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In addition to protection under federal trademark law, trademarks can be protected under the state law of Indiana.

What does the Indiana Trademark Act protect?

The Indiana Trademark Act (I.C. §24-2) protects words, phrases, symbols or designs, or any combinations thereof when they are used to distinguish the source of the goods or services rendered by one party from the goods or services of another party. Marks are checked against other marks registered in Indiana, but not against corporate, fictitious, or assumed names. It is the duty of the applicant to perform these searches.

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A computer programmer for the Mega copyright piracy conspiracy, Andrus Nomm, 36, of Estonia, pleaded guilty recently in connection with his involvement with Megaupload.com and associated piracy websites. He was sentenced to a year and a day in federal prison for conspiring to commit felony copyright infringement.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Dana J. Boente of the Eastern District of Virginia and Assistant Director in Charge Andrew G. McCabe of the FBI’s Washington Field Office made the announcement. U.S. District Judge Liam O’Grady of the Eastern District of Virginia accepted the guilty plea and imposed the sentence.

“This conviction is a significant step forward in the largest criminal copyright case in U.S. history,” said Assistant Attorney General Caldwell. “The Mega conspirators are charged with massive worldwide online piracy of movies, music and other copyrighted U.S. works. We intend to see to it that all those responsible are held accountable for illegally enriching themselves by stealing the creative work of U.S. artists and creators.”

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Fort Wayne, Indiana – In the matter of CCT Enterprises, LLC v. Kriss USA, Inc., trade secret lawyers for the parties agreed to a protective order and submitted it to the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). United States Magistrate Judge Susan Collins of the Northern District of Indiana denied the parties’ request for a protective order, holding that the proposed order was overly broad and, thus, invalid.

Magistrate Judge Collins first noted that Rule 26(c) allows the court to enter a protective order for good cause shown. For material to be protected, it “must give the holder an economic advantage and threaten a competitive injury…business information whose release harms the holder only because the information is embarrassing or reveals weaknesses does not qualify for trade secret protection.”

In the parties’ proposed order, no categories of material were provided to restrict what discovery materials would be treated as confidential. Instead, it allowed either party “in good faith” to deem any discovery materials to be confidential. Magistrate Judge Collins held that this was overbroad and that a protective order must extend only to “properly demarcated categor[ies] of legitimately confidential information.” Moreover, a mere assertion of harm to a litigant’s competitive position would not suffice but rather “the motion must explain how.” Consequently, the court held that because a showing of good cause had not been made, the proposed protective order could not issue.

The court also noted that the proposed order provided that it would continue to be binding after the conclusion of the litigation, thus implying that the court would retain jurisdiction after the lawsuit had been resolved. The court refused to enter an order that would have such an effect. Instead, it suggested that the parties should agree contractually among themselves for the return of sensitive documents.

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How should I protect my intellectual property?

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Different types of intellectual property are protected by different means.

In the United States, patents may be available to any person who “invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Patent protection must be sought by application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). There are three types of patents:

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Evansville and Hammond, Indiana – An intellectual property attorney for Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. of Feasterville, Pennsylvania filed two Indiana lawsuits, one in the Northern District of Indiana against Robert J. Matijevich and UDL, LLC, both d/b/a L F Nortons, of Lake Station, Indiana and the other in the Southern District of Indiana against John Backes and Backes Frontier, LLC, both d/b/a New Frontier Restaurant and Bar, of Evansville, Indiana. Both lawsuits allege that defendants illegally intercepted a satellite signal and broadcast protected content.

Joe Hand Promotions, a commercial distributor of sporting events, asserts that it was granted exclusive domestic rights to the commercial distribution of the Ultimate Fighting Championship 158: Georges St. Pierre v. Nick Diaz (“program”), which was broadcast on March 16, 2013.

Two recent complaints were filed by the intellectual property lawyer for Joe Hand Promotions in federal courts in Indiana. In each complaint, both the business entity that owns the accused establishment and an individual charged with responsibility for that establishment’s operations have been named as defendants.

The allegations against the defendants include such wrongful acts as interception, reception, publication, divulgence, display, exhibition, and “tortuous” [sic] conversion of the program. Joe Hand Promotions asserts that the acts were “willful, malicious, egregious, and intentionally designed to harm Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions.” As a result of these alleged acts, defendants have been have been accused of violating 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. Each complaint also lists a count of conversion.

Joe Hand Promotions seeks statutory damages of $100,000 to $110,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; $10,000 for each violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; $50,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; compensatory and punitive damages on the claim of conversion; costs, including costs incurred for the service of process and the investigation of potential wrongdoing; and attorney’s fees.

