Articles Posted in Unfair Competition

October 1, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: KM Innovations Sues LTD Commodities

Indianapolis, Indiana – An Indiana trademark attorney for KM Innovations LLC of New Castle, Indiana (“KM”) sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that LTD Commodities LLC of Bannockburn, Illinois (“LTD”) infringed the trademarked “INDOOR SNOWBALL FIGHT”, Trademark Registration No. 4,425,111 which has been issued by the U.S. Trademark Office.

KM sells synthetic “snowballs” for use in indoor “snowball fights.” It contends that it uses two distinct trademarks to market and sell these synthetic snowballs: “SNOWTIME anytime!” and INDOOR SNOWBALL FIGHT. KM has also sought patent protection for its indoor snowballs.

The SNOWTIME anytime!/”indoor snowball fight” concept was conceived in December 2012. At a party, several parents realized that a market might exist for “indoor snowballs,” which would enable children to have a “snowball fight” but without the usual requirements of snow or being outside. KM later introduced a product based on this idea.

In this Indiana trademark complaint, KM asserts that an item called an “Indoor Snowball Fight Set” is being offered and sold on by LTD on the LTD website. The retail price of the product offered by LTD is $9.95 per 12 synthetic balls, while an allegedly similar product is offered and sold by KM for somewhat more, with a retail price of about $1 per synthetic snowball.

KM contends that, by using the name “Indoor Snowball Fight Set,” LTD has deliberately misappropriated KM’s trademark rights. It claims that the use by LTD of this name demonstrates a wrongful attempt by LTD to utilize the goodwill associated with the KM synthetic-snowball product. KM also claims that LTD’s product is inferior and that, as a result, KM’s reputation will be damaged when consumers are confused into believing that KM is associated with LTD’s “Indoor Snowball Fight Set.”

In its complaint, filed by an Indiana trademark lawyer, KM claims the following:

• Count I: Infringement of Federal Trademark Registration No. 4,425,111
• Count II: False Designation of Origin/Unfair Competition – 35 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

KM asks the court for a judgment of trademark infringement and unfair competition. It requests that the court award damages, including treble damages; order the surrender of any infringing materials; prohibit the use of “Indoor Snowball Fight” by LTD and its agents; and award to KM its costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip #1: While not included as a separate count, KM did allege trademark dilution in paragraph 24 of the complaint. This cause of action is distinct from trademark infringement and applies to trademarks that are deemed to be famous. An action for dilution can assert either, or both, of two principal harms: blurring and tarnishment. Dilution by blurring, codified in 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(2)(B), arises when association with another similar mark causes the distinctiveness of the famous mark to be compromised. In contrast, dilution by tarnishment under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) happens when the reputation of the famous mark is damaged by association with a similar mark.

Practice Tip #2: KM, no stranger to intellectual property litigation, has previously sued in Indiana federal court alleging trade dress infringement of the packaging for its synthetic snowballs.

September 19, 2014

Indiana Unfair Competition Litigation: Property Damage Appraisers Sues Clinton Body Shop and Its Owner

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Texas defamation and franchise attorneys for Property Damage

Appraisers (“PDA”), in conjunction with Indiana co-counsel, sued alleging that John Mosley (“Mosley”), owner of the Clinton Body Shop, Inc. of Clinton, Mississippi, committed unfair competition under the Lanham Act by falsely representing the nature of an estimate made by one of PDA’s franchisees. Various state-law claims have also been pled to the court. This unfair competition lawsuit was initially filed in Indiana state court. It was removed from the Marion County Superior Court to the Southern District of Indiana by Indiana intellectual property attorneys for Defendants.

Plaintiff PDA is a national franchisor with a network of approximately 185 independent franchisees that are in the business of performing inspections on vehicles and other property. It has been in business for over 50 years. Defendant Mosley is the owner of the Clinton Body Shop. Clinton Body Shop advertises itself as a one-stop, full-service shop for automobile services.

Mosley is accused of inducing a PDA franchisee, John Larry Gentry, into providing a nonconforming auto-services estimate on PDA letterhead. PDA contends that Gentry was told that this estimate was only for comparison purposes and that it would be provided only to the Mississippi Attorney General’s office.

PDA claims that, instead, Mosley subsequently e-mailed this estimate to the Indiana Auto Body Association. PDA also asserts that Mosley mischaracterized the contents of, and process involved in writing, the estimate. According to the complaint, Mosley also delivered this nonconforming estimate to “other body shops around the country, making the same misrepresentations.”

In its complaint, filed by Texas defamation and franchise lawyers for PDA, in conjunction with Indiana co-counsel, the following counts are listed:

• Count I: Federal Unfair Competition (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))
• Count II: State Unfair Competition
• Count III: Defamation
• Count IV: Tortious Interference with Business Relationships

PDA asks the court for damages, including exemplary damages; interest; attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs; and a permanent injunction.

