Unfair Competition

February 12, 2014

Sprint Weighs in with Civil Suit Against Defendants in Criminal Phone-Trafficking Scheme

Indianapolis, Indiana – In a 42-page complaint for damages and injunctive relief, trademark attorneys for Sprint Solutions, Inc. of Reston, Virginia; Sprint Communications Company L.P. and Boost Worldwide, Inc., the latter two of Overland Park, Kansas (collectively, “Sprint”), sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Reginald Aldridge and Arrice Aldridge, both of Park Forest, Illinois, and Damion Transou of Humboldt, Tennessee infringed certain Sprint trademarks. These trademarks include the following Sprint marks: Registration Nos. 1,104,943, 1,573,863, 1,712,259, 1,839,302, 2,833,134, 2,836,616, and 3,046,207. They have been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

Sprint sells wireless handsets (“Phones”) under the brands Sprint, Boost Mobile, Virgin Mobile, payLo and Assurance Wireless for use on Sprint’s wireless network at prices significantly below the wholesale prices of the Phones so that they will be more widely accessible to consumers. Sprint states that it subsidizes the cost of the new Phones for the benefit of its “legitimate” customers. Sprint asserts that it spent more than $6.6 billion on handset subsidies in 2012.

Defendants, along with their alleged co-conspirators are accused of perpetrating an unlawful scheme of bulk handset theft and trafficking to profit from the illegal acquisition and resale of new Phones for their own profit and to the detriment of Sprint. As part of this purportedly fraudulent scheme, Sprint Phones are purchased and resold multiple times. During that process, the Phones are “unlocked” so that they may be used with any service provider, including non-Sprint providers. Sprint contends that, ultimately, these Phones end up in the hands of someone other than the Sprint customer whom Sprint intended to benefit. Sprint contends that the Phones often are sold overseas, where it does not provide service. As a result, Sprint states, Defendants are profiting from this scheme by appropriating the subsidies that Sprint provides to its customers.

Defendants are also accused of unlawfully accessing Sprint’s protected computer systems and wireless network, trafficking in Sprint’s protected and confidential computer passwords, and/or stealing legitimate customer upgrades. It is asserted that Defendants fraudulently placed at least 65 orders on more than 17 corporate accounts to which they had no legal right of access for the purpose of ordering more than 288 items valued at over $100,000.

Finally, Sprint contends that Defendants’ behavior violates the Terms and Conditions to which the sales of Phones are subject as well as willfully infringes Sprint’s trademark rights.

Defendants Arrice Aldridge and Damion Transou were indicted, in part for the activities described in the complaint.

In the complaint, filed by an Indiana trademark lawyer, in conjunction with trademark attorneys from Florida and Georgia, the following counts are asserted:

• Count I: Unfair Competition
• Count II: Tortious Interference with Business Relationships and Prospective Advantage
• Count III: Civil Conspiracy
• Count IV: Unjust Enrichment
• Count V: Conspiracy to Induce Breach of Contract
• Count VI: Common Law Fraud
• Count VII: Fraudulent Misrepresentation
• Count VIII: Trafficking in Computer Passwords – 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(6)
• Count IX: Unauthorized Access – 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(C)
• Count X: Unauthorized Access with Intent to Defraud – 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(4)
• Count XI: Federal Trademark Infringement – 15 U.S.C. §1114
• Count XII: Federal Common Law Trademark Infringement and False Advertising – 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1)(A)
• Count XIII: Contributory Trademark Infringement
• Count XIV: Conversion

Plaintiffs ask the court for damages, including exemplary damages; attorneys’ fees and costs; a permanent injunction prohibiting the practices described in the complaint; and the delivery to Plaintiffs of the Defendants’ inventory of accused Phones.

Practice Tip: Cases of cellular phone trafficking such as these, and there are more than a few of them, are an unusual combination of contract law, trademark law and criminal law. In at least one case similar to this one, 16 defendants were also convicted of terrorism charges when it was found that the proceeds from their phone trafficking and other illegal conduct was being funneled to the terrorist organization Hezbollah.

February 10, 2014

Swag Merchandising and Musical Group Devo Sue for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – An Indiana trademark attorney for Swag Merchandising, Inc. and Devo Inc., both of California, sued in Hamilton Superior Court alleging that Your Fantasy Warehouse, Inc. d/b/a T.V. Store Online and Fred Hajjar, both of Commerce Township, Michigan, infringed Devo’s Trademarks, Registration Nos. 3161662 and 3167516, which have been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office. The case has been removed from Indiana state court to the Southern District of Indiana.

