston Scientific paid Mirowski approximately $5.3 million and later slightly less than $1.4 million, the latter amount covering an error in the calculation of the earlier payment.

Mirowski objected to the amount of the royalty payments, contending that more was due. Mirowski also argued that Boston Scientific breached the parties’ agreement when it settled portions of its claims with St. Jude without Mirowski’s knowledge and approval.

On May 31, 2011, Boston Scientific filed suit against Mirowski, seeking declarations of non-infringement, satisfaction of royalty obligation, and no breach of contract regarding both the Indiana and the Delaware litigation. See a previous post discussing the commencement of this suit here. [NB: The Plaintiff listed in that complaint, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boston Scientific.]

In the current matter, in a motion in limine pursuant to the suit for declaratory judgment, Boston Scientific asked the court to exclude certain testimony regarding damages by Mirowski’s expert witness, Dr. Mohan Rao. After discussing a substantial list of his credentials, the court found Dr. Rao to be qualified to testify as an expert. The court also found the data on which Dr. Rao relied to be sufficient. The court then addressed Boston Scientific’s objections to Dr. Rao’s opinions in the areas of relevancy and methodology under the standard set forth in Daubert.

Dr. Rao summarized his opinions in four points: 1) his opinion regarding baseline royalties, 2) his opinion about the expected damages in the Delaware litigation, 3) his settlement valuations of the Indiana and Delaware litigations and 4) his unjust enrichment analysis. The court excluded the first, third and fourth opinions.

The court excluded the first opinion regarding baseline royalties as irrelevant. Through Dr. Rao, Mirowski argued that a baseline level of damages should be established that reflected the royalty that it would have received had Boston Scientific sought Mirowski’s consent before proceeding with the lawsuit, stating that such consent would not have been forthcoming. The court excluded this opinion, as it had already held that, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, Boston Scientific had no duty to obtain Mirowski’s consent to litigate. To the contrary, under the licensing agreement, Boston Scientific was obligated to sue St. Jude and similar infringers unless Boston Scientific and Mirowski agreed that a lawsuit should not be brought. Because Boston Scientific had an unfettered right to sue under the licensing agreement, Mirowski could not prove a factual predicate – that Boston Scientific had acted improperly by failing to obtain consent to sue – of its baseline-royalties argument. As such, the argument was impossible to win and the testimony was excluded as irrelevant.

The court excluded Dr. Rao’s third opinion, regarding the settlement valuations of the Indiana and Delaware litigations, as inconsistent with his own stated methodology of calculating an estimated settlement value. Dr. Rao had explained his methodology as consisting of two parts: the range of damages that the Plaintiff would accept at settlement and the range that the Defendant would offer. The estimated settlement value, then, would be within the overlap of those two ranges. However, in calculating his estimated settlement value, the court found that Dr. Rao appeared to have considered only the Plaintiff’s point of view. Because Dr. Rao failed to apply the methodology he described, this opinion was held to be inadmissible.

The court excluded the fourth opinion, regarding unjust enrichment, as demonstrating a fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrine. Specifically, Dr. Rao seemed to believe that a finding of unjust enrichment would result in a payment that would be split approximately evenly between Boston Scientific and Mirowski. He stated, “Mirowski would only get a portion of the proceeds on whatever it is that Boston Scientific was enriched, unjust or otherwise…Boston Scientific’s unjust enrichment would be roughly twice what the expected proceeds would be to Mirowski.” Holding that this testimony evinced a lack of understanding of the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the contractual relationship of the parties, and the parties’ positions at the time the settlement occurred, the court held the fourth opinion to be inadmissible.

The court denied one of the four motions to exclude, allowing in Dr. Rao’s testimony as to “expected damages” (the second opinion). Boston Scientific had characterized the testimony as “irrelevant, confusing, and a waste of time” and argued that, on the issues to which this testimony pertained, Mirowski could not meet its burden of proof. The court found that this issue could have been properly raised on a motion for summary judgment (but had not been) but was not properly excluded on Daubert grounds.

Practice Tip #1: Raising an argument when one of the factual predicates to that argument has already been settled by the court in favor of your opponent is not likely to be a winning strategy. To prevent such an error, it is useful to ensure that you have thoroughly considered each element of each of your claims.