Practice Tip: The vast majority of Indiana intellectual property litigation takes place in federal court, as the intellectual property causes of action that are most often litigated creations of federal statutory law. Thus, they may be heard in federal court under federal-question jurisdiction. However, some intellectual property lawsuits – for example, litigation involving a trademark that is registered only with the state of Indiana and used solely within Indiana’s boundaries – may occur in Indiana state court.

September 5, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: Chanel Sues Chanel’s Salon for Trademark Infringement and Dilution

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Hammond, Indiana – An Indiana trademark lawyer for Chanel, Inc. of New York, New York, in conjunction with New York co-counsel, sued in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that Chanel’s Salon, LLC and Chanel Jones, both of Merrillville, Indiana, committed trademark infringement and trademark dilution of the trademark CHANEL, Registration Nos. 302,690; 510,992; 1,263,845; 1,348,842; 1,464,711; 1,559,404; 1,660,866; 3,134,695; and 4,105,557, which were issued by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Chanel is a fashion and beauty company. For over 85 years, Chanel has used CHANEL as a trade name, house mark and trademark to identify its goods and business. In addition to offering cosmetics, fragrances, and skin care products, Chanel’s goods include hair accessories, such as barrettes, hair clips, and men’s shampoo.

Chanel states that it has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to advertise and promote its goods. It indicates that last year in the United States it spent over $50 million dollars on advertising, all of which prominently featured the CHANEL mark. Consequently, it asserts, the CHANEL name and trademark is one of the most famous marks in the world and has become synonymous with Chanel.

At issue in this Indiana trademark infringement and trademark dilution lawsuit are the actions of Defendants Chanel’s Salon and its owner Chanel Jones. Defendants are accused of having begun to use the trade names CHANEL’S SALON and/or CHANEL’S COSMETOLOGY SALON in October 2012 in connection with their beauty salon without Chanel’s authorization and, in doing so, impinging on Chanel’s intellectual property rights.

Chanel contends in this lawsuit that Defendants are infringing the CHANEL trademark by, inter alia, offering goods and services that are related to those offered under the CHANEL mark, including cosmetics, beauty consultation services and hair accessories. Chanel also asserts that Defendants’ use of CHANEL dilutes the trademark, which Chanel claims is famous.

In July 2013, Chanel sent Defendants a cease-and-desist letter requesting that Defendants change the name of Chanel’s Salon to a name that did not include the word CHANEL. Chanel states that Defendants did not respond to this letter and that further attempts to resolve the dispute were unsuccessful.

In the complaint, filed by an Indiana trademark attorney, the following is alleged:

• Count I: Federal Trademark Dilution (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c))
• Count II: Federal Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114(1))
• Count III: Federal Unfair Competition (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))
• Count IV: Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition Under Indiana Common Law

Chanel asks the court for injunctive relief and “such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.”

Practice Tip: This is an unusual trademark case in at least two respects. First, while trademark infringement lawsuits are relatively common, colorable assertions of trademark dilution are less so. This is due in large part to the requirement that the trademark that is allegedly diluted be “famous.” This trademark lawsuit is also unusual in that, while the complaint asks the court in passing for “such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper,” it does not explicitly seek damages for the alleged trademark infringement and dilution. Instead, the sole purpose of the complaint seems to be to obtain injunctive relief.

August 13, 2014

Indiana Patent and Trade Dress Litigation: Polymer Technology Systems Asserts Patent and Trade Dress Infringement of Its Cholesterol Testing Technology

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Indiana patent attorneys for Polymer Technology Systems, Inc. (“PTS”) of Indianapolis, Indiana filed an intellectual property lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Jant Pharmacal Corporation of Encino, California (“Jant”) Infopia America LLC of Titusville, Florida (“Infopia USA”) and Infopia Co., Ltd. of Kyunggi, Korea (“Infopia

Korea”) infringed “Method for determining HDL concentration from whole blood or plasma,” Patent No. 7,087,397, which was issued by the U.S. Patent Office. PTS has also accused Defendants of federal unfair competition under the Lanham Act.

PTS develops, manufactures and sells point-of-care diagnostic products for the human healthcare market. At issue in this Indiana litigation is PTS’s “CardioChek® Multi-Analyte Strip,” a hand-held, point-of-care testing system that can test for total cholesterol, high-density lipoproteins (HDL) and triglycerides with a single drop of blood. In August 2006, Patent No. 7,087,397 (“the ‘397 Patent”) was issued to PTS. PTS indicates that this patent includes a significant portion of the technology embodied in this Indiana invention.

