Washington, D.C. – The United States Supreme Court has unanimously reversed a patent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and has held that patent claims that are a “law of nature” are not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The decision built upon the Court’s 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappos.

Patent lawyers for Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. of San Diego, California filed a patent infringement suit against Mayo Collaborative Services, doing business as Mayo Medical Laboratories of Rochester, Minnesota, alleging that Mayo infringed patent no. 6,355,623, Method of treating IBD/Crohn’s disease and related conditions wherein drug metabolite levels in host blood cells determine subsequent dosage and patent no. 6,680,302, Methods of optimizing drug therapeutic efficacy for treatment of immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders which have been issued by the US Patent Office.

The patents at issue involve claims over an observed correlation between certain blood tests and patient health, specifically the correlation between the level of certain drug metabolites in the patient’s blood and the patient’s symptoms of gastrointestinal disease. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had twice ruled in Prometheus’s favor. Oral arguments were held December 7, 2011 at the United States Supreme Court. The Court decision essentially held that Prometheus’s “invention” was not patentable because it was effectively a law of nature. In other words, the relationship between the dosages and the effect on patient health was a natural phenomenon and therefore, unpatentable.

We blogged a preview of this case in October. This ruling is being criticized by the patent bar as making the law less clear. In particular, Robert S. Sachs of Fenwick & West LLP is examining the decision in a series of blogs on Patently-O in which he examines “just some of the logical and legal errors in the Court’s decision.” Sachs commentary also suggests that numerous patents should now be found invalid.

Practice Tip: The Court’s decision has immediately changed protocol at the patent examination office. The US Patent Office has issued new guidelines to patent examiners which are available here.
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Indianapolis; IN – The Southern District of Indiana has denied a motion to dismiss filed by CertainTeed Corporation in a patent infringement lawsuit. Knauf Insulation Limited of St. Helens, Merseyside, United Kingdom and Knauf Insulation GMBH of Shelbyville, Indiana, filed a patent infringement suit alleging that Certainteed Corporation had infringed patent 7,854,980, FORMALDEHYDE-FREE MINERAL FIBRE INSULATION PRODUCT, which was issued by the US Patent Office. We previously blogged about this case on January 16, 2012 and May 19, 2011.

Patent attorneys for Certainteed had filed the motion to dismiss arguing that Knauf did not have standing because it did not own the rights to the patent at issue and that a first-filed action by Certainteed in the District of Columbia should resolve this dispute, not the case filed with the Southern District of Indiana. The claim that Knauf did not own the patent in question was based upon Certaineed’s interpretation of an exclusive license agreement between the inventors and various divisions of Knauf. Specifically, the Knauf parties had entered a “quitclaim and assignment” agreement that was governed by the laws of the Belgium. Certainteed argued that the transfer of patent rights was not valid.

The court found no merit in Certainteed’s argument. The court found “The Quitclaim and Assignment executed [by Knauf] clearly contains what is referred to in common parlance as a ‘typo.'” The court found that the typo did not negate the parties intentions in entering the contracts. The court also declined to dismiss under the first filed rule, noting that the District of Columbia court had yet to determine whether it had jurisdiction.

Practice Tip: The case management plan had been suspended while this motion to dismiss was pending. This controversy has been slow to progress. It was first filed in February 2011 and was refilled in its current form in May 2011 so it has been nearly a year at this point. The court has quickly scheduled a conference for later this week, likely attempting to move it along.
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Indianapolis, IN – Patent attorneys for Digonex Technologies, Inc. of Indianapolis, Indiana has filed a patent infringement suit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Qcue Inc., of Austin, Texas infringed patent numbers of the 8,095,424 and 8,112,303, which have been issued by the US Patent Office.

The plaintiff claims that the defendants sell dynamic pricing software products aimed at pricing tickets for events by a variety of names “Dynamic Pricing Dashboard,” “the Qcue Product,” and “software-based dynamic pricing solution” that infringe the patents held by Digonex.Digonex.jpg The technology is apparently marketed to sports teams and event promoters. The complaint alleges that Qcue has sold infringing products to Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League and NASCAR. The complaint makes two claims of patent infringement and seeks a declaration of infringement, an injunction, damages, attorney fees and costs. The complaint also alleges that Qcue has the specific intent to induce others to infringe Digonex’s patents.

Practice Tip: The complaint alleges that Qcue has referenced the two Digonex patents in a Qcue patent application pending before the US Patent Office. This, in part, is Digonex’s “evidence” of willful infringement.  Also, Patent Office’s records reveal that in prosecuting the  8,095,424 patent it submitted an Information Disclsosure Statement on September 30, 2011, after the claims had been allowed.  However, the Patent Office refused to consider the IDS becuase it did not comply with Patent Office regulations.  Therefore, there may be some question regarding the validity of this patent. 

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South Bend, IN – Judge Theresa Springmann of the Northern District of Indiana has denied a motion to strike the report of an expert who conducted an internet survey regarding the likelihood of confusion created by a trademark infringement defendant.