Swag claims that it owns the exclusive right to license the various trademarks, copyrights and individual and collective rights of publicity of the musical group Devo. The group is best known for the song “Whip It,” which hit number 14 on the Billboard chart in 1980. Swag indicates that it licenses the Devo intellectual property to third parties around the globe.

T.V. Store Online is in the business of manufacturing, marketing and distributing apparel and memorabilia featuring classic and current television programming, movies and/or music. T.V. Store Online and Hajjar have been accused of manufacturing, producing, marketing, advertising and/or retailing a product known as “Energy Dome Hats.” Plaintiffs assert that these Energy Dome Hats are commonly associated with Devo but have not been licensed by Plaintiffs to Defendants. Plaintiffs further claim that consumers coming into contact with Defendants’ product would “immediately recognize the same as being associated with, sponsored by and/or endorsed by” the ’80s group.

In the complaint, filed by an Indiana trademark attorney, Plaintiffs assert the following:

• I: Violation of 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) of the Lanham Act
• II: Trademark Infringement – 15 U.S.C. §1114 and Common Law
• III: Counterfeiting
• IV: Dilution – 15 U.S.C. §1125(c) and New York General Business Law §360-1
• V: Common Law Unfair Competition
• VI: Statutory Right of Publicity [NB: under Indiana law]
• VII: Right of Publicity Infringement Under California Civil Code §3344
• VIII: Common Law Right of Publicity
• IX: Conversion [NB: under Indiana law]
• X: Deception [NB: under Indiana law]
• XI: Indiana Crime Victims Act

Plaintiffs ask for an injunction; the surrender of infringing materials; damages, including treble damages; costs and fees. An Indiana intellectual property lawyer for Defendants removed the case to federal court, although he noted that the removal was not a concession that the Southern District of Indiana was the proper venue for the California Plaintiffs or the Michigan Defendants.

Practice Tip:

This is at least the third case filed by Theodore Minch about which we have blogged. In at least two prior cases, LeeWay Media Group, LLC v. Laurence Joachim et al. and Leon Isaac Kennedy v. GoDaddy et al., Mr. Minch has filed in an Indiana court despite none of the parties having any connection to Indiana.

It can be surmised that perhaps the choice of Indiana as a forum might have been driven by an attempt to increase damages. I.C. §§ 35-43-4-3 and 35-43-5-3(a)(6) are criminal statutes, claimed in the complaint in conjunction with an attempt to parlay the accusation into an award for damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. The Indiana Court of Appeals has discussed “theft” and “conversion” as they pertain to takings of intellectual property in several recent cases (see, for example, here and here) and has made it clear that criminal statutes often apply differently to an unlawful taking of intellectual property.

February 7, 2014

Licensor of “Tiki Tan” Mark Alleges Infringing Use by Solarium and Solarium Bittersweet

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

South Bend, Indiana – An Indiana trademark attorney for Al Reasonover of Elkhart, Indiana sued in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that Solarium LLC of South Bend, Indiana (“Solarium”) and Solarium Bittersweet LLC of Elkhart, Indiana (“Solarium Bittersweet”) committed trademark infringement of “Tiki Tan”, Trademark Reg. No. 2602388, which has been registered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

In this complaint for trademark infringement and unfair competition, Plaintiff Reasonover states that he operates tanning salons under the Tiki Tan Mark and that he also develops tanning salons operated by others to whom he licenses the use of the Mark for a fee. Among these licensees, claims Plaintiff, is Solarium.

Reasonover asserts that, instead of displaying the Tiki Tan Mark as licensed, Solarium displays a service mark at its website reading “Tiki Tan by Solarium”. Reasonover also claims that, while he and Solarium entered into a licensing agreement that permitted Solarium to use the Mark only within a five mile territory around 4542 Elkhart Road, Elkhart, Indiana, Defendants Solarium and/or Solarium Bittersweet are operating additional tanning salons under the name “Tiki Tan” at 306 N. Bittersweet Road, Mishawaka, Indiana; 1290 E. Ireland Road, South Bend, Indiana and 215 E. University Drive, Granger, Indiana.

Plaintiff indicates that the licensing agreement neither permits Solarium to alter the Mark nor to use the Mark outside of the five mile territory around 4542 Elkhart Road, Elkhart, Indiana. He also claims that Solarium’s modification of the Mark to include its own name in connection with the promotion, sale and distribution of tanning salon services infringes on Plaintiff’s rights in his federally registered trademark, in violation of 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1114. Reasonover further alleges that Defendants’ actions are intended to cause, have caused, and are likely to continue to cause, confusion, mistake, deception among consumers, the public, and the industry as to whether Defendants’ services originate from, are affiliated with, sponsored by or endorsed by Plaintiff.