Defendant Infopia Korea has also developed a test strip that tests for total cholesterol, high-density lipoproteins and triglycerides. This system is branded as the LipidPlus Lipid Profile Test Strip. PTS contends that Infopia Korea imports the LipidPlus testing strip into the United States and that Defendants Infopia USA and Jant offer and sell the LipidPlus product in the U.S. market.

PTS alleges that much of the technology incorporated into the LipidPlus testing strip is copied from PTS’s CardioChek product. It contends that the copied aspects include the concept of the testing strip itself, the analytes selected for analysis, the structure of the strip and the chemistries used. PTS also contends that Defendants have copied the trade dress of PTS’s CardioChek testing strip. PTS further accuses Defendants of offering the LipidPlus testing strip at a price that is both extremely low and below cost.

In its complaint, filed by Indiana trade-dress and patent lawyers, PTS alleges the following:

• Count I: Patent Infringement of the ‘397 Patent

• Count II: Violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)

PTS asks the court:

• for a judgment that the ‘397 Patent is valid and enforceable;

• for a judgment of direct or indirect infringement, or inducement to infringe, by Defendants;

• to declare that Defendants have unfairly competed with PTS by infringing and misappropriating PTS’s trade dress;

• for an award to PTS of lost profits and a reasonable royalty for Defendants’ acts of patent infringement and trade-dress infringement;

• to treble the award of damages pursuant to a finding of willful, intentional and deliberate infringement;

• for an injunction prohibiting Defendants from engaging in acts of infringement or unfair competition; and

• for a declaration that the case is exceptional and an award of attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip: The United States Supreme Court addressed the elements required for trade dress to be protected in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). In Two Pesos, the Court held that, to establish a cause of action for trade dress infringement, a plaintiff must establish that (a) the design is non-functional; (b) the design is inherently distinctive or distinctive by virtue of having acquired secondary meaning; and (c) there is a likelihood of confusion.

August 7, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: Rieke Corporation Sues Riekes Packaging Corporation for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana – An Indiana trademark attorney for Rieke Corporation d/b/a Rieke Packaging Systems of Auburn, Indiana sued in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that Riekes Packaging Corporation of Nebraska infringed the trademark Rieke Packaging Systems®, Trademark No. 2742836, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Plaintiff Rieke Corporation states that it is one of the largest manufacturers of packaging components in the world. Its product line includes pumps, foamers, and sprayers for household dispensers as well as plastic and steel closures, caps, drum and pail enclosures, rings and levers for the industrial market. These products are used to store, transport, process and dispense various products in the agricultural, beverage, food, household products, industrial, medical, nutraceutical, personal care and pharmaceutical markets.

Plaintiff asserts that it has spent a considerable amount of money establishing the “Rieke Packaging Systems” trade name and trademark in the minds of customers as a source of high-quality and reliable packaging dispensers and closures. It claims that the trade name and trademark have become associated in the minds of purchasers with Plaintiff as “one of the largest and most reputable manufacturers and distributors of high quality and reliable packaging dispensers and closures in the world.”

Defendant Riekes Packaging Corporation has been manufacturing and selling packaging components since the corporation’s formation in 2012, according to Plaintiff. Rieke Corporation indicates that the “Riekes Packaging Corporation” name is shown on Defendant’s glass bottles, plastic bottles, plastic closures, caps, metal closures, dispensing closures and systems, tubes and other similar goods.

In this Indiana trademark lawsuit, Rieke Corporation accuses Riekes Packaging Corporation of knowing, deliberate, and intentional violations of Plaintiff’s trademark rights, stating Defendant’s use of the “Riekes Packaging Corporation” trade name or trademark with or on its products is likely to cause confusion in the marketplace regarding whether there is an association between Plaintiff and Defendant and as to the source or origin of Defendant’s goods. In their complaint, filed by an Indiana trademark lawyer, Plaintiff lists the following counts:

Count I-rademark Infringement under the Lanham Act
Count II-Unfair Competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Count III-Common Law Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition

Rieke Corporation asks the court to:

• enjoin Defendant and its agents from using “Riekes Packaging Corporation” as business name; in connection with sales or other commercial activities; or in a way that would be likely to lead others to believe that Defendant or its products were connected with Plaintiff;

• enjoin Defendant from engaging in any other activity that would constitute unfair competition;

• direct Defendant to recall infringing materials;

• declare that Defendant’s use of “Riekes Packaging Corporation” in connection with the sale of packaging products and components constitutes trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and the common law of the state of Indiana;

• direct that Defendant cancel or otherwise modify any trademark applications containing the “Riekes Packaging Corporation” name; and

• award to Rieke Corporation damages, including enhanced damages, costs and attorney’s fees.