In January 2009, trademark attorneys for Dwyer Instruments of Michigan City, IndianaThumbnail image for hdr_main.jpg had filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that Sensocon, Inc. and Tony E. Kohl of Highland City, Florida infringed Dwyer’s federally registered trademarks that are placed on Dwyer’s pressure gauge lens covers by placing confusingly similar marks on Sensocon’s own products. The complaint also made claims of trade dress infringement, unfair competition, false designation of origin, counterfeiting, false designation of origin and copyright infringement.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and Sensocon filed a motion to strike the report of Dwyer’s expert who had performed a survey on the likelihood of confusing that is created by the alleged trademark infringement. The Court denied the motion to strike, applying the standards for admission of expert evidence under Federal Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and its progeny. The Court noted that similar surveys are routinely admitted into evidence in trademark infringement cases. The court quoted a Seventh Circuit case, stating “[w]hile there will be occasions when the proffered survey is so flawed as to be completely unhelpful to the trier of fact and therefore inadmissible, . . . such situations will be rare.” AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1993).

Practice Tip: The Court noted that Sensocon could still attack the expert’s report by calling its methods into question and asking the court to grant little weight to the report. The court also granted Sensocon permission to file a report of its own expert to rebut Dwyer’s expert.

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Indianapolis, IN – The Southern District of Indiana has granted a Motion to Dismiss in a trademark infringement lawsuit filed by Connecticut Electric, Inc. of Anderson, Indiana alleging that Pacific Coast Breaker, Inc. of McClellan, California and and PC Systems, Inc., also of California, infringed trademark registration no. 975,845 for the mark ZINSCO registered with the US Trademark Office.

The suit involves circuit breakers sold by Pacific Coast that are manufactured in China by PC and sold only to Pacific Coast. The plaintiff claimed that Pacific previously purchased its breakers from Connecticut, but stopped purchasing circuit breakers from plaintiff and began selling circuit breakers that look “identical in appearance to the ZINSCO circuit breakers.” We previously blogged about the case here.

The court granted this motion to dismiss finding a lack of personal jurisdiction because neither of the California defendants had sufficient contact with Indiana. Connecticut had argued that there were sufficient contacts with Indiana because Pacific Coast had sold 648 circuit breakers to Indiana residents over the last five years. However, the court could not distinguish whether these Indiana sales were of the allegedly infringing product or of the authentic product. At most, the court believe only $3,780 worth of sales were allegedly infringing products, which the court concluded was not substantial enough to create personal jurisdiction.

Practice Tip: The court also rejected Connecticut’s argument for personal jurisdiction because Pacific committed intentional torts of trademark infringement, trade dress infringement, unfair competition, forgery, and counterfeiting which were directed into Indiana.

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Indianapolis; IN – The Southern District of Indiana has issued a partial summary judgment in favor of Coach, Inc. and finding that Teresa Barnes, the owner of a Muncie store, had committed trademark infringement and counterfeiting for the sale of knock-off Coach goods.

In April 2011, trademark attorneys for Coach, Inc. and Coach Services, Inc. of New York, New York,Thumbnail image for Coach.jpg had filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Chaos of Muncie, Chaos on Campus, LLC and Teresa Barnes of Muncie, Indiana have been offering for sale and advertising Coach knock-off products. The complaint alleged that in February 2011, the store was offering for sale fifty-five Coach knock-off items including flip-flops, handbags, wallets, and sunglasses. The complaint made claims of trademark counterfeiting, trademark infringement, trade dress infringement, false designation of origin, false advertising, trademark dilution, copyright infringement, common law trademark infringement, common law unfair competition, forgery, and counterfeiting. We blogged about the case here.

In the court’s decision granting summary judgment, it noted that Coach had requested summary judgment and Ms. Barnes had failed to reply. The court then reviewed the elements of trademark infringement and counterfeiting, found there was no factual dispute and found that the Coach should be granted summary judgment on the issue of liability. The court has ordered Coach to submit evidence on its damages.

Practice Tip: As the court noted, “A corporate officer, director or shareholder is, as a general matter, personally liable for all torts which she authorizes or directs or in which she participates, even if she acted as an agent of the corporation and not on her own behalf.” The court also noted that “an officer of a corporation can be personally liable for trademark infringement if the officer is a moving, active conscious force behind the defendant corporation’s infringement.” Citing Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Sultana Crackers, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 899, 913-14 (E.D.N.Y.1988). In this case, the court held that Ms. Barnes is personally liable because she was the sole owner of Chaos and managed all of the store’s business decisions.

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Indianapolis, IN – Trademark attorneys for Reindeer Logistics, Inc. of Zionsville, Indiana filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging McKnight Logistics, Inc. of Temecula, California infringed trademark registration no. 3542813 for the mark REINDEER AUTO RELOCATION, which was filed with the US Trademark Office.