Finally, Defendants are accused of infringing the Mark intentionally, deliberately and willfully. The complaint, filed by an Indiana trademark lawyer, lists the following counts:

• Count I – Trademark Infringement – Injunctive Relief
• Count II – Trademark Infringement – Damages
• Count III – Common Law Trademark Infringement
• Count IV – Common Law Unfair Competition

Reasonover asks the court for:

• a finding that Defendants have violated 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1114; that Defendants have engaged in trademark infringement and unfair competition under the common law of Indiana; and that such conduct has damaged Plaintiff monetarily and in ways not adequately remedied by monetary damages alone;
• an injunction, preliminarily and permanently restraining Defendants from altering the registered Mark, “Tiki Tan,” in any way including but not limited to including the words “by Solarium” with the Mark; operating tanning salons at 306 N. Bittersweet Road, Mishawaka, Indiana; 1290 E. Ireland Road, South Bend, Indiana; or 215 E. University Drive, Granger, Indiana under the name “Tiki Tan”; engaging in any other activity constituting unfair competition with Plaintiff; and engaging in any other activity constituting trademark infringement or which deceives consumers or the public about the origin of services associated with Plaintiff;
• an order for corrective advertising;
• statutory damages or, alternatively, the disgorgement of all profits realized as a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and also awarding Plaintiff its actual damages;
• a trebling of damages under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1117;
• Plaintiff’s costs, attorney fees, investigatory fees, and expenses under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1117; and
• pre-judgment interest on any monetary award.

Practice Tip: A trademark license may be granted by a licensor to a licensee to permit the licensee to use a trademark in a way that would otherwise infringe upon the licensor’s intellectual property rights. A license to use a trademark typically includes various restrictions. Those restrictions may include, among other things, limits on territory, term and manner of use.

December 11, 2013

Project Management Academy Sues Former Instructor for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – eCity Market, Inc. d/b/a Project Management Academy (“PMA”) of Lafayette, Indiana has sued Vaughn Scott Burch (“Burch”) and Graywood Consulting Group, Inc. d/b/a Graywood Training Solutions of Leesburg, Virginia (collectively, “Graywood”) alleging infringement of its Project Management Professional examination and certification training. This suit was initially filed in Delaware County Circuit Court No. 4 but was removed to the Southern District of Indiana.

PMA offers preparation courses for the Project Management Institute’s Project Management Professional (“PMP”) examination and certification process. PMA states that Burch was one of its most-trusted PMP course instructors in the Washington, D.C. area and that, in connection with that position, PMA provided him with access to its proprietary manner of conducting its PMP-examination preparation courses. Moreover, PMA claims that it commissioned Burch and Graywood, Burch’s company, to draft and prepare as a “work for hire” certain training modules that would be for PMA’s exclusive use.

PMA alleges that Burch and Graywood are now teaching PMP courses that are in direct competition with PMA. It also contends that Defendants have stolen PMA’s confidential, proprietary and copyrighted materials to further their own course offerings. PMA further indicates that Defendants are violating the non-competition covenants by reproducing PMA’s copyrighted materials and are passing them off as their own. Finally, PMA contends that Defendants are attempting to engage in unfair competition with PMA by publishing student testimonials as if they were from Defendants’ students when, PMA states, the testimonials were actually given by the students of PMA.

An intellectual property lawyer for PMA filed a complaint alleging the following:

• Count I – Breach of Contract
• Count II – Breach of Duty of Loyalty
• Count III – Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
• Count IV – Theft/Conversion
• Count V – Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relationship and Advantage
• Count VI – Lanham Act Violations
• Count VII – Unfair Competition

PMA asks for preliminary and permanent injunctions; an order requiring the return of all PMA materials; judgment in favor of PMA on the seven counts listed; damages, including treble and punitive damages; attorney’s fees and costs; and interest.

Practice Tip: There has also been a growing trend, perhaps fueled in part by states’ difficulties in paying increasing unemployment benefits, to limit via legislation the enforceability of non-compete agreements. Indiana considers non-compete agreements to be in restraint of trade and, thus, construes them narrowly. Among the states that have considered such limitations are Maryland, New Jersey, Minnesota, Massachusetts and Virginia. However, even in those cases where a non-compete agreement is found to be unenforceable, such a finding will not prevent a party from suing to protect its other rights, such as the intellectual property rights granted under copyright law.

