Indianapolis, Indiana — Trademark lawyers for Bekins Van Lines, Inc. (“Bekins”) of Indianapolis, Indiana sued Corporate Transfer & Storage, Inc. (“Corporate Transfer”) of Ronkonkoma, New York; JLV Software of Pompano, Florida (also referred to in the complaint as “JVL Software”) and The Verderber Enterprise of Orlando, Florida (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging infringement of the trademark BEKINS which has been registered as Trademark No. 2,427,605 with the U.S. Trademark Office.

Thumbnail image for ImageAgentProxy.gifBekins is the fourth-largest household-goods carrier in the United States.  Headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana, Bekins offers private and corporate household-goods relocation services both domestically and internationally.  The United States Military is one of the company’s largest customers.

Corporate Transfer offers household moving, corporate relocation and storage services.  The Verderber Enterprise specializes in providing technology innovations to entrepreneurs and corporate enterprises worldwide.

In December 1955, Bekins’ predecessors in interest were granted the registration of the stylized mark “Bekins.”  The first use in commerce was noted as 1891.  A second “Bekins” mark was granted to Bekins’ predecessors in interest in February 2001.  The two marks were assigned to the plaintiff in this case on April 16, 2012. 

The Defendants were, at one point, licensed agents of Bekins Van Lines, LLC.  However, Bekins asserts, they have never been affiliated in any way with Bekins Van Lines, Inc.  After Bekins Van Lines, Inc.’s acquisition of certain assets from Bekins Van Lines, LLC and Bekins Holding Corp. on April 2, 2012, Corporate Transfer was allegedly notified that it was required to cease using all of the Bekins marks immediately, as it was not an agent for the new owner of the Bekins marks. 

Bekins claims that, despite this notice and three additional notices, the Defendants’ use of the Bekins marks on the Corporate Transfer website, the use of the domain name www.bekinsrelo.com and the use of the Bekins mark on social-media sites continued.  Bekins also asserts that Corporate Transfer indicated that its use of the Bekins mark would be discontinued but that, in the spring of 2013, the website was reactivated.  Bekins contends that, when it again demanded that the domain name be taken down and transferred to Bekins, Corporate Transfer then redirected the domain to point to a consumer-comment site which was tremendously critical of Bekins Van Lines, Inc.

Finally, Bekins asserts that Corporate Transfer continues to infringe upon the Bekins marks through the maintenance of the www.bekinsrelo.com site, the use of Bekins marks on its website at www.corporatetransfer.com and various references to the Bekins marks on social-media sites.

For its claims, Bekins lists the following:

·         Count I: Federal Trademark Infringement

·         Count II: Federal and State Unfair Competition/Trademark Dilution

Bekins asks for an injunction; for an award of Defendants’ profits earned from the acts claimed to be infringing; for an award of damages, including punitive damages; and for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Practice Tip: Bekins asserts that its marks have acquired strong secondary meaning as a symbol of origin among consumers and the industry as a result of many years of use.  It further asserts that the marks are famous.  The assertion that its marks are famous allows it to pursue the additional claim of trademark dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.

 

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South Bend, Indiana — The Northern District of Indiana has ruled in favor of Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc. (“Warner Bros.”) of Burbank, California which had been sued by trademark holder Fortres Grand Corporation (“Fortres WarnerBrosLogo.JPGGrand”) of Plymouth, Indiana.  Fortres Grand had alleged that Warner Bros. infringed its trademark, Registration No. 2,514,853, for the mark CLEAN SLATE, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Fortres Grand develops, markets and sells software. Since 2000, it has marketed and sold software called “Clean Slate.”  The Clean Slate software protects the security of computer networks by erasing all evidence of user activity so FortresGrandLogo.JPGthat subsequent users see no indication of a previous user’s activity, meaning that each new user starts his or her computer activity with a “clean slate.”  Fortres Grand has sold millions of dollars worth of its Clean Slate software.  In 2001, Fortres Grand obtained a federal trademark registration for the use of “Clean Slate” in connection with “computer software used to protect public access computers by scouring the computer drive back to its original configuration upon reboot.”