Practice Tip: Under U.S. trademark law, trademarks that are primarily surnames, or which consist of a surname and other material that is not registrable as a trademark, are treated the same as descriptive trademarks. Thus, the trademark will not be protected as intellectual property until it has achieved secondary meaning through advertising and/or use over an extended period of time. Once that surname has acquired secondary meaning, it may be protectable as a trademark and others can be prevented from using the trademark on confusingly similar goods, even if that person has the same last name. So, for example, Joe McDonald could expect a legal challenge – presumably one that would succeed – if he opened a restaurant named “McDonald’s,” despite that “McDonald” is his last name.

July 18, 2014

Indiana Patent and Trademark Litigation: American Archery Accused of Patent and Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Evansville, Indiana – Indiana intellectual property attorneys for SOP Services, Inc. of Las Vegas, Nevada and Bear Archery, Inc. of Evansville, Indiana (collectively “Bear Archery”) initiated an infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that American Archery, LLC of Suwanee, Georgia infringed “Arrow Rest,” Patent No. RE38,096; “Arrow Rest System and Method,” Patent No. 6,978,775; WHISKER BISCUIT ARROW REST, Trademark Registration No. 2,501,255; and WHISKER BISCUIT, Trademark Registration No. 3,312,392, which have been issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

Bear Archery is in the business of researching, developing, designing, manufacturing, and selling archery products. Its business includes traditional archery bows, compound bows, bow sights, arrow rests, arrows and arrow components, archery targets, and various other archery accessories. American Archery is in the business of selling hunting products and accessories, including archery products.

At issue in this Indiana intellectual property dispute are arrow rests for mounting to archery bows. The lawsuit asserts claims of patent infringement, trademark infringement, as well as false and deceptive labeling and unfair competition.

American Archery is accused of selling counterfeit arrow rests, both through its website and through online auction sites. Specifically, Bear Archery asserts that the “ready to shoot” packages offered by American Archery advertise that they include a genuine Bear Archery Whisker Biscuit® arrow rest as part of the preassembled bow. However, Plaintiffs state, the bow that a consumer receives instead includes a pre-installed counterfeit arrow rest.

There are two patents at issue in this litigation: “Arrow Rest,” Patent No. RE38,096 (the “‘096 patent”) and “Arrow Rest System and Method,” Patent No. 6,978,775 (the “‘775 patent”). The ‘096 patent and the ‘775 patent (collectively “the patents-in-suit”) are owned by SOP Services. Bear Archery has been granted an exclusive license to the patents-in-suit. Plaintiffs accuse American Archery of having willfully, intentionally and deliberately infringed the patents-in-suit by offering the allegedly counterfeit items.

In addition to patent infringement assertions, this Indiana litigation also includes allegations of trademark infringement. Bear Archery contends that it owns trademark rights for the Whisker Biscuit mark, indicating that it has used the mark with its arrow rest products since at least 1999. It claims that consumers have come to recognize the mark as identifying Bear Archery’s arrow rest products. It further asserts that it owns a trademark on “Whisker Biscuit Arrow Rest” for archery equipment, namely arrow-rest devices. Bear Archery claims that American Archery’s use of the marks is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to origin, sponsorship or approval and therefore constitute trademark infringement and counterfeiting in violation of Section 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 et seq. and the common law.

Bear Archery includes a final claim of “false and deceptive labeling and unfair competition” under Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. §1125 and the common law.

Bear Archery, via its Indiana intellectual property lawyers, asks the court for the following relief:

A. A judgment of infringement of the ‘096 patent and the ‘775 patent;
B. A judgment that the use of the “WHISKER BISCUIT” mark in Defendant’s commercial advertising and sales in the Unites States creates a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception among relevant consumers and therefore infringes Plaintiff’s trademarks;
C. A judgment that Defendant has engaged in counterfeiting with respect to Plaintiffs’ trademarks;
D. An order permanently restraining Defendant or any of its agents from further acts of infringement of the patents-in-suit;
E. An order permanently restraining Defendant or any of its agents from engaging in misleading advertising of products or services bearing or resembling the “WHISKER BISCUIT” mark that have caused actual confusion, mistake or deception of the public;
F. An order that all infringing devices or materials in the possession of, or subject to control by, Defendant or its agents be delivered up and destroyed or altered to eliminate any possibility any further infringement;
G. An award of damages not less than a reasonably royalty, adequate to compensate Plaintiffs for Defendant’s acts of infringement under 35 U.S.C. §284;
H. An award to Plaintiffs of treble Defendant’s profits under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and (b);
I. An award to Plaintiffs of statutory damages for counterfeiting up to $2,000,000, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c);
J. An order declaring that this is an exceptional case pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285 and 15 U.S.C. 1117 as a result of Defendant’s knowing and willful infringement of the patents-in-suit and the asserted trademarks, and awarding Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees;
K. An award of Plaintiffs’ costs, and/or expenses; and
L. Aw award of Defendant’s wrongful profits associated with its infringement of Plaintiffs’ patent and/or trademark rights.