Practice Tip #2: On the surface, the errors with opinions three and four seem easy to avoid: 1) make sure your expert follows his own stated methodologies and 2) make sure your expert is well versed – and conversant at deposition – in all elements of each legal claim at issue.


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Hammond, IN – Unverferth Manufacturing Company, Inc. of Kalida, OH has filed suit against Par-Kan Company of Silver Lake, IN for the infringement of United States Patent No. 8,221,047, which has been registered by the USPTO.

Unverferth.JPGPatent attorneys for Unverferth Manufacturing Company, Inc. filed a civil suit in Northern District of Indiana alleging that Par-Kan Company infringed, and continues to infringe, upon Unverferth’s patented seed tender products, including its “Seed Weigh” product.  Unverferth alleges that Par-Kan has engaged in both the “unauthorized, infringing manufacture, use, importation, sale and/or offer for sale” of the product and inducing others to infringe.

Unverferth further alleges that the infringing behavior continued after Par-Kan was notified of the infringement and, as such, some or all of the infringement was willful.

Par-Kan.JPGUnverferth asks for preliminary and permanent injunctions, for lost profits in an amount no less than a reasonable royalty, and that such damages be trebled.  It also seeks a judgment that the case is “exceptional,” and that, as such, it is entitled to all costs and expenses of the action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip: If a court finds that a patent has been infringed upon, it may then consider the additional issue of whether the infringement was willful.  Infringing behavior that continued despite an allegation of infringement can support such a finding.  The determination that an infringement was “willful” can, in turn, increase damages significantly.
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Indianapolis, IN – Commercial Recovery Corporation of Blaine, MN has filed a patent infringement suit in the Southern District of Indiana against American Financial Credit Services, Inc. for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,167,839 (“the ‘893 Patent”) which has been registered by the U.S. Patent Office 

Patent attorneys for Commercial Recovery Corporation filed this suit, the latest of six patent suits filed by the Plaintiff since September 2011, alleging infringement of their patented “Collection Agency Data Access Method.”  This patent protects a data-access method which allows secure access to an account database, such as the account database of a collection agency, via a network by affiliated agencies and clients. 

Plaintiff alleges that American Financial Credit Services, Inc. has infringed and continues to infringe on the Plaintiff’s patent by, among other ways, providing clients of collection agencies with secure access to client accounts using methods that infringe on the Patent.  Plaintiff seeks remedies that include an injunction, treble damages, attorneys’ fees and costs. 

Practice Tip: Patents are not granted solely on physical inventions but also on innovations in, among other things, a process or a method.  If you are uncertain whether a process your business utilizes is patented, consult an experienced patent attorney.

 

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HillRom.JPGIndianapolis, IN – The Southern District of Indiana has issued an Order concerning claim construction for three of nine patents-in-suit: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,699,038,6,147,592 and 7,538,659.

Patent attorneys for Hill-Rom Services, Inc., Hill-Rom Company, Inc. and Hill-Rom Manufacturing, Inc. (collectively, “Hill-Rom”) filed a patent-infringement action against Stryker Corporation, doing business as Stryker Medical and Stryker Sales Corporation (collectively, “Stryker”), alleging that Stryker had infringed nine of its patents. Stryker countered, alleging non-infringement and invalidity of the patents-in-suit.

The suit, initially filed in the Western District of Wisconsin, was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana. Six of the nine patents-in-suit are currently undergoing reexamination before the United States Patent and Trade Office pursuant to Stryker’s request and the Court considered only the other patents-in-suit.

In this Order, the Court determined the scope and meaning of the asserted patent claims, a necessary step before ruling on the question of infringement. The three patents-in-suit addressed involve data transfer patents that allow hospital personnel to monitor the status of patients’ beds remotely.

Five claim terms from the three patents at issue were presented to be construed by the Court: 1) “datalink”, 2) “interface board including processor”, 3) “message”, 4) “bed condition message” and 5) “message validation information”.

In each case, Hill-Rom proposed no definition other than reiterating the precise wording of each claim term at issue, apparently relying substantially on the heavy, but rebuttable, presumption that claim terms will be afforded their full ordinary and customary meaning. In contrast, Stryker criticized Hill-Rom’s failure to expand on what a plain and ordinary meaning would be when considered in the context of the specification and prosecution history.

