Indianapolis, IN – The Southern District of Indiana has denied all summary judgment motions of both plaintiff CleanTech and all defendants in this multi-district litigation involving patents issued by the US Patent Office.

GreenShift Corp. Thumbnail image for GreenShift-Logo.jpgand its subsidiary GS CleanTech Corp. (“CleanTech”) have brought a series of suits alleging infringement of their family of patented methods of extracting corn oil from byproducts of ethanol manufacturing.  This multi-district litigation, In re Method of Processing Ethanol Byproducts and Related Subsystems (‘858) Patent Litigation, consolidates 11 separate actions in multiple states involving several similar patents in the Southern District of Indiana. 

The defendants are: Big River Resources Galva, LLC; Big River Resources West Burlington, LLC; Cardinal Ethanol, LLC; ICM, Inc.; LincolnLand Agri-Energy, LLC; David J. Vander Griend; Iroquois Bio-Energy Co., LLC; Al-Corn Clean Fuel; Blue Flint Ethanol, LLC; ACE Ethanol, LLC; Lincolnway Energy, LLC; United Wisconsin Grain Producers, LLC; Bushmills Ethanol, Inc.; Chippewa Valley Ethanol Co.; Heartland Corn Products and Adkins Energy, LLC.

The initial litigation alleged infringement of one patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,601,858 (the “‘858 patent”), which was issued on October 13, 2009.  CleanTech sued GEA Westfalia Separator, Inc. (not a party in this matter) and others alleging infringement of that patent shortly after its issuance.

Allegations of infringement of three additional patents, U.S. Patent Nos., 8,008,516 (the “‘516 patent”), 8,008,517 (the “‘517 patent”) and 8,283,484 (the “‘484 patent”; collectively known, together with the ‘858 patent, as the “‘858 patent family”) were later added.  The patents in the ‘858 family share an identical specification and have substantially similar claim terms.  As such, the court concluded that the construction of the ‘858 patent applied to all of the asserted claims in the other patents in the ‘858 family.

CleanTech’s patented methods recover corn oil by evaporating, concentrating and mechanically separating thin stillage (“stillage”), a byproduct of ethanol produced from corn, into two components: corn oil and a post-recovery syrup (“syrup”) with most of its corn oil removed.  In the patents, the term “substantially oil free” (and the essentially identical term “substantially free of oil”) had been used to describe the syrup after the patented process had removed the corn oil. 

The defendants argued that this language required that, to infringe upon the patented processing, a removal process must remove almost all of the corn oil from the syrup.  The defendants moved for a finding on summary judgment that they had not infringed, arguing that the patented process did not include one which did not render the processed syrup “substantially oil free.”  The court disagreed that this was the proper construction of the term.

Defendants also asked the court to construe “substantially oil free” to require that at least 95% of the oil from the unprocessed stillage be removed by the patented oil-removal process, thus rendering any less efficient process non-infringing.  While the court agreed that a comparison between the oil levels in the input stillage and the output syrup was appropriate when considering the term, it declined to limit the protection afforded by the patent to this, or any, specific percentage and held that the term “substantially oil free” was to be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning.

In addressing the issue, the court discussed the language of the various patents and noted that, across the entire ‘858 patent family, the term “substantially oil free” had been found in only two substantially similar claims.  Further, the one reference found in the specification had been parenthetical — “[r]ecombining the syrup (which is substantially free of oil) from the centrifuge…” — and, according to the court, “almost an afterthought.” 

In sum, on this issue, the court found that none of the claims in the ‘858 patent family required that the post-oil-recovery syrup be substantially free of oil and concluded, instead, that the ‘858 patent family merely disclosed that the post-oil-recovery syrup was “substantially free of oil.”  The court held that the primary focus of the invention was not the amount of oil that remained in the syrup but, instead, on the recovery of oil.

Additionally, the defendants (except Adkins) asked the court to revisit an earlier construction of the term “substantially oil,” as applied to the corn oil captured, asking that it be held to mean that the oil must be nearly pure.  Defendant Cardinal further argued that the “substantially oil” term should be construed to mean nearly 100% pure, with only trace amounts of contaminants.  The court declined to readdress the construction of this term. 

The court also denied CleanTech’s motions for summary judgment against various defendants.

Finally, the court acknowledged that, since receiving the parties’ summary judgment motions, it had allowed CleanTech to amend its complaints against each defendant such that nearly all patents in the ‘858 family were asserted against each defendant.  Consequently, all summary judgment motions were denied without prejudice and with leave to re-file them to address the amended complaint. 