Warner Bros. is one of the most famous names in movie history.  In the summer of 2012, it released its latest Batman film, The Dark Knight Rises.  One of the plot lines in the film involves the character Selina Kyle (a.k.a. supervillainess Catwoman) and her attempt to procure a software program that will erase her criminal history from every computer database in the world.  The software program she is trying to obtain was designed by the fictional company Rykin Data and is referred to four times in the film as “clean slate.”

Two websites — rykindata.com and rykindata.tumblr.com — were also created to promote the film.  These websites are consistent with a recent trend in the online advertising of films: rather than just creating a straightforward promotional website where consumers can get information about the film (like, in this instance, www.thedarkknightrises.com), additional websites are created that market the film in a more subtle or creative way.  In this instance, the websites are essentially a creative outgrowth of the fictional world of the film.  They look like what a (fictional) citizen of Gotham might find if they were looking for information on the (fictional) Rykin Data company.  These websites also use the term “clean slate” to describe the software referenced in the film.

Fortres Grand filed suit on September 19, 2012 alleging three counts based on the use of “clean slate” in the film and on the websites: 1) trademark infringement under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.); 2) unfair competition under the Lanham Act; and 3) unfair competition under Indiana state law.

Fortres Grand asserted that it is, in fact, trademark infringement when a fictional product bears the same name as a real product.  Warner Bros. took the opposite view and moved to dismiss the case.

The court began by noting that there is surprisingly little case law in matters such as these.  Despite the many movie and television releases every year, courts have rarely been called upon to answer the question of whether it is trademark infringement if a fictional company or product in a movie or television drama bears the same name or brand as a real company or product. 

The court analyzed all three of Fortres Grand’s claims — infringement, federal unfair competition, and state unfair competition — under the same trademark infringement analysis.  It noted that an essential ingredient of trademark infringement is a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the source of a product.  Specifically, only confusion about origin supports a trademark claim.  For this purpose, “origin” means the producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace.  Moreover, although the hallmark of trademark infringement is protecting against consumer confusion, it is not enough that there just be some generalized confusion.  Trademark infringement protects only against mistaken purchasing decisions and not against confusion generally.

In this case, Grand Fortres was arguing a case of reverse confusion.  This type of confusion exists when a junior user uses its size and market penetration to overwhelm the senior, but smaller, user. The “senior user” (here, Grand Fortres) is the first to adopt and use a mark anywhere in the country. The “junior user” (Warner Bros.) is the second user.  The reverse confusion doctrine protects the senior user’s control of its mark and the goodwill created by the mark from a junior user’s employment of the mark, and protects the public from being deceived into believing that the senior user’s product emanates from, is connected to, or is sponsored by the junior user. 

The court was not persuaded by Grand Fortres’ claim of confusion.  To state a claim for reverse confusion in this case, the court held that Fortres Grand had to make plausible allegations that Warner Bros. saturated the market with a product that the public had been deceived into believing emanated from, was connected to, or was sponsored by Fortres Grand.  The fatal flaw in Fortres Grand’s case had to do with correctly identifying the exact product that Warner Bros. had introduced to the market — a film, not a piece of software.

The court held that a comparison between the two products led to the conclusion that there was no plausible claim for consumer confusion regarding a consumer’s purchasing decision between the two nonfictional products — Fortres Grand’s software and Warner Bros.’s film.  “Plaintiff is not in the motion picture business,” the court stated, citing a Warner Bros. pleading.  “[I]t would be absurd to think that customers buy tickets to The Dark Knight Rises or purchase the DVD/Blu-ray because of a perceived association of the Film with Fortres Grand’s products.”

Finally, the court discussed the First Amendment issues associated with considering a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act when the asserted infringement took place in an artistic work.  The Second Circuit’s Decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi, a landmark opinion in such cases, in discussing the use of intellectual property in the title of a work states:

[T]he [Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the

public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in

free expression.  In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s

name, that balance will normally not support application of the Act unless the title

has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some

artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the

content of the work.