The Court agreed with Stryker. Thumbnail image for Stryker.JPGFor each of the five claim terms at issue, the Court exactly or substantially adopted Stryker’s proposed definition.

For “datalink”, which was both the claim term and the proposed construction by Hill-Rom, the Court adopted Stryker’s proposal exactly, construing it to mean “A cable connected to the bed that carries data”.

The Court construed “interface board including processor” to mean “A board that processes an input signal to create bed condition messages and sends those messages to a remote location via the wall interface unit. It can also receive messages through the wall interface unit.” Of all of the claim terms, the Court differed the most from Stryker’s proposal — “A board that includes the electronics that control the sending of messages to, and the receiving of messages from, a remote location.” — on the construction of this term.

The third term, “message”, again proposed to mean only “message” by Hill-Rom, was interpreted to mean “A plurality of data fields of appropriate length assembled into a defined structure. A message is distinct from an input signal.”

“Bed condition message” was construed to mean “A message not generated in response to any user request that contains the status of all conditions the bed is capable of monitoring.”

Finally, “message validation information” was construed to mean “A data field within a message that is used to verify that the message was received exactly the same as it was sent.”

The case was referred to Magistrate Judge LaRue for further proceedings.

Practice Tip #1: Hill-Rom’s interpretation of “plain and ordinary meaning” as requiring merely the repetition of the terms at issue was soundly rejected by this Court, as it has been by other courts. Instead, it is often true that, in those cases that a lawsuit is filed, the parties can expect that there will be disagreements on what constitutes a “plain and ordinary meaning.” Consequently, it is advisable for both parties to consider providing the court with additional language supporting their respective positions. Failure to do so results in the court being presented with only one alternate definition to consider when construing claims, a situation not likely to benefit the party providing no additional language.

Practice Tip #2: It appears that Hill-Rom was trying to use general language in its claims to secure for itself broad protection under its patents. While that goal is understandable, claims cannot enlarge the scope of a patent beyond what has been described in the invention. So, for example, while the use of the broad term “datalink” might seem to protect a wide range of types of data sent over different types of links, without a proper foundation elsewhere in the patent, such a term will be ineffective in providing the desired protection.
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Indianapolis, IN – The Southern District of Indiana has denied all summary judgment motions of both plaintiff CleanTech and all defendants in this multi-district litigation involving patents issued by the US Patent Office.

GreenShift Corp. Thumbnail image for GreenShift-Logo.jpgand its subsidiary GS CleanTech Corp. (“CleanTech”) have brought a series of suits alleging infringement of their family of patented methods of extracting corn oil from byproducts of ethanol manufacturing.  This multi-district litigation, In re Method of Processing Ethanol Byproducts and Related Subsystems (‘858) Patent Litigation, consolidates 11 separate actions in multiple states involving several similar patents in the Southern District of Indiana. 

The defendants are: Big River Resources Galva, LLC; Big River Resources West Burlington, LLC; Cardinal Ethanol, LLC; ICM, Inc.; LincolnLand Agri-Energy, LLC; David J. Vander Griend; Iroquois Bio-Energy Co., LLC; Al-Corn Clean Fuel; Blue Flint Ethanol, LLC; ACE Ethanol, LLC; Lincolnway Energy, LLC; United Wisconsin Grain Producers, LLC; Bushmills Ethanol, Inc.; Chippewa Valley Ethanol Co.; Heartland Corn Products and Adkins Energy, LLC.

The initial litigation alleged infringement of one patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,601,858 (the “‘858 patent”), which was issued on October 13, 2009.  CleanTech sued GEA Westfalia Separator, Inc. (not a party in this matter) and others alleging infringement of that patent shortly after its issuance.

Allegations of infringement of three additional patents, U.S. Patent Nos., 8,008,516 (the “‘516 patent”), 8,008,517 (the “‘517 patent”) and 8,283,484 (the “‘484 patent”; collectively known, together with the ‘858 patent, as the “‘858 patent family”) were later added.  The patents in the ‘858 family share an identical specification and have substantially similar claim terms.  As such, the court concluded that the construction of the ‘858 patent applied to all of the asserted claims in the other patents in the ‘858 family.

CleanTech’s patented methods recover corn oil by evaporating, concentrating and mechanically separating thin stillage (“stillage”), a byproduct of ethanol produced from corn, into two components: corn oil and a post-recovery syrup (“syrup”) with most of its corn oil removed.  In the patents, the term “substantially oil free” (and the essentially identical term “substantially free of oil”) had been used to describe the syrup after the patented process had removed the corn oil. 