Practice Tip #1: Multi-district litigation affords consistency and judicial economy, as well as allowing plaintiffs and defendants to concentrate their efforts in one forum.  However, lawsuits that are not settled before trial must later be remanded to the transferring court and to a judge who has had little opportunity to become familiar with the issues.

Practice Tip #2: In this case, CleanTech filed suit almost immediately after the issuance of the first of the patents in the ‘858 family.  Thus, damages are limited to a reasonable royalty upon a showing that an infringer had actual notice of the published patent application and that the patent was subsequently issued on essentially the same claims.  As such, if a patent is filed in anticipation of litigation, it is wise to provide such notice immediately upon publication of the patent application. 

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Geneva, Switzerland – The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) has granted its permission for the twin-island nation of Antigua and Barbuda (“Antigua”) to disregard intellectual property rights granted by the United States (i.e., patents, copyrights and trademarks).  The decision follows nearly ten years of negotiations and litigation pursuant to a 2003 complaint to the WTO by Antigua.

In the United States, there are three separate federal laws (the “Wire Act,” the “Travel Act” and the “Illegal Gambling Business Act”) and various state laws promulgated by Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Utah that prohibit certain means of delivering gambling services, most particularly the interstate delivery such services.  The dispute centered on the conformance of these laws with an international trade agreement when the laws restricted online gambling services offered in the U.S. by Antigua.  [NB: Other WTO members participated as complainants but, by 2009, the U.S. had negotiated agreements with each of them.]

Via its attorneys, Antigua alleged that, together, the federal and state restrictions amounted to discrimination against foreign companies and constituted a breach of the United States’ agreement under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).  Antigua stated that its economy, which had, without the restrictions, included a substantial volume of online gambling services offered to the residents of the U.S., had been significantly damaged.

Indianapolis, IN – The Indiana Court of Appeals has vacated the decision of The Honorable Timothy Oakes, Marion County Superior Court, to seize the truck of a defendant who pled guilty to fraud for having sold pirated movies from the truck.

In December 2009, the State charged Michael Curtis with felony fraud for selling pirated movies out of his truck.  The State also sought forfeiture of the truck from which the movies had been sold under 34-24-1-1(a)(1)(B) which allows for the seizure of vehicles that are used to facilitate the transportation of “stolen . . . or converted property” valued at $100 or more. 

Curtis pled guilty to one count of fraud and the remaining charges were dismissed.  The court granted the State’s motion to seize the truck.  Curtis filed a motion in opposition, which was not granted, and later appealed.

Thumbnail image for 11_ram1500_outdoorsman.jpgUpon appeal, Curtis cited Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) as precedent and the Indiana Court of Appeals discussed the case.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that a copyright was “no ordinary chattel,” Dowling, 473 at 216.  Theft of a copyrighted work via infringement was held to be distinguishable from theft of tangible property as it “plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud.”  Id. at 218.

In Dowling, the defendant had engaged in infringement but had been convicted under the portion of the National Stolen Property Act (“NSPA”) which criminalized actions wherein items, subject to other conditions, were “stolen, converted or taken by fraud.”  18 U. S. C. § 2314.  The Court ruled that the language of “stolen, converted or taken by fraud” did not include copyright infringement.  Under the rule of lenity — a rule which calls for construing ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of criminal defendants — the Court held that the defendant had not violated the NSPA by infringing upon a copyright.

In Dowling, the rule of lenity caused the Court to construe the language of a criminal statute narrowly.  Here, the Indiana Court of Appeals was asked to interpret a statute authorizing forfeiture, another type of statute that is strictly construed.  As the language “stolen . . . or converted” did not include either fraud or copyright infringement, the order of the trial court to forfeit the truck was vacated.

Practice Tip: While the penalties for copyright infringement can be significant, the rule in Dowling will presumably prevent many statutes prohibiting theft of tangible items from being applicable to copyright infringement unless the legislature makes clear its intent to include copyright infringement in the language of the statute.

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South Bend, IN – Patent attorneys for Engineered Solutions, L.P.of Mishawaka, IN has filed suit against AL-KO KOBER, LLC of Elkhart, IN for infringement of PatentPDF.JPGU.S. Patent No. 6,681,531, issued by the US Patent Office. The plaintiff claims that the AL-KO Kober offers for sale an above-floor, slide-out actuating mechanism for RVs that infringes Plaintiff’s ‘531 patent.

This case has been assigned to Chief Judge Philip P. Simon and Magistrate Judge Christopher A Nuechterlein of the Northern District of Indiana, and assigned Case No. 3:13-cv-00051-PPS-CAN.