December 2, 2013

Wounded Warrior Project Sues Help Indiana Vets for False Advertising, Defamation and Unfair Competition

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Wounded Warrior Project, Inc. (“WWP”) of Jacksonville, Florida has sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Dean M. Graham and Help Indiana Vets, Inc. (“HIVI”), both of Acton, Indiana, defamed WWP. The lawsuit also asserts that HIVI engaged in false advertising and unfair competition. While this suit did not allege trademark infringement, it included references to WWP’s trademark, U.S. Trademark Registration No. 30014447, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

WWP is a Virginia nonprofit corporation, which has been registered with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. It was founded in 2003 as a small nonprofit corporation to provide comfort items to service members injured in combat after September 11, 2001. In the years which followed, WWP grew into a complete rehabilitative effort to assist service members injured in combat with both visible and invisible injuries (such as post-traumatic stress disorder, combat and operational stress, and depression) as they recover and transition back to civilian life.

HIVI is believed to be an Indiana nonprofit corporation. WWP indicates that HIVI was founded in April 2013 by Graham. WWP asserts that HIVI’s business is to offer financial help to Indiana veterans through donor support as a nonprofit. As such, WWP contends, HIVI is a direct competitor of WWP.

WWP asserts that, over the last decade, it has invested substantial time and resources to develop the WWP mark through national direct-mail campaigns, marketing, corporate product promotions and press releases. WWP indicates that it has received substantial national and local press coverage for its efforts. It claims that its success is due in no small part to the support of the media and celebrities who support WWP. Finally, WWP indicates that, over the last decade, it has received approximately 30 billion media impressions with an estimated publicity value of $500 million. WWP claims that, due to its efforts, the WWP mark has become famous.

This suit is founded upon, inter alia, WWP’s contentions that HIVI published false and misleading statements of fact regarding WWP. The assertions allegedly made by HIVI included that Wounded Warrior Project is a fraud and that it is pulling the biggest “Oke Doke” ever pulled on the American public. WWP contends that, on the page containing the purportedly false and misleading statements about WWP, a PayPal link is included so that users of the HIVI site may make charitable donations to HIVI.

WWP further alleges that HIVI has contacted numerous government entities and officials, as well as multiple media outlets, claiming that WWP is a fraud.

Trademark attorneys for WWP assert the following in their complaint against Graham and HIVI:

• Count I: False Advertising – Lanham Act
• Count II: Criminal Deception – Indiana Crime Victims Act
• Count III: Defamation – Indiana Common Law
• Count IV: Unfair Competition – Indiana Common Law
• Count V: Tortious Interference with Business Relationships – Indiana Common Law
• Count VI: Unjust Enrichment – Indiana Common Law

WWP asks the court for a permanent injunction; treble damages under the Indiana Crime Victims Act; an order compelling Defendants to disgorge all financial benefits realized as a result of the alleged wrongful conduct; and an award of costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip: Paul Overhauser was interviewed regarding this unusual lawsuit between nonprofit entities. See here.

November 25, 2013

Eli Lilly Sues Singpet for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana has filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Sebastian Wiradharma a/k/a Sebastian Singh (“Singh”) and Singpet Pte. Ltd., both of Singapore, infringed the trademark COMFORTIS, Registration Number 3,370,168, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Lilly, through its Elanco Animal Health Division, manufactures, markets and sells pet medicines, including flea-control preparations and treatments for parasitic infestations. It contends that it has made long and continuous of the name and mark “Elanco” in connection with veterinary preparations. It also asserts that it has long used the “Comfortis” mark, which was registered by the U.S. Trademark Office in 2008. Lilly claims that it has sold tens of millions of dollars’ worth of veterinary preparations, pet medicines and related goods and services under the Elanco and Comfortis marks.

Among Lilly’s products is Trifexis, a once-monthly veterinary medication, which contains the veterinary chemicals spinosad and milbemycin oxime. Trifexis is for the prevention of heartworms, fleas and intestinal worms. It is sold in the United States with what Lilly contends to be an inherently distinctive and non-functional trade dress. Trifexis is available only by prescription through licensed veterinarians. Lilly sells a similar product in Australia, with similar trade dress, under the name “Panoramis.”