Practice Tip: Bear Archery requested that eBay remove various auctions posted by Bear Archery on the grounds that the items for sale were counterfeit. Bear Archery indicates that eBay removed the auctions and notified American Archery that the auctions had been removed because they had been flagged as offering counterfeit goods. Bear Archery requested this under eBay’s Verified Rights Owner (“VeRO”) Program. The VeRO Program provides a mechanism for an owner of intellectual property to request the removal of eBay auctions that offer items that infringe that owner’s intellectual property rights.

June 18, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: Liquid Palace Sues E Liquid Palace for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

New Albany, Indiana – Trademark attorneys for Liquid Palace, LLC and Robert W. Kaiser, Jr., both of New Albany, Indiana, filed an intellectual property lawsuit alleging that E Liquid Palace, LLC and Austin Simon, both of Jeffersonville, Indiana, and Russell Simon of Louisville, Kentucky infringed registered trademarks “Genie” and “Liquid Genie“, serial numbers 86107913 and 86107799 by using the registered trademark “Electric Genie“, serial number 86194345. This Indiana trademark litigation, initially filed in Indiana state court, was removed to the Southern District of Indiana.

Liquid Palace manufactures, distributes and sells electronic cigarettes, also known as e-cigarettes, and related products through brick-and-mortar and e-commerce channels. Liquid Palace indicates that it began conducting business on or around March 21, 2013. It claims that, in the next few days, it registered the domain name “liquidpalace.com” and began using the trademark “Liquid Genie” along with an accompanying image of a genie. Liquid Palace submitted applications for trademarks to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for the “Genie” and “Liquid Genie” word marks, with an accompanying image, in November 2013.

E Liquid Palace, which does business as “Electric Genie,” engages in a similar business approximately 6 miles from Liquid Palace’s retail store. Defendant Austin Simon is asserted to be the sole member of E Liquid Palace. On April 4, 2013, two weeks after Plaintiffs’ claimed business-opening date, Defendants submitted articles of organization to the Indiana Secretary of State to form E Liquid Palace, LLC, while Defendant Russell Simon is listed as the owner of the “Electric Genie” trademark.

Liquid Palace contends that it owns rights to the marks “Genie”, “Liquid Genie” and “Electronic Genie”. It claims that Defendants are using those marks and/or marks that are substantially similar. Liquid Palace asserts that these actions violate its trademark rights.

In its complaint, filed by trademark attorneys for Plaintiffs, the following counts are alleged:

• Count I: Violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
• Count II: Common Law Trademark Infringement
• Count III: Intentional Interference with Prospective Business Advantage and/or Intentional Interference with Business Relationships
• Count IV: Unfair Competition
• Count V: Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs seek damages, including compensatory and punitive damages; statutory and/or liquidated damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1051; interest; injunctive relief and costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip:

Plaintiffs may have a difficult case to prove. They claim that at “the time the Defendants’ submitted articles of organization for [E Liquid Palace], the Defendants knew or should have known that the Plaintiff’s [sic] claimed a right to use ‘Liquid Palace’ in its business operations and that the intentional registration of ‘E Liquid Palace, LLC’ would confuse and/or mislead the consuming public.” However, Plaintiffs’ entity, Liquid Palace, LLC, is shown on the website of the Indiana Secretary of State to have been created in Kentucky on April 9, 2013, after the creation of E Liquid Palace, LLC.

Moreover, given that E Liquid Palace, LLC is the Defendants’ legal name, not the name under which they present themselves to the public, Liquid Palace is going to have a hard time showing confusion in the marketplace resulting from any similarities between the legal names of the entities.

It will also be interesting to see how the court handles any competing rights conferred by the registration of the marks at issue, given that both Plaintiff(s) and Defendant(s) have rights in federally registered marks.

Finally, the core infringement standard for trademark law is the “likelihood of confusion” test. This test imposes liability if a substantial number of consumers are likely to be confused by a defendant’s use of a trademark in which the plaintiff in the litigation has intellectual property rights. Given the exceedingly short period of time for which Plaintiffs here claim exclusive use of any mark in question, proving that consumers have come to identify Plaintiffs’ marks exclusively with their goods will be challenging.