The defendants argued that this language required that, to infringe upon the patented processing, a removal process must remove almost all of the corn oil from the syrup.  The defendants moved for a finding on summary judgment that they had not infringed, arguing that the patented process did not include one which did not render the processed syrup “substantially oil free.”  The court disagreed that this was the proper construction of the term.

Defendants also asked the court to construe “substantially oil free” to require that at least 95% of the oil from the unprocessed stillage be removed by the patented oil-removal process, thus rendering any less efficient process non-infringing.  While the court agreed that a comparison between the oil levels in the input stillage and the output syrup was appropriate when considering the term, it declined to limit the protection afforded by the patent to this, or any, specific percentage and held that the term “substantially oil free” was to be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning.

In addressing the issue, the court discussed the language of the various patents and noted that, across the entire ‘858 patent family, the term “substantially oil free” had been found in only two substantially similar claims.  Further, the one reference found in the specification had been parenthetical — “[r]ecombining the syrup (which is substantially free of oil) from the centrifuge…” — and, according to the court, “almost an afterthought.” 

In sum, on this issue, the court found that none of the claims in the ‘858 patent family required that the post-oil-recovery syrup be substantially free of oil and concluded, instead, that the ‘858 patent family merely disclosed that the post-oil-recovery syrup was “substantially free of oil.”  The court held that the primary focus of the invention was not the amount of oil that remained in the syrup but, instead, on the recovery of oil.

Additionally, the defendants (except Adkins) asked the court to revisit an earlier construction of the term “substantially oil,” as applied to the corn oil captured, asking that it be held to mean that the oil must be nearly pure.  Defendant Cardinal further argued that the “substantially oil” term should be construed to mean nearly 100% pure, with only trace amounts of contaminants.  The court declined to readdress the construction of this term. 

The court also denied CleanTech’s motions for summary judgment against various defendants.

Finally, the court acknowledged that, since receiving the parties’ summary judgment motions, it had allowed CleanTech to amend its complaints against each defendant such that nearly all patents in the ‘858 family were asserted against each defendant.  Consequently, all summary judgment motions were denied without prejudice and with leave to re-file them to address the amended complaint. 

Practice Tip #1: Multi-district litigation affords consistency and judicial economy, as well as allowing plaintiffs and defendants to concentrate their efforts in one forum.  However, lawsuits that are not settled before trial must later be remanded to the transferring court and to a judge who has had little opportunity to become familiar with the issues.

Practice Tip #2: In this case, CleanTech filed suit almost immediately after the issuance of the first of the patents in the ‘858 family.  Thus, damages are limited to a reasonable royalty upon a showing that an infringer had actual notice of the published patent application and that the patent was subsequently issued on essentially the same claims.  As such, if a patent is filed in anticipation of litigation, it is wise to provide such notice immediately upon publication of the patent application. 

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Geneva, Switzerland – The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) has granted its permission for the twin-island nation of Antigua and Barbuda (“Antigua”) to disregard intellectual property rights granted by the United States (i.e., patents, copyrights and trademarks).  The decision follows nearly ten years of negotiations and litigation pursuant to a 2003 complaint to the WTO by Antigua.

In the United States, there are three separate federal laws (the “Wire Act,” the “Travel Act” and the “Illegal Gambling Business Act”) and various state laws promulgated by Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Utah that prohibit certain means of delivering gambling services, most particularly the interstate delivery such services.  The dispute centered on the conformance of these laws with an international trade agreement when the laws restricted online gambling services offered in the U.S. by Antigua.  [NB: Other WTO members participated as complainants but, by 2009, the U.S. had negotiated agreements with each of them.]

Via its attorneys, Antigua alleged that, together, the federal and state restrictions amounted to discrimination against foreign companies and constituted a breach of the United States’ agreement under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).  Antigua stated that its economy, which had, without the restrictions, included a substantial volume of online gambling services offered to the residents of the U.S., had been significantly damaged.

