Washington, DC The Federal Circuit on October 9, 2012 granted en banc review of a case in which a Federal Circuit panel held that a claim must not be deemed inadequate under 35 U.S.C. §101 if, after taking all of the claim recitations into consideration, it is not “manifestly evident” that a claim is directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea. The court vacated the panel decision and requested briefing on the following questions:

  1. What test should the court adopt to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible “abstract idea”; and when, if ever, does the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?
  2. In assessing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of a computer-implemented invention, should it matter whether the invention is claimed as a method, system, or storage medium; and should such claims at times be considered equivalent for § 101 purposes?

The panel decision stressed that patent eligibility must be determined by what is evident from specific, concrete applications of the ideas behind an invention disclosed in the claims. The panel opinion, written in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), included the following observation:

“[N]othing in the Supreme Court’s precedent, nor in ours, allows a court to go hunting for abstractions by ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible, and otherwise not abstract invention the patentee actually claims. It is fundamentally improper to paraphrase a claim in overly simplistic generalities in assessing whether the claim falls under the limited “abstract ideas” exception to patent eligibility under 35 USC §101. Patent eligibility must be evaluated based on what the claims recite, not merely on the ideas upon which they are premised.”

Practice Note:

The challenged patents in this case are directed to a computerized trading platform for exchanging obligations in which a trusted third party settles obligations between a first and second party so as to eliminate “settlement risk.” The district court granted a summary judgment motion that the claims were not patent eligible because they are directed to an abstract idea. On appeal the Federal Circuit panel reversed, concluding that the system, method, and media claims are directed to practical applications of an invention falling within the categories of patent eligible subject matter defined by Section 101.

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Washington DC: President Obama on October 5, 2012, signed legislation (H.R. 6215) that restores the limitation of the federal registration defense to trademark dilution claims based on state law only.

Background

In 1995, Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act with a federal registration defense intended to encourage federal trademark registation. Section 43(c)(6) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(6) included a complete bar for state dilution claims brought against federally registered marks. In 2006, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act addressed a number of problems with the legislation, including an amendments to make the federal registration defense specify not simply “dilution,” but “dilution by blurring” and “dilution by tarnishment.”

The House version of the 2006 amendment stated that a federal registration bars an action that is brought under state law and that seeks to prevent dilution, or that asserts harm to distinctiveness. When the bill was in the Senate, the language was unchanged, but the elements were enumerated in a way that changed the meaning. Thus, the enacted bill stated that a federal registration bars an action (A)(i) that is brought under state law and (ii) that seeks to prevent dilution, or (B) that asserts harm to distinctiveness. The result was that a federal registration could bar both state and federal dilution actions.

Signed Legislation
H.R. 6215 restores the intent of the House-passed version of 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(6) as follows:

(c)(6) The ownership by a person of a valid registration … shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that —

(A) is brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State; and

(B) (i) seeks to prevent dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment; or

(ii) asserts any claim of actual or likely damage or harm to the distinctiveness or
reputation of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.’.

The House Report (H. Rept. 112-647) for H.R. 6215 points out that Congress could not have intended that federal registration could serve to bar all dilution claims since that result would make it difficult to cancel a diluting mark that is registered. That would only encourage illegitimate mark holders to register diluting marks, and would force legitimate mark holders to expend greater resources monitoring registrations as well as other marks being used in commerce, the Report noted.

Practice Tip:
The need for this legislation was recently confirmed by a ruling of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in the cancellation action in Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Alliance of Professionals and Consultants, Inc., TTAB, Canc. No. 95055081, 9/24/2012. The TTAB dismissed the action, finding that the language of the 2006 amendment barred a federal dilution claim against a federally registered mark. The TTAB explained as follows:

While a “most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions” by Congress may justify a departure from the plain language of a statute, Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984), there is scant legislative history, and certainly not enough to support an alternative reading in this case. The Board must apply and enforce the statute as written, rather than picking and choosing a preferred interpretation. “Congress’ intent is found in the words it has chosen to use.” Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 198 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).

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Indiana patent attorneys obtained issuance of the following 173 patents from the US Patent Office to persons and businesses in Indiana in September, 2012:

     PAT. NO.