June 4, 2014

Indiana Trademark Litigation: Harmony School Sues School Reform Initiative

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Indiana trademark attorneys for Harmony School Corporation (“Harmony”) of Bloomington, Indiana, filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging, inter alia, that School Reform Initiative, Inc. (“SRI”) of Lakewood, Colorado infringed its service mark “Critical Friends Group,” Trademark Registration No. 2,925,985, which has been registered with the United States Trademark Office.

Established in 1974, Harmony is an Indiana non-profit corporation that seeks “to prepare young people to live in and contribute to a heterogeneous democratic country.” Among its programs is its National School Reform Faculty (“NSRF”), a program designed to develop skills in teachers that will then enable children to learn more effectively. Harmony claims ownership of a service mark in “Critical Friends Group,” as used in connection with providing training in the field of improving teaching skills. “Critical Friends Group” is also referred to as CFG. In addition to the rights conferred by federal registration, Harmony asserts common law trademark rights in the marks through actual use in interstate commerce beginning no later than 2000 and continuing since.

Defendant SRI is also a non-profit organization. It is dedicated to creating transformational learning communities committed to educational equity and excellence. Harmony asserts that SRI is a direct competitor in the business of professional development within the field of education. SRI is accused of having infringed marks belonging to Harmony.

Gene Thompson-Grove is asserted to have worked for Harmony from 2000 to 2009. During that time, Harmony claims that Thompson-Grove was actively involved in Harmony’s use and federal registration of the Critical Friends Group mark. Harmony also contends that, immediately after discontinuing her work for Harmony, Thompson-Grove began working with SRI. Harmony indicates that, around this time, the alleged infringement of the Critical Friends Group and CFG marks began.

In March 2014, Harmony demanded that SRI cease and desist using the Critical Friends Group mark. It claims that infringement continued.

In this Indiana trademark lawsuit, Harmony accuses SRI of having willful intent to deceive the public as to the ownership of the mark, the source of the services, or both. It states that it has incurred substantial damages and irreparable injury as a result of SRI’s alleged infringement. In its complaint, filed by Indiana trademark lawyers, Harmony asserts the following causes of action:

• Federal Trademark Infringement in Violation of § 32 of the Lanham Act
• Unfair Competition in Violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Common Law Trademark Infringement
• Common Law Unfair Competition

Harmony asks the court for injunctive relief, including the destruction of materials determined to be infringing and removal of infringing marks from digital media; damages, including treble damages to reflect the deliberateness and willfulness of SRI’s actions; costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip: There used to be an unspoken rule that organizations operated with the primary objective of public service ought to go out of their way to “get along” with similar organizations. That notion seems to be dissipating. Instead, trademark infringement litigation and other legal disputes between non-profit organizations, once relatively rare, have increased in recent years. Among the organizations issuing cease-and-desist letters and/or initiating intellectual property litigation are some of the largest non-profit organizations in the United States: Susan G. Komen, the Lance Armstrong Foundation and Wounded Warrior Project.

May 23, 2014

Indiana Copyright Law: Court Orders Severance of Misjoined Copyright Infringement Complaint

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Magistrate Judge Denise K. LaRue, writing for the Southern District of Indiana, directed the Clerk of the Court to sever all but one defendant from the copyright infringement complaint of Richard Bell, an Indiana copyright attorney. Bell was also ordered by the court to pay separate filing fees for each new cause of action.

Bell is a copyright lawyer and a professional photographer. He contends that he is the owner of two copyrighted photographs of Indianapolis taken in March 2000. The photos have been registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.

In April, Bell filed another copyright infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging copyright infringement of his photos by numerous Defendants. The Defendants were: Diversified Vehicle Services of Marion County, Indiana; Cameron Taylor and Taylor Computer Solutions of Indianapolis, Indiana; Rhonda Williams of Indianapolis, Indiana; Forensic Solutions, Inc. of Waterford, New York; Heath Garrett of Nashville, Tennessee; CREstacom, Inc. of Fishers, Indiana; American Traveler Service Corp LLC, location unknown; Mike Cowper of Martinsville, Indiana; Kimberly Hinds of Indianapolis, Indiana; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute of Troy, New York; EasyStreet Realty of Indianapolis, Indiana; Drohan Management of Reston, Virginia; Metal Markets of Indianapolis, Indiana; Mattison Corporation of Indianapolis, Indiana; Industrial Heating Equipment Association of Taylor Mill, Kentucky; Junk Dawgs of Indianapolis, Indiana and WRTV of Indianapolis, Indiana. Bell is both the copyright lawyer and Plaintiff in this lawsuit.

In this earlier complaint, Bell alleged that each Defendant, independent of each other Defendant, “created their individual website to promote and market their business” and placed the Plaintiff’s copyrighted photo on each of the Defendants’ respective websites. Claiming copyright infringement, unfair competition and theft, Bell asked the court for, inter alia, the maximum allowable statutory damages for each copyright violation.