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Indianapolis, IndianaJudge Sarah Evans Barker of the Southern District of Indiana dismissed the patent infringement claims asserted in the amended complaint of pro se Plaintiff Dennis Lee Maxberry against ITT Technical Institute (“ITT”). Also included in Maxberry’s amended complaint were claims for copyright infringement, deprivation of disabled veterans’ benefits, sabotage of Maxberry’s bachelor’s degree, stalking, sabotage of Maxberry’s employment opportunities, RICO liability against ITT and the State of Wisconsin, malicious prosecution of intellectual property actions against Maxberry, violations of various executive orders relating to Maxberry’s service in the military, violations of the Higher Education Act, and violations of a number of Maxberry’s constitutional rights.

The parties in this patent infringement litigation are Defendant ITT, an Indiana-based for-profit higher education company, and Maxberry of West Allis, Wisconsin, who had previously been enrolled in an M.B.A. graduate course at ITT. In April 2014, Maxberry, acting as his own patent attorney, sued Defendant ITT alleging multiple harms, which the court summarized as follows:

It appears that Plaintiff accuses Defendant of stealing his federal student loan money, failing to award him grades for the classes that he completed, and applying money from his educational loans towards tuition payments even after he withdrew from school. Plaintiff also accuses Defendant of “being unconscious to the plaintiff by arbitrating the contract,” searching his person or property “without a warrant and without probable cause,” using excessive force upon him, failing to provide him with “needed medical care,” “false credit testimony, mayhem on property, defamation, false imcriminalization [sic], malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and/or any other claim that may be supported by the allegations of this complaint.” Plaintiff’s Complaint makes reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986, “Title IX, and Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act,” the “False claim act,” and avers that “[t]he criminal proceeding by the defendants … [is] still pending,” but that Plaintiff “was innocent.”

The court dismissed Maxberry’s initial complaint on two grounds. First, Judge Barker noted that the Plaintiff was asking the Southern District of Indiana, a federal court, to review the rulings of a Wisconsin state court. Such a review, which would in effect place the Indiana federal court in the position of acting as a Wisconsin appellate court, was impermissible under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court further found that the assertions in the complaint were “cast in such an incoherent and confusing manner that they must be dismissed under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)] based on Plaintiff’s failure to give Defendant (as well as the Court) fair notice of what they actually are.”

The court allowed Maxberry to file an amended complaint, which ITT moved to dismiss. In this complaint, Maxberry again made multiple claims, including five claims involving patent 8,632,592, for an “expandable vertebral body replacement device and method.” Maxberry asserted that this patent encompassed a cure for cancer, an automotive window-locking device, as well as a type of computer display equipment.

The court dismissed these “facially implausible” patent infringement claims with prejudice. Judge Barker noted that, not only was it wildly improbable that a single patent covered all of the asserted functions, but the records of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office showed that the patent-in-suit was not registered to Maxberry.

The court also dismissed Maxberry’s other claims but granted him leave to reformulate those claims in a more understandable form and resubmit them.

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The U.S. Patent Office issued the following 123 patent registrations to persons and businesses in Indiana in February 2015, based on applications filed by Indiana patent attorneys:

PAT. NO. Title
D722,803 Chair 
8965805 Method and system for delivering and accessing files 
8965636 Systems and methods for detecting jack contact with ground 
8965613 System, method, and apparatus for controlling power output distribution in a hybrid power train 
8964952 System and method for self-configuring sip-capable device 
8963721 Hand hygiene compliance device 
8963195 Flexible lighting device including a heat-spreading layer 
8963079 Systems and methods for transfer of ions for analysis 
8963071 Detection of buried explosives 
8962954 Inbred sunflower (Helianthus annuus) line designated CN5110R
8962729 Soy methyl ester polystyrene blends for use in concrete 

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The U.S. Trademark Office issued the following 142 trademark registrations to persons and businesses in Indiana in February 2015 based on applications filed by Indiana trademark attorneys: 

Serial Number Reg. Number Word Mark Click to View
86376930 4692572 SERVICETOWN View
86341641 4692351 RAE SECURITY View
86341637 4692350 RAE SECURITY View
86339607 4692203 THE AURORA View
86338386 4692095 H View
86338000 4692065 VIRTUAL LANDFILL View
86335763 4691944 EMPOWERING BEAN COUNTERS TO BECOME BETTER ENTREPRENEURS View
86335762 4691943 RWC360 View

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Indianapolis, Indiana – An Indiana patent attorney for Sherrill, Inc. of Greensboro, North Carolina (“Sherrill”) filed a patent infringement complaint in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that TreeStuff, Inc. of Indianapolis, Indiana infringed Patent No. 5,887,577 entitled “Apparatus for Propelling a Projectile,” which has been registered by the U.S. Patent Office.