Defendant Singh, who is allegedly the principal of Singpet, and Singpet do business over the Internet, including via websites at www.singpet.com, www.petcorporate.com, www.fleastuff.com and http://www.ourpetworld.net/home.asp, among others.

Defendants are accused of marketing and selling European and Australian versions of Elanco- and Comfortis-branded pet medicines to customers in the United States. Specifically, Lilly contends that Defendants market “Panoramis (Triflexis)” [sic] on their websites. While the Defendants are apparently based in Singapore, this marketing is allegedly directed at consumers in the United States. Lilly asserts that units designed for sale in markets such as Europe and Australia are neither intended nor authorized for sale in the United States.

Lilly further objects to the Defendants’ purported advertisement of units designed for the Australian and European markets as identical to or interchangeable with the units designed for sale in the United States. It states that that the Elanco-branded “Panoramis” pet medicines are materially different from its Elanco-branded “Trifexis” pet medicines sold in the United States.

Lilly contends that the Elanco- and Comfortis-branded pet medicines are tailored to meet the requirements of different geographic regions and countries to reflect the differences in language, climate, government regulations, units of measure, local addresses and telephone numbers, among other things.

Trademark attorneys for Lilly assert that Defendants are not authorized to use Lilly’s Elanco or Comfortis names and trade dress in connection with the sale of once-monthly spinosad and milbemycin oxime pet medicines outside of Australia. Lilly has sued Defendants, asserting willful infringement of its trademarks. It asserts the following in its complaint:

• First Claim for Relief: Trademark Infringement in Violation of Section 32 of the Lanham Act
• Second Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Third Claim for Relief: False Advertising in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Fourth Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Indiana Common Law

Lilly asks for preliminary and permanent injunctions; damages, including treble damages; the Defendants to be required to notify all purchasers of the accused products, request the return of the products and refund the price paid; pre- and post-judgment interest and costs of the suit.

Practice Tip:

Lilly is objecting to the so-called “grey market” for its veterinary pharmaceuticals. Prices for drugs can vary considerably between countries, often as a result of government intervention in the market. As a result, a “grey market” – selling a drug intended for use in one country to consumers in another country – can emerge. In this complaint, Lilly has framed its objection to a grey market for its pet-care pharmaceuticals as an intellectual property dispute.

Intellectual property law requires a balancing of competing interests. On the one hand, innovation will be discouraged if inventors, authors and other creators of intellectual property are not allowed to benefit from their labors. Such a problem arises if others are allowed to use creators’ ideas without compensating them (the “free-rider problem”). On the other hand, the public good is promoted by encouraging free competition in the marketplace and easy alienability of property.

Under the first-sale defense to infringement, once a copy of an item protected by intellectual property laws has been sold to a purchaser, the creator of the intellectual property generally may not prevent that purchaser from reselling or otherwise disposing of the item. In patent and copyright law, the first-sale rule in most cases provides an absolute defense against infringement. In patent law, this is also referred to as “patent exhaustion.” As a result, the purchaser of a copy of the work and the owner of the intellectual property rights to that work may become competitors in the marketplace if the purchaser goes to resell a copy of the work.

The first-sale defense is not as broad in a trademark context. Enunciated in 1924 by the U.S. Supreme Court, the general rule for the resale of a trademark item provides that, after a trademark owner has sold a trademarked product, the buyer ordinarily may resell that product under the original mark without incurring any trademark liability. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). However, unlike patent or copyright law, trademark law has as one of its primary goals preventing confusion among potential purchasers. Typically, but not always, such confusion will not exist where a genuine article bearing an authentic trademark is sold. While there is a split among the circuits concerning the extent to which consumer confusion is a relevant factor, some hold that certain types of confusion about a product’s origin cause the first-sale defense to be inapplicable to the resale of a trademarked good. See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 2010).

November 20, 2013

Eli Lilly Sues Pet Supply, Pet Products Net and Graham Nelson for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana (“Lilly”) has filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Graham Nelson, Zoja Pty Ltd. d/b/a Pet Supply International Ltd., and Pet Products Net, all of Australia, infringed the trademark COMFORTIS, Trademark Registration No. 3,370,168, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Lilly, through its Elanco Animal Health Division, manufactures, markets and sells pet medicines, including flea-control preparations and treatments for parasitic infestations. It contends that it has made long and continuous of the name and mark “Elanco” in connection with veterinary preparations. It also asserts that it has long used the “Comfortis” mark, which was registered by the U.S. Trademark Office in 2008. Lilly claims that it has sold tens of millions of dollars’ worth of veterinary preparations, pet medicines and related goods and services under the Elanco and Comfortis marks.