As several Circuits have done, the court extended this analysis to cover not only the title of an artistic work, but also the body of the work.  It concluded by holding that, even if there were a potential for consumer confusion caused by the use of “clean slate” in the film, the case still must be dismissed because Warner Bros.’s use of the term is also protected by the First Amendment. 

Practice Tip: A more plausible legal argument might have been trademark dilution.  The complaint, however, did not bring a claim under the Trademark Dilution Act.  This may have been because Fortres Grand recognized that its “Clean Slate” trademark was not a “famous” one, which is a requirement for bringing a trademark dilution case.

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Indianapolis, Indiana — Intellectual property lawyers for Master Cutlery, Inc. of Secaucus, New Jersey sued Pacific Solution Marketing, Inc. (“Pacific”) of Ontario, California alleging copyright and trademark infringement of three-dimensional artwork applied to knives.  Master Cutlery seeks an injunction, damages, treble damages, statutory damages, profits, attorney’s fees and costs. 

Founded 30 years ago, Master Cutlery has become the largest importer of knives in the United States.  It asserts ownership of federal trademark, patent and copyright registrations for its knives, as well as common law trade dress rights (collectively, “Master Cutlery IP”).  Among the rights that Master Cutlery claims are trademarks for the word marks “Sheriff” and “EMT” registered in Class 8 with the U.S. Trademark Office for knives.

Master Cutlery asserts that, after its use and registration of its various items of intellectual property, Pacific also began using the Master Cutlery intellectual property.  It contends that Pacific has manufactured, produced, advertised and/or sold knives that infringe upon the Master Cutlery IP.  It also asserts that Pacific has distributed advertisements and packaging bearing reproductions of Master Cutlery’s trademarks, trade dress and copyrights. 

Master Cutlery sued alleging copyright infringement under the Copyright Act; federal trademark infringement, federal trademark dilution, false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act; common law trademark and copyright infringement; unfair competition; and theft and counterfeiting under Indiana state law.  It further contends that this infringement was willful, intentional and done with the intent to confuse consumers.  The complaint, originally filed in Indiana state court, was removed by a trademark attorney for Pacific on both the grounds of federal question and diversity of citizenship.

For its claims, Master Cutlery lists the following:

·         Count I: Copyright Infringement Under 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

·         Count II: Federal Trademark Infringement Under U.S.C. § 1114

·         Count III: Trademark Dilution Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)

·         Count IV: False Designation of Origin or Sponsorship, False Advertising and Trade Dress Infringement Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

·         Count V: Common Law Trademark and Copyright Infringement

·         Count VI: Unfair Competition

·         Count VII: Theft Under Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)

Master Cutlery asks for a permanent injunction enjoining infringement; that Pacific be required to deliver to Master Cutlery both unsold goods and goods already distributed or sold so that they can be destroyed; for compensatory damages; for treble damages or, alternatively, Pacific’s profits trebled; for statutory damages; and for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Practice Tip: Master Cutlery has included a count of felony theft under Indiana Code § 35-43-4-2(a) in its complaint.  The extent to which intellectual property is “property” in the usual sense has been litigated several times recently in the Indiana appellate court, which has made it clear that criminal statutes often apply differently to an unlawful taking of intellectual property.  For a discussion of two recent cases, see here and here.   

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South Bend, Indiana — Trademark lawyers for Coach, Inc. of New York, New York and Coach Services, Inc. of Jacksonville, Florida (collectively, “Coach“) have sued Maxx Tan; Maxx Tan Logan, LLC — both of Logansport, Indiana — and James Robert McCarthy (“McCarthy”) of Marion, Indiana, individually and d/b/a Maxx Tan, for infringement of the COACH trademark which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office

Coach was founded more than 70 years ago as a family-run workshop in Manhattan. Since then, the company has been engaged in the manufacture, marketing and sale of fine leather and mixed-material products including handbags, wallets and accessories including eyewear, footwear, jewelry and watches.  Coach products have become among the most popular in the world, with Coach’s annual global sales currently exceeding three billion dollars.