The court ordered Bell to show cause why all defendants but one should not be severed for misjoinder. Bell argued that the rules regarding joinder should be given a broad scope so that multiple lawsuits could be avoided.

The court was not persuaded. In addressing Bell’s contention that joinder of the unrelated Defendants was proper, it was Bell’s own language, and the factual underpinnings of that language, to which the court pointed in denying joinder. The court noted that Bell’s “complaint alleges that ‘[e]ach defendant, independently of each other, created or had created a website to promote and advertise the business of each Defendant,’ and that Plaintiff discovered that ‘the website [of] each of these Defendants contained [one of the photographs].'” The court also noted that “[e]xcept for defendants Cameron Taylor and Taylor Computer Solutions, the Complaint contains no allegation that any defendant acted in concert with another defendant in appropriating Plaintiff’s photographs and it does not allege any transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences in which two or more defendants participated.” (Citations omitted.)

The court then reviewed the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2)(A) that a Plaintiff’s claims against defendants joined in the same action must respect or arise out of the same occurrence or the same series of occurrences. While Bell had alleged copyright infringement of the same copyrighted material against all Defendants, the court held this to be insufficient. Similarly, while the same types of questions of fact would arise against each Defendant – “e.g., how did the defendant find Plaintiff’s photograph, what did the defendant know about the photograph’s copyright status, did the defendant make commercial use of the photograph, and did the defendant pay for the use of the photograph” – those similar questions of fact provided no logical relationship among the Defendants that would support joinder.

Instead, the court found that each Defendant was accused of independently committing separate and distinct acts of copyright infringement that happened to involve the same photograph.

The court then directed the Clerk of the Court to sever all defendants other than Diversified Vehicle Services from the complaint as it had been filed and to open separate causes for each of the severed defendants, with the exception of defendants Cameron Taylor and Taylor Computer Solutions, which the court directed to be joined in one cause. WRTV was dropped, as Bell indicated that it had been included as a defendant inadvertently.

The court also ordered Bell to pay the $400 filing fee for each of the 15 severed causes of action no later than June 2, 2014.

Practice Tip #1: There has been a growing trend of attempting to monetize copyright infringement. In this particular case, the docket for the initial complaint showed Bell’s demand to be $5,000,000 for the alleged infringing activities. In ruling that “unrelated claims against unrelated defendants belong in different suits, in part to ensure that plaintiffs pay the required filing fees” and subsequently ordering the Plaintiff to pay a separate filing fee for each of the Defendants, Magistrate Judge LaRue has employed one approach that may be useful in combatting such copyright trolling.

Practice Tip #2: Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), a copyright owner may elect actual or statutory damages. Statutory damages range from a sum of not less than $750 to not more than $30,000 per infringed work.

Practice Tip #3: The claims of this case appear calculated to trigger the “advertising injury” clause of many general business liability insurance policies. If a defendant has applicable business insurance, this may allow Bell to negotiate quicker settlements. Overhauser Law Offices, publisher of this Site, counsels clients on insurance coverage for insurance claims.

Practice Tip #4: These latest causes of actions represent the most recent of three ongoing cases filed by Bell asserting infringement of his photos. We have blogged about his copyright infringement litigation before. See here. The Indiana Lawyer also wrote recently about Bell’s copyright litigation. That article includes an interview with Paul B. Overhauser, Managing Partner of Overhauser Law Offices.

May 16, 2014

Indiana Trademark Law: Seventh Circuit Holds Indiana Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction Over RAP4

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Chicago, Illinois – Indiana trademark attorney Paul B. Overhauser, on behalf of K.T. Tran and Real Action Paintball, Inc., a California corporation (collectively “RAP4”), argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the trademark infringement suit brought in the Northern District of Indiana by Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, LLC, an Indiana corporation (“ATO”), was not properly before the Indiana court, as it lacked personal jurisdiction over RAP4. The Seventh Circuit agreed and instructed the district court to dismiss the complaint.

RAP4 and ATO are competitors in the “irritant projectile” market. Unlike the more familiar game of paintball, in which a paint-filled sphere is shot at opponents as part of a war game, these irritant projectiles are used by the police and military to intervene in hostile situations where lethal force is unnecessary. While paintballs are filled with paint, irritant projectiles use capsaicin, the active ingredient in pepper spray. Irritant projectiles, thus, allow law enforcement personnel to use less-than-lethal force from a distance.