1

D667,963

Wall panel

2

D667,953

Combination patella drill guide and clamp

3

D667,937

Faucet spout

4

D667,935

Faucet

5

D667,934

Faucet

6

D667,933

Faucet

7

D667,927

Showerhead

 

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The US Trademark Office issued the following  160 trademark registrations to persons and businesses in Indiana in September, 2012, based on applications filed by Indiana Trademark Attorneys:

 Reg. Number

 Mark

 

    85,606,789

IRELY

4214085

Click to View

    85,585,401

ELDER ADVISERS

4215699

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    85,583,755

BOAT CARPET BUYS

4215698

Click to View

    85,549,669

50DN

4213837

Click to View

    85,549,311

40SI

4213823

Click to View

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The US Trademark Office issued the following trademark registrations to persons and businesses in Indiana in August, 2012 based on applications filed by Indiana trademark attorneys:

 Reg. Number

Mark

Click to View

          4,197,979

CHAINBUILDER

VIEW

          4,198,633

VIEW

          4,198,544

HIP HOP VOTES HOT 97 FM

VIEW

          4,198,475

WHERE THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE HAS ITS VOICE

VIEW

          4,198,442

ANGIE

VIEW

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The USPTO seeks public comment on the possibility of adjusting trademark application fees so as to lower the fees for all applicants willing to file and communicate electronically with the USPTO . The efficiencies achieved by trademark electronic filing and communications have put the USPTO in a position to potentially reduce the overall collection Thumbnail image for Thumbnail image for uspto.JPGof trademark application fees, and the Office wishes to adjust the fees in a way that further promotes efficiency both for users and the USPTO. Comments are also being sought on the possibility of increasing fees on applications based on paper, currently only 1% of trademark applications, given that these applications are more costly and burdensome for the USPTO to process. A Notice of Inquiry has been published in the Federal Register, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-16/pdf/2012-20127.pdf. Responses are due b y October 15, 2012.

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The USPTO seeks public comment on the possibility of amending federal law to shorten by two years the first filing deadline to demonstrate either use or excusable nonuse of a registered trademark. Although any such change would require a legislative amendment of the Trademark Act, and thus is beyond the authority of the agency, the uspto.JPGUSPTO wishes to collect public comment that might assist in the consideration of such an amendment, or another alternative. The goal would be to remove marks no longer in use, known as “deadwood,” from the register sooner.” Under this proposal, Sections 8 and 71 of the Trademark Act would be amended, requiring a trademark owner to file the first Affidavit of Declarations of Use or Excusable Nonuse within three to four years after the registration date, or the six-month grace period that follows. Under current law, owners must file their first Affidavit between five and six years after the registration date, or the six-month grace period that follows. A request for comments has published in the Federal Register, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-16/pdf/2012-20130.pdf, and responses are due by October 15, 2012.

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Washington, DC. Current EPO regulations require that search results from an application, to which a European patent application filed on or after January 1, 2011 claims priority, must be filed with the EPO by the patent attorney without delay after the search results are made available to applicants. See Amended Rule 141(1) EPC (European Patent Convention). For the time being, U.S. applicants are exempt from personally providing search results for a U.S. priority application to the EPO as a result of an arrangement worked PTO.jpgout between the USPTO and the EPO, whereby the USPTO will electronically deliver search results from priority U.S. applications to the EPO, as a no-charge service to applicants. See Electronic Delivery of Search Results From the United States Patent and Trademark Office to the European Patent Office, 76 FR 82279 (December 30, 2011).

Maintenance of the exemption, however, is dependent upon delivery of search results by the USPTO to the EPO as soon as they become available, including when search results are available prior to publication of the U.S. application. Because 35 U.S.C. 122 prohibits the USPTO from providing information about an as-yet unpublished application to a third party without the applicant’s consent, timely delivery of pre-publication search results requires applicant cooperation in providing the USPTO with the proper consent to release the search result information to the EPO. Failure of applicants to provide the USPTO with the required consent will prevent the USPTO from delivering the search results in a timely fashion and could result in EPO rescinding the exemption, which would require all U.S. applicants to provide the search result information to the EPO at their own time and expense.

Practice Tip: Inventors should timely file the Certification and Authorization form PTO/SB/69 (available at http://www.uspto.gov/forms/sb0069.pdf) in each application that is intended to form the basis for a claim of priority to a corresponding application filed with the EPO. This form provides applicant’s consent for the USPTO to deliver to the EPO the search results from an unpublished U.S. application. Applicants should file the form prior to filing a European application that claims priority to the U.S. application in order for search results to be delivered to the EPO without delay should they become available prior to publication of the U.S. application. When filing form PTO/SB/69 using EFS-Web, applicants should be careful to select the correct document description,”PTO/SB/69 – Authorize EPO Access to Search Results,” which can be found under the General Transmittal category. Identifying form PTO/SB/69 using any other document description will significantly delay or prevent delivery of the search results from an unpublished U.S. application to the EPO.