On October 17, 2012, a private investigator from Coach visited Maxx Tan and observed numerous trademarked handbags, sunglasses and accessories displayed for sale.  These items bore the trademarks of many high-end brands, including Coach. 

The investigator purchased a purse which bore a Coach trademark for $69 plus tax and left the store.  The investigator then returned, explained the reason for the purchase, attempted to serve a cease-and-desist letter on McCarthy, and asked McCarthy to surrender the merchandise.  McCarthy agreed to stop selling the merchandise but refused to surrender anything.

The investigator contacted the Logansport police.  In the following weeks, Maxx Tan surrendered various purses, a pair of sunglasses and a sunglasses case to the police, all of which bore the Coach mark.  All of the surrendered items are alleged to be counterfeit.

Coach, the owner of at least 47 trademarks, subsequently sued Maxx Tan and McCarthy, whom Coach contends is individually liable for any infringing activities.  It alleges that Maxx Tan and McCarthy are engaged in designing, manufacturing, advertising, promoting, distributing, selling, and/or offering for sale products bearing logos and source-identifying indicia and design elements that are studied imitations of the Coach trademarks.

The complaint includes counts for trademark infringement, false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116, 1117, 1125(a) and (c); trademark infringement and unfair competition under the common law of the State of Indiana; and forgery under Indiana Code § 35- 43-5-2(b) as well as counterfeiting under Indiana Code § 35-43-5-2(a), pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-24-3-1.  These counts are listed as:

·         COUNT I (Trademark Counterfeiting, 15 U.S.C. § 1114)

·         COUNT II (Trademark Infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114)

·         COUNT III (False Designation of Origin and False Advertising, 15

                             U.S.C. § 1125(a))

·         COUNT IV (Common Law Trademark Infringement)

·         COUNT V (Common Law Unfair Competition)

·         COUNT VI (Forgery Under Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(b))

·         COUNT VII (Counterfeiting Under Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(a))

·         COUNT VIII (Common Law Unjust Enrichment)

·         COUNT IX (Attorneys’ Fees)

Coach asks the court, inter alia, to enter judgment against the defendants on all counts; for an injunction against further wrongful activity; to order that all infringing materials be recalled and disposed of; to award to Coach statutory damages of $2,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of good; to award punitive damages; and to award to Coach its costs and attorneys’ fees.

Practice Tip: Coach has been very aggressive in protecting its intellectual property rights in Indiana courts over the last few years. Coach’s intellectual property attorneys have filed numerous similar lawsuits in Indiana courts, several of which Indiana Intellectual Property Law and News has blogged about. 

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The US Trademark Office issued 149 trademark registrations to persons and businesses in Indiana in June, 2013, based on applications filed by Indiana Trademark Attorneys:

Reg. Number Mark Click To View
1 4358361 ORTHOSIZE LIVE
2 4348082 SAVE YOUR SURFACE LIVE
3 4358083 KCCO LIVE
4 4358082 CHIVE ON LIVE
5 4358074 SOLITUDE LIVE
6 4357923 MIRACLE WELD LIVE
7 4357741 CROCODILE CREEK LIVE
8 4357542 LIVE
9 4357511 BRAND MAESTRO LIVE
10 4357470 MOONSHINE COWBOYS XXX RC LIVE

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Indianapolis, Indiana — The Southern District of Indiana has granted a motion by New York-based Broadcast Music, Inc. et al. for summary judgment against Diamond Investments, Inc. and Salvatore Mazza of Franklin, Indiana for copyright infringement for the unlicensed use of copyrighted musical compositions in live performances at The Juke Box Live.

Thumbnail image for Thumbnail image for Thumbnail image for BMILogo.JPGBroadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) is a “performing rights society” under 17 U.S.C. § 101 that operates on a non-profit-making basis and licenses the right to publicly perform copyrighted musical works on behalf of the copyright owners of these works.  The other plaintiffs in this action are the copyright owners of the eight compositions at issue in this lawsuit.