Among Lilly’s products is Trifexis, a once-monthly veterinary medication, which contains the veterinary chemicals spinosad and milbemycin oxime. Trifexis is for the prevention of heartworms, fleas and intestinal worms. It is sold in the United States with what Lilly contends to be an inherently distinctive and non-functional trade dress. Trifexis is available only by prescription through licensed veterinarians. Lilly sells a similar product in Australia, with similar trade dress, under the name “Panoramis.”

Defendants Nelson, Zoja, Pet Supply and Pet Products Net do business over the Internet, including at the website www.bestvaluepetsupplies.com. Among the products listed on their website is “Panoramis aka Trifexis.” While the companies are apparently based in Australia, the website indicates that they ship to the United States.

Lilly has sued Defendants over the sale of Panoramis to the United States. It asserts that units designed for sale in markets such as Europe and Australia are neither intended nor authorized for sale in the United States. Lilly further indicates that the Elanco- and Comfortis-branded pet medicines are tailored to meet the requirements of different geographic regions and countries to reflect the differences in language, climate, government regulations, units of measure, local addresses and telephone numbers, among other things.

Lilly objects to the Defendants’ purported advertisement of units designed for the Australian and European markets as identical to or interchangeable with the units designed for sale in the United States. It states that that the Elanco-branded “Panoramis” pet medicines are materially different from its Elanco-branded “Trifexis” pet medicines sold in the United States.

Trademark attorneys for Lilly assert that Defendants are not authorized to use Lilly’s Elanco or Comfortis names and trade dress in connection with the sale of once-monthly spinosad and milbemycin oxime pet medicines outside of Australia. Lilly has sued Defendants, asserting willful infringement of its trademarks. It asserts the following in its complaint:

• First Claim for Relief: Trademark Infringement in Violation of Section 32 of the Lanham Act
• Second Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Third Claim for Relief: False Advertising in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Fourth Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Indiana Common Law

Lilly asks for preliminary and permanent injunctions; damages, including treble damages; the Defendants to be required to notify all purchasers of the accused products, request the return of the products and refund the price paid; pre- and post-judgment interest and costs of the suit.

Practice Tip:

Lilly is objecting to the so-called “grey market” for its veterinary pharmaceuticals. Prices for drugs can vary considerably between countries, often as a result of government intervention in the market. As a result, a “grey market” – selling a drug intended for use in one country to consumers in another country – can emerge. In this complaint, Lilly has framed its objection to a grey market for its pet-care pharmaceuticals as an intellectual property dispute.

Intellectual property law requires a balancing of competing interests. On the one hand, innovation will be discouraged if inventors, authors and other creators of intellectual property are not allowed to benefit from their labors. Such a problem arises if others are allowed to use creators’ ideas without compensating them (the “free-rider problem”). On the other hand, the public good is promoted by encouraging free competition in the marketplace and easy alienability of property.

Under the first-sale defense to infringement, once a copy of an item protected by intellectual property laws has been sold to a purchaser, the creator of the intellectual property generally may not prevent that purchaser from reselling or otherwise disposing of the item. In patent and copyright law, the first-sale rule in most cases provides an absolute defense against infringement. In patent law, this is also referred to as “patent exhaustion.” As a result, the purchaser of a copy of the work and the owner of the intellectual property rights to that work may become competitors in the marketplace if the purchaser goes to resell a copy of the work.

The first-sale defense is not as broad in a trademark context. Enunciated in 1924 by the U.S. Supreme Court, the general rule for the resale of a trademark item provides that, after a trademark owner has sold a trademarked product, the buyer ordinarily may resell that product under the original mark without incurring any trademark liability. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). However, unlike patent or copyright law, trademark law has as one of its primary goals preventing confusion among potential purchasers. Typically, but not always, such confusion will not exist where a genuine article bearing an authentic trademark is sold. While there is a split among the circuits concerning the extent to which consumer confusion is a relevant factor, some hold that certain types of confusion about a product’s origin cause the first-sale defense to be inapplicable to the resale of a trademarked good. See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 2010).

November 15, 2013

Ambre Blends Sues doTERRA For Trademark Infringement of “Solace”

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Ambre Blends, LLC of Fishers, Indiana has filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that doTERRA, Inc., doTERRA International, LLC, both of Orem, Utah (collectively, “doTERRA”) and Kerry Dodds d/b/a Kerry Essentials of Indianapolis, Indiana (“Kerry”) infringed SOLACE®, Trademark No. 4266473, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

In its complaint, Ambre Blends claims to have been producing organic body products since 2001. It offers four fragrances which are designed to be worn by both women and men. Founded in 2008, doTERRA offers essential oils both as single oils and as proprietary essential oil blends via independent product consultants. Both companies claim rights in the mark “Solace” in connection with essential oil products.