The complaint states that Reindeer uses its markThumbnail image for Thumbnail image for Thumbnail image for reindeer.jpg Reindeer Auto Relocation in association with “high quality auto relocation services.” The complaint alleges that the defendant, McKnight, operates a website at www.reindeerautotransport.com to advertise auto relocation services and to “consummate” transactions. Reindeer discovered this allegedly infringing website in February 2012, and its trademark attorneys sent a cease-and-desist letter to McKnight. The complaint states that McKnight continues to use the infringing website and slogan. Reindeer alleges that the only possible purpose of McKnight’s use of that website and slogan are to “illegally divert traffic from Reindeer’s site and/or to confuse the public.” The complaint makes claims of trademark infringement, violation of federal anti-cybersquatting act, federal and state unfair competition and trademark dilution. Trademark attorneys seek an injunction, an accounting of profits, damages, attorney fees and costs.

Practice Tip: The plaintiff here makes a claim under the anti-cyberquatting act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), which establishes a cause of action for registering or operating a domain name that is confusingly similar to a registered trademark or name.

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New York, NY – The Southern District of New York has dismissed an innovative patent infringement lawsuit brought by a group of organic farmers against agriculture giant Monsanto Company for lack of jurisdiction. Monsanto has filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a justiciable case or controversy and therefore the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because there was no current case or controversy.

We previously blogged about the case here. Earlier this year, patent attorneys for a group of 60 organizations and farmers, including the Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association, filed a patent lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against agriculture giant Monsanto Monsanto.jpgCompany of St. Louis, Missouri. The plaintiffs are farmers who do not want their organic seeds contaminated by the transgenic or genetically modified seeds that are produced and patented by Monsanto. They feared contamination occurs when organic seeds come into contact with genetic material from transgenic seeds through natural pollination processes, such as the wind blowing transgenic pollen to a organic farm nearby. The plaintiffs alleged that, given Monsanto’s reputation for vigorously defending its patents, they have brought “this action to protect themselves from ever being accused of infringing patents on transgenic seed.” Their complaint begins: “Society stands on the precipice of forever being bound to transgenic agriculture and transgenic food. Coexistence between transgenic seed and organic seed is impossible because transgenic seed contaminates and eventually overcomes organic seed. ” The organic farmers sought a declaratory judgment that all of Monsanto’s transgenic seed patents are invalid as injurious to public health and for numerous other reasons. “

The Organic Seed Farmers have not yet indicated whether they will appeal this decision.

Practice Tip: As the court noted in finding it did not have jurisdiction: “The Declaratory Judgment Act provides, “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C.§ 2201(a).” A plaintiffs belief that a lawsuit may be threatened, even if somewhat realistic, must typically allege some affirmative facts to support the threat in order for the court to find an actual case or controversy exists.

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Indianapolis, IN – Today is the last day of the Indiana General Assembly’s legislative session, called Sine Die, and it looks like the session will end without passing of proposed changes to the Indiana Right to Publicity law.Seal-4.jpg The bill would have clarified that a person who died before 1994 does have the publicity rights provided by the law. This bill is co-authored by Representatives <a href="http://www.in.gov/h57/" font ShelbyvilleSean Eberhart of Shelbyville and Ralph Foley of Martinsville.   As we blogged, the bill was passed by the Indiana House, but did not make it through the Senate committee.

As we have previously blogged about Indiana Right to Publicity law is considered one of the strongest in the world.

Practice Tip: The authors of this bill are free to propose it again next year. This year’s legislative session was a “short session” and the law makers were focused on several high-publicity issues. It looks like the right to publicity bill had some initial momentum, but the lawmakers ran out of time to get it passed.

Indianapolis, IN- Patent attorneys for Fostech Outdoors, LLC of Paris Crossing, Indiana filed a patent infringement suit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging Slide Fire Solutions, Inc. of Moran, Texas infringed patent no. 6101918, METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR ACCELERATING THE CYCLIC FIRING RATE OF A SEMI-AUTOMATIC FIREARM, which has been issued by the US Patent Office.

The patented technology is described as “bump fire stocks” which are a device that, when attached to certain firearms, allows the firearm to rapidly fire multiple shots. The complaint alleges that Slide makes, imports, and/or sells a product called “SSAR-15 stock” that infringes the ‘918 patent “when used in conjunction with certain firearms assemblies.” The complaint alleges that Slide actively induces other to infringe the Fostech’s patent and thatFostech.JPG Slide should be liable for contributory infringement because it knows there are no non-infringing uses for its product. The complaint makes one claim of patent infringement and seeks an injunction, damages, costs and attorney fees.

Practice Tip: The plaintiff here has made a claim of contributory patent infringement, which governed by 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and is defined as selling or importing a device “for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use”

Personal jurisdiction may be an issue in this case. The plaintiff alleges Slide regularly conducts business in Indiana and the events giving rise to the suit occurred in Indiana. However, none of the specific acts of infringement seem to have occurred in Indiana.
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