South Bend, IN – Patent attorneys for Engineered Solutions, L.P.of Mishawaka, IN has filed suit against AL-KO KOBER, LLC of Elkhart, IN for infringement of PatentPDF.JPGU.S. Patent No. 6,681,531, issued by the US Patent Office. The plaintiff claims that the AL-KO Kober offers for sale an above-floor, slide-out actuating mechanism for RVs that infringes Plaintiff’s ‘531 patent.

This case has been assigned to Chief Judge Philip P. Simon and Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein of the Northern District of Indiana, and assigned Case No. 3:13-cv-00051-PPS-CAN.

Further Information about the case is as follows:

Plaintiff: Engineered Solutions LP
Defendant: Al-Ko Kober LLC
Case Number: 3:2013cv00051
Filed: January 24, 2013
Court: Indiana Northern District Court
Office: South Bend Office
County: St. Joseph
Presiding Judge: Philip P Simon
Referring Judge: Christopher A Nuechterlein
Nature of Suit: Intellectual Property – Patent
Cause: 35:271
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Jury Demanded By: Plaintiff

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Indianapolis; IN – Patent attorneys for Michael Ware, President of SCR Solutions of Madison, Indiana filed a patent infringement suit in alleging H2O Underpressure, Inc., of Dale, Wisconsin infringed provisional patent application no. 61,633,642, MANUAL SCR CATALYST CLEANING METHOD which has been filed with the US Patent Office.

On May 11, 2012, Michael Ware, President of SCR Solutions, filed the Complaint pro se against H20 Underpressure for willful patent infringement. The Complaint alleges that H2O Underpressure infringed, and continues to do, the Manual SCR Catalyst Cleaning Method by using it and selling it to the Duke Energy East Bend Power Plant in Union, Kentucky. SCR Solutions is also alleging that H20 Underpressure had previous knowledge of the ownership of the patent pending process and “conspired to steal and use so without written agreement or intention to compensate the owner” for the sale and use of the Manual SCR Catalyst Cleaning Method. SCR solutions claims to have complied with the statutory requirement of placing notice of the patent on all Manual SCR Catalyst Cleaning Method sells and also giving H2O Underpressure written notice of the infringement. SCR Solutions is seeking to enjoin H2O underpressure from using and selling the Manual SCR Catalyst Cleaning Method by demanding a preliminary and permanent injunction against the continuing infringement and damages.

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Indianapolis; IN – Patent attorneys for Tower Reinforcement of Newburgh, Indiana filed a patent infringement suit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging Crown Castle International and Crown Castle Operating of Houston, Texas, and Aero Solutions, LLC of Boulder, Colorado infringed patent no.7,849,659, TOWER REINFORCEMENT APPARATUS AND METHOD, which has been issued by the US Patent Office.

Both the Crown Defendants and Aero Solutions are incorporated outside of Indiana, but the complaint alleges they maintain substantial contacts with Indiana by regularly conducting business in the state. Tower alleges patent infringement of three of their patents–“the ‘659 patent,” “the ‘972 patent,” and “the ‘712 patent”–to which Tower owns all the rights and interest. According to Tower’s complaint, the Defendants had actual notice of the Tower patents and still infringed on the patents through their making, using, selling and the offer of sale of products utilizing Tower’s patented technology. Tower asserts that the Defendants also encourage the design and construction of the protected patents, their actions being willful and deliberate. The complaint does not give many details about specific acts of infringement. Tower alleges they have, and will continue to, suffer substantial and irreparable financial loss and is therefore seeking to permanently enjoin the Defendants from their infringing activities of their ‘659, ‘972, and ‘712 patents.

Practice Tip: The US Patent laws applicable to this suit are 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a) gives district courts jurisdiction in any civil action relating to patents.

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Indianapolis; IN – Patent attorneys for Norco Industries, Inc. of Elkhart, Indiana filed a patent infringement in the Southern District of Indianaalleging Mito Corporation of Elkhart, Indiana infringed patent no. D650,723 ROOF BOW, which has been issued by the US Patent Office.

The patented technology was invented by Bernard F. Garceau and Robert G. Chew, but the complaint states the patent was owned by Norco during the period of alleged infringement. The ‘723 patent wasroofbow.jpg issued in December 2011. The complaint seeks an injunction, damages, attorney fees and costs.

Practice Tip: The complaint makes only a barebones statement regarding the patent infringement: it simply states Mito is infringing the patent by “making, selling and using roof bows that embody the patented invention.”

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