Further Information about the case is as follows:

Plaintiff: Engineered Solutions LP
Defendant: Al-Ko Kober LLC
Case Number: 3:2013cv00051
Filed: January 24, 2013
Court: Indiana Northern District Court
Office: South Bend Office
County: St. Joseph
Presiding Judge: Philip P Simon
Referring Judge: Christopher A Nuechterlein
Nature of Suit: Intellectual Property – Patent
Cause: 35:271
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Jury Demanded By: Plaintiff

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Washington, DC

On January 18, 2013, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on issued final rules setting revised patent fees under Section 10 of the America Invents Act. (78 Fed. Reg. 4211). Section 10 of the AIA permits the USPTO to set or adjust by rule any fee under Title 35 or Title 15 for any services performed by or materials furnished by the Office. According to the statute, the fees may only recover the aggregate estimated uspto.JPGcosts for patent and trademark processing, activities, services, and materials. In its final rule notice, the Office said the fee-setting authority would permit sustainable funding and reduce the patent application backlog. According to the Federal Register notice:
The fee schedule in this final rule will recover the aggregate estimated costs of the Office while achieving strategic and operational goals, such as implementing a sustainable funding model, reducing the current patent application backlog, decreasing patent application pendency, improving patent quality, and upgrading the patent IT business capability and infrastructure.
For the most part, the fees in the final rules are the same as those in the proposal published last September (77 Fed. Reg. 55028, 9/6/2012). Many of the new front-end fees are reduced, such as the basic filing fee for an original patent application (reduced from $380 to $280), and the new fees include the 50% discount for small entities and 75% discount for micro entities. Among the differences between the proposed and final fees, the following are examples for non-small entity applicants:
• Correction of inventorship after first Office action (§1.17(d))
Proposed: $1,000; Final: $600
• Issue fee paid before January 1, 2014 (§1.18(a)(2))
Proposed: $960; Final: $1,780
• Ex parte reexamination fee (§1.20(c)(1)):
Proposed: $15,000; Final: $12,000
• Ex parte reexamination fee after supplemental examination (§1.20(k)(2))
Proposed: $13,600; Final: $12,000
• Notice of appeal to PTAB (§41.20(b)(1))
Proposed: $1,000; Final: $800
The Patent Public Advisory Council reviewed the September 2012 proposed rules and noted the many of the fees were tied to reducing pendency, using a goal of 10 months to the first Office action by 2015, and a goal of 20 months total pendency by 2016. Under the final rules, achievement of those two goals is pushed back to 2016 and 2017 respectively. In addition, the Office anticipates a reduced backlog and inventory of approximately 335,000 patent applications by 2016. For most of the fees, the effective date is March 19. 2013.

Indianapolis, INAttorney and self-proclaimed professional photographer Richard N. Bell, suing on his own behalf, filed two separate complaints alleging copyright infringement and unfair competition under the Copyright Act and conversion under Indiana statutory law as a result of the unauthorized use of a photograph he had taken and which had been registered with the United States Copyright Office. Bell is seeking damages, injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. Mr. Bell has been disciplined by the Indiana Supreme Court for violating the Rules of Professional Responsibility. (See Disciplinary Action here.)

In the first complaint, filed January 4, 2013, Bell named twenty-five separate Defendants: Greg Bayers, LLC; Leppart Associates; crazy-frankenstein.com; Hometown Rentals; Frank Kirchner; Brent Bythewood; Pixmule.com; InternMatch; Team Champion; Electraproducts; Alex Bruni; Mark Groff; Greatimes Family Fun Park; Peter Brzycki; Tom Kelly; Relociti.net; gerberbabycontest.net; MerchantCircle, Inc; Amber Russell; WSBT, Inc.; Delia Askew; Intercontinental Industries; The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice; Linen Finder, Inc.; and Radio One of Indiana.

In the second complaint, filed January 8, 2013, Bell named the remaining forty-eight Defendants: Jerry Gordon; Demand Media, Inc.; Bryce Welker; Royal Corniche Travel Ltd.; VRBO.com, Inc.; Experience Credit Unions, LLC; Jaclothing.com; Glacier International; ABNHotels.com; 1&1 Internet, Inc.; Conde Nast Digital; Flixter, Inc.; Financing-USA.com; SodaHead, Inc.; NuMedia Marketing, Inc.; Jynell Berkshire; Tzvetelin Petrov; Los Pentecostales del Area de la Bahia; 10Best, Inc.; Keyes Outdoor Advertising; Zoom Communications Inc.; Christine Nevogt; Zarzar, Inc.; Hydro-Gear; Tam T. Dang; Lon Dunn; William McLaws, Trustee; Natl-electronic Residential Payment History Recording Agency; CVI; Constant Contact, Inc.; Charles Lantz; Schumacher Cargo Logistics; Eventbrite, Inc.; Celebrity Entertainment Corp.; Association of Equipment Manufacturers; Yardi Systems Inc.; DiamondIndyLimo.com; Marcelo Santos; National Rural Recruitment & Retention Network; Anbritt Stengele; Pinnacle Sports Equipment, Inc.; Marygrove College; RunAnyCity.com; Buzzle.com, Inc.; Charles Onuska; University of Indianapolis; and PersephoneMagazine.com.