Ambre Blends asserts that it has used the Solace mark continuously in commerce since at least as early as February 2007. It holds a federally registered trademark on the mark in connection with “Aromatic preparations, namely, oils, body creams, body sprays, soaps, shower gel; Beauty creams; Body and beauty care cosmetics; Body cream; Body sprays; Essential oils for use in aromatherapy; Essential oils for use in manufacturing of candles, lip balm, shower gel, shampoo, conditioner; Face and body lotions; Non-medicated skin creams with essential oils for use in aromatherapy; Oils for perfumes and scents; Perfume; Perfume oils; Perfumed creams; Perfumed soaps; Scented body spray; Skin soap.” It describes its essence as having been “created for the sole purpose of comfort and attraction” and marks its products with “Solace®”.

According to the doTERRA website, doTERRA sells its product, a blend for women, as “Solace™”. It describes its oil as “a proprietary blend of Certified Pure Therapeutic Grade® essential oils carefully formulated to balance hormones and manage symptoms of PMS and the transitional phases of menopause.” (It also provides the disclaimer, required by the Food and Drug Administration, that the “product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent disease.”)

In its complaint, Ambre Blends contends that doTERRA willfully and intentionally used the Solace mark knowing both that the mark was the property of Ambre Blends and that such a use was unlawful. It further asserts that doTERRA’s use of the mark was intended to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the general public and that doTERRA acted in bad faith.

The complaint asserts, inter alia, violations of the Lanham Act and unfair competition:

• Count I: Trademark Infringement
• Count II: False Designation of Origin
• Count III: Unfair Competition
• Count IV: Forgery
• Count V: Corrective Advertising Damages
• Count VI: Declaratory Judgment
• Count VII: Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief

Trademark counsel for Ambre Blends seeks a declaratory judgment; a preliminary injunction; a permanent injunction; damages, including treble damages; costs and attorney’s fees; the transfer to Ambre Blends of any domain name that includes “Solace”; and corrective-advertising damages.

Practice Tip #1: From the complaint, this appears to be a straightforward case of infringement. However, Ambre Blends may have a tougher case than is obvious from the complaint itself. It appears from doTERRA’s sales literature that doTERRA has used the mark “Solace” along with “™”, thus claiming rights in the mark, at least as early as 2011. In contrast, Ambre Blends did not file its application until April 4, 2011; it was published for opposition on October 16, 2012. A federal registration confers a presumption of validity. However, here, the right to use the mark “Solace” may result in a battle of the facts.

Practice Tip #2: This complaint highlights the difference between the “®” mark and the “™” mark. While the former may not be used until a mark has been granted a federal registration, the latter has no such requirement. Instead, it may be used whenever a business wishes to put competitors on notice that it considers the mark to be its intellectual property.

Practice Tip #3: doTERRA is currently embroiled in litigation in both state and federal court in Utah with Young Living, another giant in the essential-oil industry.

November 7, 2013

WindStream Sues Rambo and Keebler for Trademark Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

New Albany, Indiana – WindStream Technologies, Inc. of North Vernon, Indiana filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Rambo LLC, Rambo Montrow Corporation (collectively, “Rambo”) and Rick Keebler, all of Madison, Indiana, as well as ten unidentified John Does residing in Indiana, infringed its trademarked TurboMill, Trademark Registration No. 3,986,494, which has been registered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

WindStream manufactures wind turbines for municipal, residential and commercial use. Those turbines are shipped worldwide from its Indiana manufacturing facility. It contracted with Rambo and Keebler, who is asserted to be a principal of the Rambo entities, to provide component parts and to act as an authorized dealer of TurboMill turbines in certain territories.

WindStream has multiple contractual disputes with Defendants and Defendants’ predecessors in interest and asserts that component parts in which WindStream has an interest are being held “hostage” in an attempt to renegotiate the terms of one of the contracts. Further, WindStream contends that the failure of Defendants to deliver the parts has damaged its business. WindStream also charges Defendants with unfair competition, claiming that they are selling WindStream products, including WindStream’s TurboMill, as their own. Finally, it asserts that, among the prospective customers that Keebler and Rambo are targeting are individuals and entities that had previously been identified by WindStream as potential customers.