Among the many issues in this lawsuit, including assertions by ATO of trade-dress infringement, unfair competition and misappropriation of trade secrets, were allegations that RAP4 had infringed the trademarked term “PEPPERBALL,” to which ATO claimed ownership. That trademark, Registration No. 2716025, was issued in 1999 by the U.S. Trademark Office to a non-party to this suit.

The trouble began when another company, non-party PepperBall Technologies, Inc. (“PTI”), began to have financial problems. PTI had also been a competitor in the irritant-projectile market. To address its difficulties, PTI held a foreclosure sale, the validity of which was hotly contested. ATO claimed that it had purchased PTI’s trademarks – including “PEPPERBALL” – and other property during this foreclosure sale.

During the time that PTI ceased its operations and was attempting to convey its assets, RAP4 was contacted by an executive of non-party APON, a company which had manufactured some of PTI’s irritant projectiles. He asked if RAP4 was interested in acquiring irritant projectiles from APON.

RAP4 agreed to purchase irritant projectiles from APON. After having negotiated this access to APON’s machinery, recipes, and materials – which had had at one time been used by PepperBall Technologies Inc. – RAP4 announced this fact to the people on its e-mail list. Specifically, it stated in its e-mail that it had acquired access to, “machinery, recipes, and materials once used by PepperBall Technologies Inc.” It was this language to which ATO, which claimed to be the successor in interest to PTI, particularly objected.

ATO sent a cease-and-desist letter to RAP4. In response, RAP4 added a disclaimer that it was not affiliated with PTI. ATO then sued in the Northern District of Indiana. It claimed several different theories of recovery, including intentional violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1111 et seq., common law trademark infringement and unfair competition, trade dress infringement, and misappropriation of trade secrets.

Of particular interest to the Seventh Circuit in addressing this Indiana trademark litigation was the issue of personal jurisdiction over RAP4 in the Northern District of Indiana. RAP4 contested that such jurisdiction over it was lacking. ATO countered that RAP4 had sufficient contacts, including a “blast e-mail” announcement from RAP4 that would suffice for jurisdiction in Indiana, stating that “many [RAP4 customers] are located here in the state of Illinois. I mean, state of Indiana.” It also contended that RAP4 regularly e-mailed customers or potential customers from all over the United States, including Indiana, and that RAP4 had made at least one sale to an Indiana resident.

ATO conceded that it lacked general jurisdiction. Thus, the Seventh Circuit turned to an analysis of specific jurisdiction. “For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State,” noted the appellate court. Moreover, the relation between the defendant and the forum “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum.”

In determining that personal jurisdiction existed, the Indiana district court had relied on several facts: “first, [RAP4] fulfilled several orders of the allegedly infringing projectiles for purchasers in Indiana; second, it knew that Advanced Tactical was an Indiana company and could foresee that the misleading emails and sales would harm Advanced Tactical in Indiana; third, it sent at least two misleading email blasts to a list that included Indiana residents; fourth, it had an interactive website available to residents of Indiana; and finally, it put customers on its email list when they made a purchase, thereby giving the company some economic advantage.”

The Seventh Circuit held that these facts were insufficient to support specific jurisdiction. The only Indiana sales that would have been relevant were those that related to RAP4’s allegedly unlawful activity. ATO failed to meet its burden of proof of any such Indiana sales. Similarly, the court held that any effects that were purportedly felt in Indiana by ATO did not support specific jurisdiction. Instead, the relation between RAP4 and the Indiana forum “must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State.”

Further, neither RAP4’s e-mail communications nor its website were held to create specific jurisdiction. If such contacts were sufficient, the court held, there would be no limiting principle on personal jurisdiction and a plaintiff could sue almost any defendant with an Internet presence or which utilized e-mail in almost any forum in the United States or the world. To find jurisdiction on such vanishingly small contacts would offend the long-held and traditional “notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the Indiana district court with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Practice Tip #1: RAP4’s references to “Pepperball Technologies, Inc.” could not as a matter of law constitute trademark infringement, counterfeiting or false advertising. Instead, RAP4’s use of its competitor’s name is a merely a wholly permissible nominative use of that mark. As a matter of law, a “nominative use of a mark – where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service – lies outside the strictures of trademark law.”

Practice Tip #2: Personal jurisdiction is an essential element of federal court jurisdiction, without which the court is powerless to adjudicate the matter before it. However, a defendant’s argument that personal jurisdiction does not exist can easily be waived inadvertently by the incautious litigant. In this case, an evidentiary hearing regarding personal jurisdiction was conducted in December 2012. It was only by careful preservation of this argument by trademark counsel for RAP4 while litigating in the district court that the appellate court was able to hear RAP4’s claim and reverse the district court.

Practice Tip #3: This case was successfully argued before the Seventh Circuit by Paul B. Overhauser, Managing Partner of Overhauser Law Offices.