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The US Trademark Office issued the following 130 trademark registrations to persons and businesses in Indiana in December, 2012, based on applications filed by Indiana Trademark Attorneys:

 

Word Mark

1

4264717

FLOWERS IN VASES ACROSS AMERICA

VIEW

2

4264439

THE BRODERICK

VIEW

3

4264390

LEARN MORE, BETTER.

VIEW

4

4264387

MOTHER BEAR’S

VIEW

5

4264181

MONEY FLOW NEWS

VIEW

6

4264112

CHRIST IS MY BIG C

VIEW

7

4264092

BELIEVE YOU CAN

VIEW

8

4263840

CLARK AND OSBORNE

VIEW

9

4265783

THE PRODUCE MOM

VIEW

10

4265944

TAILORED PROJECT MANAGEMENT

VIEW

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Local Rules for the Northern District of Indiana have been revised and are effective January 1, 2013. The rules which have been amended areThumbnail image for NDPic.JPG L.R. 1-1, L.R. 5-3, L.R. 6-1, L.R. 16-1, L.R. 83-6.7, L.Cr.R. 47-2, L.Cr.R. 47-3 and Local Patent Rules LPR 1-1 through 6-1.

A complete copy of the newly adopted Local Rules can be viewed by following the link provided below.

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Fort Wayne, IN – Copyright attorney Paul Nicoletti filed a lawsuit on behalf of Malibu Media in the Northern District of Indiana alleging copyright infringement of the pornographic movie “Romantic Memories.” It alleges the infringement occurred by downloading it using the Internet file sharing “bittorrent” protocol. The suit was against 14 as-yet-unnamed Indiana Defendants, John Does 1-14. “Romantic Memories” had been coded with a “Unique Hash Number,” and upon investigation, 14 Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses were identified. Upon receiving permission from the court, Plaintiff served third party subpoenas on two Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to discover the names and other contact information of each Defendant.

Defendant John Doe No. 12, acting pro se, filed a Motion to Dismiss or Sever for Misjoinder and to Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena. The court rejected the Motion to Dismiss on a technicality, noting that under local rules motions must be filed separately, and denied the Motions for Severance and to Quash.

Doe No. 12’s Motion to Quash under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a) argued that there was no evidence that any improper use of his IP address would be sufficient to support an assertion that he was responsible for such misuse. The Court acknowledged that Doe No. 12 had standing to object to the subpoena on the grounds that it would implicate his privacy interest. However, it went on to reject his argument as a mere denial of liability and not relevant to a Motion to Quash. Doe No. 12 further asserted that the subpoena should be quashed as a burden on his ISP. The court found that argument unpersuasive as 1) the subpoena would not burden Doe No. 12 personally and 2) Rule 45 only requires a court to quash a subpoena when it subjects a person to an undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iv). Further, the court held that no exception for privilege was applicable, as courts have consistently held that “there is no expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber information because it has already been exposed to a third party, the Internet Service Provider.”

Doe No.12’s Motion to Sever under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 or 21 argued, that there was no single transaction or series of transactions as is required for permissive joinder. Courts across the country are split regarding whether joining anonymous defendants alleged to have participated in a single BitTorrent “swarm” in a single suit is appropriate. The court here allowed joinder as the Plaintiff alleged a set of facts sufficient to support a finding that the separate actions were part of the same series of transactions, noting that the file sharing protocol required each participant to send and receive portions of the work in order to download and view the entire work. The second requirement for joinder under Rule 20, a “common question of law or fact,” was sufficiently pled by the Plaintiff’s assertion, without exception, of the same counts of copyright infringement against all Defendants. Discretionary severance under Rule 21 was also denied as unnecessarily cumbersome at this stage of the litigation.

Finally, the court issued a warning to plaintiffs in situations such as these, stating that “the litigation strategy Plaintiff has employed in this case has a history of becoming abusive and potentially giving rise to sanctions under Rule 11.” The court further cautioned plaintiffs against improperly leveraging a defendant’s reluctance to have his identity revealed to coerce a settlement.

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