Indianapolis, IN – The Southern District of Indiana dismissed multiple claims by Plaintiff Wine & Canvas in its trademark infringement suit against YN Canvas, et al.

Wine & Canvas organizes parties where guests can take a painting class while enjoying cocktails.  Anthony Scott (“Scott”), one of the founders of Wine & Canvas, sued multiple Wine&CanvasLogo.JPGdefendants.  He alleged that he entered into a business venture wherein he would license the Wine & Canvas business model to Christopher Muylle (“Muylle”) and Theodore Weisser (“Weisser”) for use in San Francisco, both to operate a new Wine & Canvas location and to license others to operate under the Wine & Canvas name and business model.  Instead, Scott alleged, the defendants breached that agreement, appropriated the Wine & Canvas model and proceeded without Scott as YN Canvas CA, LLC (“YN Canvas”).  Defendants, in turn, alleged that they breached no agreement but instead merely parted ways, changing their business name to “Art Uncorked,” when Wine & Canvas insisted on a new agreement with additional terms that were unfavorable to the defendants.

Plaintiff Wine & Canvas Development, LLC (“Wine & Canvas”), via its attorneys, sued multiple defendants: (1) YN Canvas, a Nevada limited liability company with its principal place of business in California; (2) www.art-uncorked.com, the corporate website for Art Uncorked; (3) Weisser, an officer of YN Canvas; and (4) Muylle, an officer of YN Canvas (collectively, “defendants”).  [NB: Art Uncorked was also named as a defendant but, as that was merely the new name of YN Canvas, which had already been named as a defendant, the court chose to refer to both by the one name, “YN Canvas.”]

The eleven-count complaint was originally filed in Hamilton County Circuit Court and included claims for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, trademark dilution, sales of counterfeit items/services, unfair competition, declaratory judgment, civil action under the Indiana Crime Victims Act, breach of contract, fraud, permanent injunctive relief, and request for writ of attachment.  It was removed to the Southern District of Indiana as its Lanham Act issues provided federal question jurisdiction.  We previously blogged about that element of this case here.

The parties came to the court with several motions.  After a detailed discussion on personal jurisdiction, the court held that it could exercise specific jurisdiction over both Weisser and YN Canvas and denied the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to them.  The motion to dismiss the website as a defendant was granted, with the court finding that, “[b]ased on common sense and Indiana precedent, it is obvious to this Court that a website alone is not an entity capable of being sued.” 

The court declined to discuss jurisdiction regarding “Art Uncorked,” finding that it was merely the new name of YN Canvas and, as such, it need not be considered separately.  Any references to YN Canvas would also apply to Art Uncorked.

The court then moved to the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Two counts – trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) and use of a counterfeit mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) – were dismissed.  Each of those claims required a registered mark, which Wine & Canvas conceded it did not have.  However, the court dismissed the counts without prejudice, as the registration of the marks is pending. 

The court next moved to two “counts” – permanent injunction and attachment – and dismissed them summarily as inappropriate pleading.  “Because these remedies are based on causes of actions in other counts within the Wine & Canvas’s complaint and are included within the Wine & Canvas’s prayer for relief,” the court held, “it is unnecessary to dedicate a separate count for each specific remedy.”

Defendants next asked the court to dismiss the claim of fraud for failure to meet the heightened standard required for pleading fraud.  As no time frame or location of the alleged fraud had been included in the plaintiff’s complaint, the court dismissed the fraud claim without prejudice.

Finally, as with the “counts” for permanent injunction and attachment noted earlier, the court addressed another “count” by Wine & Canvas seeking a declaratory judgment.  Ruling here on the defendants’ motion to strike, the court cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allowing a court to strike “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” from any pleading and, again, held that the “count” was redundant, as appropriate remedies would be addressed in the adjudication of the substantive claims, and granted the defendants’ motion to strike.

Practice Tip #1: The decision to sue a website is a curious one and seems to be the modern-day equivalent of suing a book.  It is notable that this has, however, happened.  See, e.g., here.  On the one hand, it is an attorney’s duty to pursue zealously his clients’ interests and, at times, that leads to maintaining a cause of action that is not a “sure thing.”  On the other hand, the law is unambiguous that a website is neither a real person nor a legal entity capable of being sued and, thus, it would have been wiser to omit this “defendant.”

Practice Tip #2: The decision to include various remedies that a party is seeking as separate causes of action is also curious but, instead of zealous advocacy run amok, it merely seems to reflect improper drafting.
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