Diamond Investments, Inc. (“Diamond”) is an Indiana corporation that operated The Juke Box Live, a “nightclub restaurant entertainment venue.” Musical compositions were publicly performed at The Juke Box Live in connection with Diamond’s operation of that business. 

Salvatore T. Mazza (“Mazza”) was an officer of Diamond with primary responsibility for the operation and management of Diamond and The Juke Box Live. Mazza also had a direct financial interest in the corporation and The Juke Box Live.

Prior to February 2010, BMI learned that The Juke Box Live was offering musical entertainment without a license from BMI and without permission from the copyright owners whose music was being publicly performed. Between February 4, 2010 and May 31, 2011, BMI repeatedly informed Diamond and Mazza (collectively, “defendants”) in writing of the need to obtain permission for public performances of copyrighted music and offered to enter into a license agreement with defendants, but they refused.  BMI also sent four letters instructing defendants to cease unauthorized public performances of BMI’s music and telephoned on 55 occasions to advise defendants of the need to enter into a license agreement.

Nonetheless, the infringement continued.  On March 19, 2011, a BMI investigator went to The Juke Box Live and recorded the performance of songs owned by the various non-BMI plaintiffs.  An action for copyright infringement of eight works performed at The Juke Box Live, brought pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (the “Copyright Act”), followed.

BMI later moved for summary judgment and the defendants, although represented by counsel, did not respond.  The court held that, due to their failure to answer or object to BMI’s requests for admissions, defendants were deemed to have tacitly admitted to copyright infringement. 

The court awarded $3,000.00 for each of the eight findings of infringement in this case, for $24,000.00 in total, for the infringement itself.  It also found that the infringement had been willful and consequently awarded to the plaintiffs $17,985.55, to cover in full plaintiff’s costs and attorney’s fees.  The court also ordered that post-judgment interest be paid.  These damages and costs were assessed against Diamond and Mazza jointly and severally.

Finally, the court ordered that Diamond and Mazza, each individually, as well as all persons acting under their permission or authority, be permanently enjoined from infringing the copyrighted musical compositions licensed by BMI.

Practice Tip:

The Copyright Act empowers a plaintiff to elect to receive an award of statutory damages between $750 and $30,000 per infringement in lieu of an award representing the plaintiffs’ actual damages and/or the defendants’ profits.  In a case where the copyright owner proves that infringement was committed willfully, the court may increase the award of statutory damages to as much as $150,000 per infringed work.  A finding of willful infringement will also support an award of attorney’s fees. 

Here, the court awarded $3,000 per infringement plus attorney’s fees.  Courts considering awards of statutory damages have recognized that awards in the range of $3,000 to $7,000 or higher per infringement are appropriate in cases where the infringement resulted from deliberate indifference toward copyright laws.

Furthermore, not only is the performer liable for infringement, but so is anyone who sponsors the performance.  A corporate officer will be found jointly and severally liable with his corporation for copyright infringement if he (1) had the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity, and (2) has a direct financial interest in such activities.

 

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Continuing our recent initiative in response to feedback from practitioners and other stakeholders expressing a desire to provide constructive input on examination guides before they are finalized, a draft version of an examination guide on geographic certification marks is now available for comment.

The purpose of the examination guide, entitled “Geographic Certification Marks,” is to provide additional guidance to examiners and practitioners in this area, as well as provide examples illustrating the concepts discussed.

You can submit comments on the examination guide using a web-based collaboration tool, which some of you may have already used to comment on the TMEP or other guides. The tool allows users to post comments on a topic, and view and respond to others’ comments. In addition, users may vote to indicate agreement or disagreement with a particular comment. We will use the collaboration webpage to address comments and will take all timely comments into account before issuing a final version of the guide.