In its complaint, filed by the trademark attorney for WindStream, the following counts are alleged:

• Federal Unfair Competition and Passing Off (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))
• Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114)
• Breach of Contract (Dealer Agreement)
• Breach of Contract (Purchase Orders)
• Interference with Contract and Prospective Economic Advantage

WindStream asks the court for an injunction prohibiting trademark infringement and similar conduct; damages, including treble damages; punitive damages for Defendants’ willful and malicious acts; and attorney’s fees and costs of the lawsuit.

Practice Tip: The complaint asserts that the trademark for TurboMill was registered on June 28, 2001 and that the mark has been used in commerce since at least 2009. In contrast, the registration is listed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as having occurred on June 28, 2011 with the mark shown as having first been used in commerce in 2011, the same year in which WindStream began manufacturing its wind turbines. While the former inconsistency, which adds exactly ten years to the apparent life of the trademark, can be assumed to be a typographical error, the origin of the latter inconsistency, which adds another two years to the period during which the TurboMill mark is claimed to have been used in commerce, in unclear.

October 21, 2013

Dissimilarity Between Trademarked Goods and Allegedly Infringing Goods is Not Dispositive

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana — In June 2013, Australian Gold, LLC of Indianapolis, Indiana sued Devoted Creations, LLC of Oldsmar, Florida in the Southern District of Indiana alleging trademark infringement of the mark LIVE LAUGH TAN, Trademark Registration No. 4,154,194, which has been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office. Devoted Creations moved to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to state a claim.

Australian Gold has been in the business of selling indoor-tanning preparations for over 20 years. Devoted Creations also sells indoor-tanning preparations. Australian Gold contended in its complaint that, since at least October 2010, it has used the registered mark “LIVE LAUGH TAN” as a trade name and trademark in conjunction with sales of its Australian Gold line of indoor-tanning products.

Devoted Creations, which competes directly with Australian Gold for customers, uses the name “LIVE LOVE TAN” to advertise its indoor-tanning preparations. Australian Gold alleges that Devoted Creations’ use of a similar trademark to sell products similar to those which it sells infringes on its intellectual property rights in the “LIVE LAUGH TAN” trademark. It further asserted that Devoted Creations was aware of the goodwill and reputation associated with Australian Gold’s trademark, and that Devoted Creations intentionally copied that trademark. Australian Gold sued for trademark infringement and unfair competition.

In this opinion, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson addressed the request of Defendant Devoted Creations to invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and dismiss the case against it on the basis that Australian Gold had stated no plausible claim. Devoted Creations asserted that the claims against it failed because Devoted Creations’ use of a mark on one product – indoor tanning preparations – could not as a matter of law infringe on Australian Gold’s use of its own mark in conjunction with an entirely different product – tote bags, the class of products for which the trademark is registered.

Judge Magnus-Stinson pointed out that Devoted Creations made two errors. Devoted Creations’ first error was one of fact. Devoted Creations asserted that Australian Gold did not use the trademark in conjunction with the sale of tanning products but, rather, that the mark was used only for tote bags. The court did not accept this version of the facts. Instead, the court referred to the standard of review for a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” As Australian Gold had explicitly alleged in its complaint that its use of the trademark was “in conjunction with the marketing and sale of its AUSTRALIAN GOLD® line of indoor tanning preparations,” the court was not persuaded that a motion to dismiss was appropriate.

The second error was one of law. Even if it were true that the purported infringement occurred only on a different type of goods, that dissimilarity is not dispositive, as the analysis of likelihood of confusion requires the application of a seven-factor test.

Finally, the court reminded Devoted Creations and its counsel of the ethical duties imposed by “both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) (stating that a motion presented to the Court functions as a certification by the presenting attorney that ‘the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law’) and 28 U.S.C § 1927 (providing for sanctions for unreasonably protracting litigation) when filing a motion with the Court.”

Practice Tip: The precedent in the Seventh Circuit is that similarity between a plaintiff’s goods and a defendant’s allegedly infringing goods is only one of seven factors considered in evaluating whether there is a likelihood of confusion. Dissimilarity alone is not dispositive. Even when products are “quite different,” an evaluation of the other factors is required. The factors are:

1. the similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion;
2. the similarity of the products;
3. the area and manner of concurrent use;
4. the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers;
5. the strength of the plaintiff’s mark;
6. any actual confusion; and
7. the intent of the defendant to “palm off” his product as that of another.