Plaintiff Sherrill asserts ownership by assignment to United States Patent No. 5,887,577 (“the ‘577 Patent”), which was issued to William T. Sherrill in 1999. It claims that TreeStuff manufactures, uses, offers for sale, and/or sells a product that infringes upon that patent, namely TreeStuff’s Stein Tekichu Throw Weight Launcher.

In November 2014, Sherrill sent a cease-and-desist letter to TreeStuff. In that letter, it identified the ‘577 Patent, stated that the Stein Tekichu Throw Weight Launcher infringed upon certain claims of the ‘577 Patent and demanded that TreeStuff cease all infringing activities.

Sherrill claims that TreeStuff did not respond to this letter but instead continued to use, offer to sell, and/or sell the accused product. Sherrill contends that, by engaging in these activities, TreeStuff has directly infringed, and will continue to directly infringe, at least claim 8 of the ‘577 Patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) literally and/or under the doctrine of equivalents. Sherrill also suggests in its complaint that it is “reasonable to infer” that TreeStuff also intended to induce infringement. TreeStuff has also been accused of contributory infringement. Sherrill asserts that TreeStuff’s infringement has been and continues to be willful and deliberate.

In its complaint, filed by an Indiana patent attorney, Sherrill asks that the court:

• Declare that the ‘577 Patent was duly and legally issued, is valid and is enforceable;

• Enter judgment that defendant TreeStuff has infringed at least claim 8 of the ‘577 Patent;

• Enter judgment that defendant TreeStuff has induced infringement of at least claim 8 of the ‘577 Patent;

• Enter judgment that defendant TreeStuff has contributed to infringement of at least claim 8 of the ‘577 Patent;

• Enter a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining defendant TreeStuff and its agents from any further sales or use of their infringing products and any other infringement of claims of the ‘577 Patent, whether direct or indirect, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 283;

• Award damages to compensate Sherrill for defendant TreeStuff’s infringement of the claims of the ‘577 Patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284;

• Award enhanced damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284;

• Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and costs to plaintiff Sherrill in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 284; and

• Deem the case to be “exceptional” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 285, entitling plaintiff Sherrill to an award of its reasonable attorney fees, expenses and costs in this action.

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Washington, D.C. – The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a royalty award in Gaylord v. United States for copyright infringement committed by the United States Postal Service.

Frank Gaylord, a World War II veteran and renowned sculptor, created The Column, consisting of nineteen stainless steel statues depicting a squad of soldiers on patrol. This work, completed and dedicated in 1995, formed a central part of the Korean War Veterans Memorial located on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. For his efforts in creating the work, Gaylord was paid $775,000.

Shortly after the completion of the work, an amateur photographer named John Alli visited the Memorial during a heavy snowstorm and photographed The Column. In 2002, the United States Postal Service decided to issue a stamp to commemorate the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War armistice. It settled on Alli’s photo of The Column for the stamp face and paid Alli a one-time fee for the right to use his photo. The Postal Service made no payment to Gaylord.

Gaylord sued for copyright infringement. The United States Court of Federal Claims acted as the trial court in the litigation. Twice prior to the instant appeal, an appeal was made to the Federal Circuit, first in 2010 and again in 2012. In Gaylord I, the Federal Circuit held that the government was liable to Gaylord for copyright infringement. Upon remand, the Court of Federal Claims awarded Gaylord a total of $5,000 to compensate for the infringement of his copyright. This award was vacated by the Federal Circuit in Gaylord II and the lawsuit remanded with instructions to “determine the fair market value of a license for Mr. Gaylord’s work based on a hypothetical negotiation with the government.”

Upon remand, the trial court split the calculations of damages for the infringement into three categories: (1) stamps used to send mail; (2) commercial merchandise featuring an image of the stamp; and (3) unused stamps purchased by collectors. The parties agreed that no damages would be paid for stamps used to send mail and that a royalty of 10% of revenues would be appropriate for commercial merchandise featuring the copyrighted work.

The only disputed issue was the appropriate measure of copyright infringement damages for the stamps purchased by collectors. The lower court determined that the Postal Service received $5.4 million in revenue, which was deemed “almost pure profit,” from these sales. It then found that an appropriate copyright royalty would be 10%, or $540,000.

At issue in this latest appeal, Gaylord III, is whether this royalty was appropriate. The Federal Circuit applied the “hypothetical negotiation” analysis in reviewing the Court of Federal Claims’ award to Gaylord, stating that “actual damages for copyright infringement may be based on a reasonable royalty representing the fair market value of a license covering the defendant’s use.” Determining that “fair market value,” in turn could be done employing a valuation tool used in the context of patent infringement litigation: a hypothetical negotiation that would determine “the reasonable license fee on which a willing buyer and a willing seller would have agreed for the use taken by the infringer.”

The Federal Circuit held that the lower court neither committed clear error nor abused its discretion in arriving at a 10% royalty rate affirmed the award of $540,000.

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