Indianapolis, Indiana — The Southern District of Indiana denied a motion by Wine & Canvas Development, LLC for default judgment and instead dismissed claims against Rachael Roberts and all defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The suit alleged that Rachael Roberts, Avraham Levi, and Las Vegas Bungee, Inc. d/b/a Design & Wine of Las Vegas, Nevada, infringed Wine & Canvas’ trademark, Registration No. 4,185,017, which has been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

Wine&CanvasLogo.JPGWine & Canvas Development, LLC (“Wine & Canvas”), filed this action in Indiana state court alleging that defendants Rachel Roberts, Avraham Levi, and Las Vegas Bungee, Inc., d/b/a Design and Wine (“Design and Wine”) (collectively, the “defendants”) violated the Lanham Act by infringing on Wine & Canvas’ trademark through the use of the Design & Wine Las Vegas website.  Roberts unilaterally removed the action to federal court in November 2012.

Wine & Canvas moved for default judgment January 16, 2013, after defendants failed to respond to its complaint. Two days later, Roberts moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.   Roberts attested that she is married to Levi, that they are the sole owners of Design and Wine, that they have one store, that it is located in Las Vegas and that they have never done business in Indiana. She further attested that they have never contacted a business in Indiana, have never offered or sold any franchises in Indiana, have no bank accounts in Indiana, have no employees in Indiana, have no affiliates in Indiana, have not sold any services or gift certificates in Indiana and have never purposefully targeted any residents of Indiana.

In response to Roberts’ motion, Wine & Canvas moved to strike her affidavit.  It argued that her affidavit was insufficient because she had not attested to her personal knowledge or her competence.  It also claimed that Roberts’ earlier removal of the case to federal court prevented her from claiming a lack of personal jurisdiction.  Finally, it argued that her motions were filed only on her own behalf, and not also on behalf of the other two defendants. 

The court was not persuaded by Wine & Canvas’ arguments.  It held that Roberts’ affidavit was sufficient, because, as a corporate officer of Design and Wine, she was presumed to have personal knowledge of the acts of that business.  It next held that Roberts’ earlier motion to remove the case to federal court did not prevent her from successfully arguing a lack of personal jurisdiction.  Finally, although Roberts filed her motion on her own behalf, not on behalf of the other two defendants, the motion challenged the court’s personal jurisdiction and contains common attestations regarding the defendants’ business activities. The court decided sua sponte to raise the issue of personal jurisdiction regarding the non-moving defendants and held that it lacked such jurisdiction.  The court dismissed the matter without prejudice.

 Practice Tip #1: While all defendants typically must consent to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, failure to do so is a procedural defect that must be raised (here, by Wine & Canvas) within thirty days.  Wine & Canvas did not object to Roberts’ unilateral removal and, hence, the issue was waived.

Practice Tip #2: Courts have held that the mere existence of nationally accessible websites is a poor foundation on which to base personal jurisdiction.  Here, a holding that accepted Wine & Canvas’ argument would result in personal jurisdiction in Internet-related cases in every forum in the country.  That, in turn, would go against the grain of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence which has stressed that, although technological advances may alter the analysis of personal jurisdiction, those advances may not eviscerate the constitutional limits on a state’s power to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.

 

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Ft. Wayne, Indiana — The Northern District of Indiana has directed Malibu Media, LLC of Los Angeles, California to file separate amended complaints against each defendant in its lawsuit for copyright infringement.

The case, initially filed in July 2012 against 14 Doe defendants, had only four defendants remaining.  In December 2012, the court had denied the motions to sever and declined to exercise its own discretion to sever the Doe defendants.

The court, in a recent opinion issued by Magistrate Judge Roger Cosbey, moved sua sponte to reconsider the issue.  It held that, while permitting joinder earlier had promoted judicial economy and facilitated the discovery process, the case had reached the point where continued joinder would instead create judicial inefficiency due to the different factual issues and legal defenses in each defendant’s case.  Does No. 5, 9 and 12 were severed, leaving Doe No. 6 as the only defendant remaining in the current suit. 

The practical effect of severance of previously joined claims is the creation of one or more new actions.  The court directed Malibu Media to file a separate amended complaint for each of the severed Does. 

Practice Tip:

It has been estimated that over 200,000 users of various peer-to-peer file-sharing protocols, usually users of BitTorrent, have been sued for copyright infringement.  Instead of a thorough investigation, followed by a lawsuit, these plaintiffs — usually holders of a copyright to a work of adult entertainment — gather the IP addresses of many potential/presumed infringers and then sue tens, hundreds or even thousands of defendants in a single suit.  The plaintiffs then extract settlements from the defendants, who are motivated to settle to avoid the embarrassment of being associated with pornography and the expense of litigation, even if they may not have infringed the work.

The problem has become sufficiently widespread that it has garnered attention from mainstream press (see, e.g., here).  Different approaches to the growing problem of copyright trolls have been taken.  In some cases, defendants have filed suit, alleging fraud and extortion. 

The problem has also caused considerable strain on the federal judiciary, leading one judge to deny joinder as serving no legitimate purpose in such cases once IPSs have been put on notice to preserve identifying information for particular IP addresses and to opine that it is “difficult to even imagine the extraordinary amount of time federal judges have spent on these cases.”   Many other courts have also denied joinder, often on the theory that, while doing so does not solve the problem it, at least, makes pursuing such abusive litigation much less profitable.

Some courts have exercised their discretion to allow Doe defendants to proceed under a pseudonym, at least during the discovery phase of a suit. 

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Indianapolis, Indiana — Trademark lawyers for Sensory Technologies, LLC (“Sensory Indiana”) of Indianapolis, Indiana sued Sensory Technology Consultants, Inc. (“Sensory Utah”) of Morgan, Utah alleging infringement of Trademark Registration No. 3282956 for the mark “SENSORY TECHNOLOGIES®” which has been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.

Sensory Indiana sued in the Southern District of Indiana for declaratory judgment, injunction and damages, alleging that SensoryUtahLogo.JPGSensory Utah has committed trademark infringement, false designation of origin and unfair competition with its unauthorized use of “Sensory Technology Consultants,” a mark similar to Sensory Indiana’s “Sensory Technologies” trademark. 

Sensory Indiana, which describes itself on its website as “a leading audio-visual, telepresence system and collaboration solutions provider” asserts that Sensory Utah used a mark which is visually and phonetically similar to the “Sensory Technologies” mark with the intent to trade on the goodwill with the public established by Sensory Indiana and to cause confusion, mistake or deception.  Sensory Indiana further asserts that Sensory Utah is in the business of providing services similar to those provided by Sensory Indiana.

The “Sensory Technologies” mark is federally registered for audio-visual and video conferencing design services, integrating audio-visual and video conferencing systems, help desk technical consultation services, customized computer programming for others and technical consultation regarding audio-visual equipment and video conferencing systems.  Sensory Indiana indicates that the mark has been used in commerce since March 2006 and that it is distinctive and/or has acquired secondary meaning and significance in the minds of the purchasing public.

Several times in early 2013, Sensory Indiana alerted Sensory Utah that Sensory Utah’s use of “Sensory Technology Consultants” was unauthorized.  The current lawsuit was commenced after those notices went unanswered.  The complaint alleges:

      ·         Count I: Trademark Infringement

·         Count II: False Designation of Origin

·         Count III: Unfair Competition

·         Count VI [sic]: Declaratory Judgment

·         Count VIII [sic]: Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief

Sensory Indiana seeks a judgment against Sensory Utah on counts I through III; injunctive relief; and damages, including punitive damages and damages for corrective advertising.

Practice Tip: According to its website, Sensory Utah has been in business since 2006, the same year in which Sensory Indiana’s mark was initially used in commerce.  This may cause some difficulties for Sensory Indiana.  While federal registration of a trademark has advantages, trademark protection may also be acquired by being the first to use a mark in commerce.  As a result, an unregistered trademark may be more robust from a legal standpoint than one that has been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office.  This makes it extremely important to do a comprehensive search for others’ potential trademark rights — including those that will not be evident from a search of the Trademark Electronic Search System databasebefore you begin to use a mark. 

 

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